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2ABSTRACT
‘Historical development toward a universal community of civilization,’ said Rosa 
Luxemburg, ‘will, like all social development, take place in the midst of a contradiction... ’ 
Indeed, on its face it seems that the simultaneous consolidation and spreading (within a 
progressing global order) of nationalist particularism, on the one hand, and of the support 
for democracy, on the other, do constitute such a contradiction. But is this really the case? 
Are nationalism and democracy mutually exclusive, or are they reconcilable after all?
In this project, to paraphrase Rousseau's words at the beginning of The Social Contract, 
it is my purpose to enquire whether it is possible to reconcile nationalism with democracy, 
taking nationalism as it is and democracy as it may be. The dissertation shows that both 
democracy (as we commonly understand it today) and nationalism are strongly embedded 
in modem conditions (primarily capitalism) and their inherent contradictions, namely, the 
development of the autonomous self, on the one hand, and the loss o f community and 
prevalence of identity crisis, on the other. Liberal theories of democracy, the thesis 
suggests, celebrate the development of the autonomous self but largely neglect or ignore 
the problem of identity crisis, hence contribute precisely to moral and political tendencies 
they normally reject. Nationalism and its academic sympathisers, though, may supply a 
solution to identity crisis but too easily or carelessly sacrifice individual liberty and equality 
on the altar of renewed Gemeinschaft-hke communities. What is urgently needed, I argue, 
is a form of democracy that could transcend the contradictions latent in modem capitalism 
and deliver a solution to identity crisis and alienation without subverting the values of 
individual equality and liberty. Such a democracy, it is concluded, must be a socialist one 
in which the means of identity production are collectively owned.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 GLOBAL CAPITALISM, NATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
Modernity, suggested Marx, is better understood as the kind of civilisation formed by the 
domination of the capitalist mode of production. The dominance of capitalism (or, rather, 
industrial capitalism), Marx observed, involves three interrelated trends of expansion, each 
of which constantly accelerates due to the rapid development of the productive forces 
inherent in capitalism: the consolidation of ever bigger industries at the expense o f small 
manufacturers and the self-producing peasant household, urbanisation, and globalisation. 
As he put it in the Communist Manifesto, there is no need to abolish ‘the property o f the 
petty artisan and of the small peasant...the development o f industry has to a great extent 
already destroyed it; and is still destroying it daily.’1 As far as urbanisation is concerned, 
‘The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule o f the town. It has created enormous 
cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus 
rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.’2 And in regard 
to globalisation, Marx observed that
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the
XK. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx-Selected Writings, ed. D. McLellan 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977; infra: MSW), p. 232.
2Ibid., p. 225.
7whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish 
connections everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country....In place of the old local and 
national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal 
interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The 
intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one­
sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the 
numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the 
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations 
into civilization.3
Global capitalism, Marx added, not only reduces national differences, but also diminishes 
conflicts and hostility between peoples. In his own words, ‘National differences and 
antagonisms betweenpeoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development 
of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode 
of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.’4
3Ibid., pp. 224-225.
4Ibid., p. 235.
8But was Marx right in his depiction? To a great extent he was: despite the uneven scope 
and pace it takes in different regions and societies, the movement towards ever bigger 
businesses is a paramount tendency nowadays; gigantic corporations and firms (industrial 
and others, e.g., communication companies and networks) often merge and cartelise and 
firmly winnow out small enterprises, retail chains and shopping centres succeed small shops 
and stalls, and where the movement of people from rural to urban areas (on a world scale 
a prevalent tendency in itself) is still limited, a growing number of the villagers there 
nonetheless become city-based labourers.5 Globalisation, in its turn (and therein the 
economic ‘universal interdependence of nations’), is a bare feet that nobody could seriously 
deny: whether one likes this feet or not is, o f course, another question. To be sure, the state 
still retains some power and to some extent still decides (despite the globalisation of capital 
-  the internationalisation of both industry and finance -  and the dictates o f the IMF, WTO, 
World Bank and others of that kind) how to distribute its domestic resources and wealth.6 
Further,
...the role of the state has grown substantially since the early 1970s; state policies have 
become increasingly decisive on the international front, not more futile. Governments have 
become more and more involved in active management of monetary policy and interest 
rates in order to condition exchange-rate fluctuations and short-term capital flows. They
5See for example the details regarding movement of labour power from the countryside to the city in 
East Asia in the World Bank Group, Annual Report 1997: East Asia and Pacific (Washington DC: World 
Bank Group, 1997), table 4.
6See A. Giddens, The Third Way (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot, 2000), pp. 51-56. (In Hebrew).
9have become actually and potentially decisive in bargaining over production and 
investment agreements... [Ejveryone including transnational corporations has become 
increasingly dependent upon co-ordinated state intervention for restructuring and resolution 
of the underlying dynamics of crisis.7
But, as B. Barry remarks, the distributive ability o f the state in our global era is indeed more 
limited than before: ‘There is unquestionably some validity in the claim that the ability o f 
the nation-state to transform market outcomes in line with an egalitarian political agenda 
is more circumscribed then it was in the era of exchange controls and import quotas. ’8 And 
although the state can, and in feet does, restructure and resolve the underlying dynamics 
of economic crises, it cannot, by itselfj avoid or prevent them altogether and produce 
smooth economic growth. Indeed, a butterfly that flaps its wings in the stock exchange in 
Singapore may easily bring a hurricane to the US, flood to Brazil and sirocco to Italy. Thus, 
as J. Gray put it, everyone is ‘threatened by a return of the boom-bust cycle... [because] 
when capitalism is truly global, as it is today, no economy can be insulated from turmoil 
elsewhere in the world.’9
7D. M. Gordon, ‘The global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?’, in New Left Review 
168 (1988), pp. 63-64. As Giddens adds, ‘the nation state does not vanish with the globalisation, and the 
general scope of state rule does not shrink, but expands.’ Giddens, The Third Way, p. 55.
8B. Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 8.
9J. Gray, ‘Gordon’s Little Lamb’, in the Guardian, July 31, 1998.
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The question we are yet to answer, then, is, Does globalisation also reduce national and 
cultural differences and antagonisms, as Marx asserted? Again, as far as national and 
cultural differences are concerned, I believe that Marx was quite correct, or at least not 
grossly wrong. Globalisation, argues D. Held, does not involve the movement of goods and 
capital alone, but also ‘the flow of communication, the interchange of cultures and the 
passage of people.’ And the spread of globalisation, he adds, takes place through different 
‘dimensions o f activity -  technological, organizational, administrative and legal, among 
others...’10 As J. Waldron elaborates, these different ‘structures o f action and interaction, 
dependence and interdependence, effortlessly transcend national and ethnic boundaries and 
allow men and women the opportunity to pursue common and important projects under 
conditions of goodwill, cooperation, and exchange throughout the world. ’11 Obviously, such 
associations and their activities influence and transform the structures, relations and ideas 
within nations and cultures, and at the same time are to a great extent the outcome o f these 
structures, relations and ideas. In short, exchange of practices and ideas between nations 
and cultures do prevail in our world and blur some of the differences between them, 
although diversity does exist and is definitely here to stay. Practically, then, cultures and 
nations, to paraphrase E. Gellner’s words, are not islands.12
10D. Held, ’Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?’, in Prospects for Democracy, ed. 
D. Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 39.
n J. Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, in The Rights o f Minority 
Cultures, ed. W. Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 102.
12E. Gellner, ‘Anything Goes’, in Zionism: A Contemporary Controversy, eds. P. Ginossar & A  Bareli
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Many (perhaps most) of these inter- and transnational associations and organisations (e.g., 
Amnesty International, UNICEF, the international socialist movement, Doctors Without 
Borders, some ecological movements) are formed and characterised by their commitment 
to advance human interests, relieve suffering and satisfy needs globally. Taking into account 
the highly heterogeneous national composition of these movements and associations, it 
seems to be a bare fact that in all societies -  across cultures, nations, states and different 
communities13 — there are people who are devoted to the promotion and protection of 
universal human rights, individual equality, just distribution of resources and universalist 
democratic politics.14 It is therefore not only that cultures and nations are not islands, but 
in a way (to take up Gellner’s metaphor) they constitute one land, so to speak, in which 
democratic practices and ideas are widely performed and accepted, though rarely 
institutionalised, constitutionalised or implemented politically in a satisfactory way, if ever.15
(Sde-Boker: the Ben-Gurion Research Center, 1996), p. 119. (In Hebrew).
13Note that nations are presented here as separate structures and by no means identified as cultures, 
states, or even communities.
14Democracy, I take it, is inherently universalist. But what exactly this universalism entails (both 
morally and politically) is rather controversial. For the moment, then, I will confine this universalism to 
a very basic common intuition, according to which democracy requires 'that the rights to engage fully in 
political life must be extended, with very few if any exceptions, to the entire population of adults 
permanently residing in a country.’ R. A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1998), p. 90. Later on I will elaborate on this general idea and show what full engagement in political 
life exactly means, what kind of institutional arrangements the right to so participate entails, and how 
democracy should decide who is entitled to permanently reside in a country in the first place. It will thus 
also become clear what fundamentals are involved in the universalism of democracy.
15For a relevant discussion, see S. Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2004). (In 
Hebrew).
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The main difficulty, then, is Marx’s assertion regarding the disappearance of national 
conflicts and antagonisms. As we all know, the 20th century has experienced the most 
violent, not to say genocidal, nationalist particularism, seclusion and exclusion, bigotry and 
hostility ever (hopefully more than coming centuries as well).16 Serbia’s atrocities in 
Kosovo, Russia’s terror in Chechnya, China's brutality towards the Uighur population, the 
slaughter in Rwanda, Burma’s oppression o f the Muslim Rohingya in Arakan state, 
Indonesia’s horrors in Bast Timor and Aceh, and Israel’s ferocities in the 1967 occupied 
Palestinian territories, all unfortunately make C. J. Hayes’s famous words from 1931 very 
topical:
We do know that as an accompaniment of this [industrial; O.C.] revolution there has been 
a rapid growth of a kind of economic internationalism—a huge expansion of trade in 
goods, persons, and ideas across national political frontiers. But it is, or should be, 
apparent also that there have been during the same hundred and forty years and down at 
least to the present moment a parallel diffusion and intensification of nationalism, so that 
the more trade has expanded between nations, the more within each nation various sorts 
of nationalism have been intensified and recently have given rise to the most intolerant sort, 
integral nationalism. It seems paradoxical that political nationalism should grow stronger 
and more virulent as economic internationalism increases. Yet the former is as much a feet 
in contemporary society as is the latter...Industrial revolution...[o]f itself...is neither 
nationalist nor internationalist. It is essentially mechanical and material. It has merely
16C£ J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001), p. 21. 
(In Hebrew).
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provided improved means and greater opportunities for the dissemination of any ideas 
which influential individuals entertain....[W]hile the newer industrial machinery has been 
utilized for international ends, it has also been utilized, even more, for nationalist purposes. 
The obvious international fruits of the Industrial Revolution must not blind our eyes to its 
intensely nationalist contributions and implications.17
‘Historical development toward a universal community of civilization,’ said R. Luxemburg, 
‘will, like all social development, take place in the midst o f a contradiction...’18 Indeed, on 
the face of it it would seem that the simultaneous consolidation and spread (within a 
progressing global order) of nationalist particularism, on the one hand, and of the support 
for democracy, on the other, do constitute such a contradiction. But is this really the case? 
Are nationalism and democracy mutually exclusive, or are they reconcilable after all?
1.2 THE THESIS
In this project, if I may paraphrase Rousseau's words at the beginning of The Social 
Contract, it is my purpose to enquire whether it is possible to reconcile nationalism with 
democracy, taking nationalism as it is and democracy as it may be.19 In analysing
17C. J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution o f Modern Nationalism (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1968), pp. 236-237.
18R. Luxemburg, ‘The National Question and Autonomy’, in The National Question (New York & 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 129.
19See J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in Political Writings (Wisconsin: the University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 3.
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nationalism ‘as it is’, I will be referring to actual nationalist movements and thinkers -  what 
Barry calls ’real-world nationalists'20 -  and to the ideas, goals and activities that they 
commonly share and pursue. In contrast, in talking of democracy ‘as it may be’, I (naturally) 
do not intend to examine existing societies and regimes. Instead, I would like to develop 
a normative theory of democracy that could tackle the urgent (and indeed dynamic) issues 
that we all now face better than the current (pathological) institutions and other 
(problematic) theories, and by reference to which actual societies should be assessed and 
amended.21
Now two related questions may be raised here. First, am I not being too abstract here in 
taking democracy as it may be? Am I not, that is, building castles in the air that bear no 
relation to reality? The answer is decidedly in the negative: in analysing democracy as it may 
be my intention is by no means to ignore current theories and conceptions of democracy, 
but to reveal their logical implications out of which my own theory will emerge. In other 
words, my own theory will not ignore the current democratic wisdom but will examine the 
real possibilities and potentialities that are inherent in it and try to suggest their actualisation 
and radicalisatioa The other question, then, might be, What about nationalism? Am I not,
20See B. Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, in NOMOSXLI: Global Justice, 
eds. I. Shapiro & L. Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
21For the general difference between empirical and normative theories of democracy, see R. A. Dahl, 
Democracy, Liberty, and Equality (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), p. 229. For a detailed 
discussion, see Dahl, On Democracy, parts II & III.
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in examining it as it is, ignoring its own possibilities and potentialities? It will be shown 
during this study that the present characteristics o f nationalism, as plainly expressed by 
those who are commonly regarded as nationalists (Le., real-world nationalists), and the 
nationalist ideal are in fact one and the same. In that sense, the possibilities and potentialities 
o f nationalism are already materialised in its current ideas and practices, as opposed to 
democracy in which, as said, there is still a gap to be filled between its present features and 
its paragon. Putting it another way, whereas the innate characteristics of democracy can still 
be expanded into a new and higher form of democracy, the intrinsic qualities of nationalism 
cannot be transformed into any superior nationalist model without losing the very meaning 
of the term or the common intuition about it.22
As Held correctly argues, under prevailing conditions, especially the circumstances of 
globalisation,
...the meaning and place o f democratic politics, and of the contending models of 
democracy, have to be rethought in relation to a series o f overlapping local, regional and 
global processes and structures...Democracy has to come to terms with all...these 
developments and their implications for national and international power centres. If  it fails 
to do so, it is likely to become ever less effective in determining the shape and limits of 
political activity. The international form and structure o f politics and civil society have,
22 A  very similar point is made by N. Bobbio: ‘The natural state of democratic system,’ he writes, ‘is 
(me of a constant change. Democracy is dynamic, as opposed to despotism that is static, resembles itself and 
always substantive.’ N. Bobbio, The Future o f Democracy (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2003), p. xi. (In Hebrew). 
I shall show that nationalism is equally static, resembles itself and always substantive.
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accordingly, to be built into the foundations of democratic thought and practice.23
I believe that radical changes in our understanding o f democracy and the implementation 
of a new form of democratic politics are also required in order to confront the grave(yard) 
problem of nationalism. I will thus not examine the relations between nationalism and those 
actual political systems commonly called democratic. The question, rather, will be, How 
democracy -  given its internal structure and qualities -  should treat nationalism, given its 
own internal structure and qualities? Should democracy adjust itself to nationalism, 
accommodate it in one way or another, or perhaps reject it altogether?
As Hayes rightly suggested, modernity (globalisation in particular) could, in principle, 
spread any ideas. But would it not be correct to say that modernity also created new ideas, 
not only spread, as it were, ideas from a premodem available repertoire? And would it not 
be also correct to add that both nationalism and democracy are such ideas (and, incidentally, 
practices) that modernity in feet created? The modernity of democracy, I believe, is 
unquestionable. Indeed, the term ‘democracy’ was coined in ancient Greece to designate 
‘rule by the people’ or, in Dahl’s words, ‘popular government.’ But as Dahl himself shows, 
neither the existence of the term nor of past popular governments (e.g., in classical Rome 
and in some Italian city-states during 11th-13th centuries) suggests that current democratic 
ideas and practices are theoretically or practically identical to them. Clearly enough, given
23Held, ‘Democracy: From City-states’, p. 39.
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its universalism (even if in the minimalist sense we currently employ), democracy, as we 
understand it today, is quite new: it represents ‘not only a new type of political system but 
a new kind of popular government, a type of “democracy” that had never existed’ until the 
20th century.24 What seems to me to be wholly new in modem democracy is not necessarily 
the representative form it takes but rather, as already noted, its universalism -  the idea that 
‘rule of the people’ means rule by all the people, i.e., that the sovereign people consists of 
‘the entire population of adults permanently residing in a country.’ Modem democracy, 
then, is supposedly totally inclusive and therefore qualitatively different from old forms of 
democracy: it involves a thoroughly new kind of social relations and institutions. This new 
type of democracy, it will be argued, is a by-product of the rise of ethical individualism (the 
moral priority of the individual over the community), itself an outgrowth of modernity.
But what about nationalism? Is this a modem phenomenon as well? Chapters 2 and 3 
concentrate on that question. Chapter 2 critically reviews the primordialist-modernist debate 
and offers an alternative theory to both. It then continues with a detailed analysis o f 
premodem communities and the individual identity in them, as a background to Chapter 3's 
study of the rise of nationalism and democracy. Chapter 3, then, explores both the causes 
and the consequences of the decline of premodem communities. It will be suggested that 
the modem conditions were responsible for this decline, and that it was (and still is) their 
internal contradictions that gave rise to as distinct doctrines as nationalism (described as
24See Dahl, On Democracy, ch. 2 & passim. The citation is from p. 90.
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ethically collectivist) and democracy (portrayed as ethically individualist).
Chapter 4 takes up the issues of the nationalist conception of the nation and national 
identity formation, and looks into their relations to ethnicity. It will be argued that the 
affinity that scholars normally find between nationalism and ethnicity is radically different 
not only from the ways that nationalists themselves see it but also from the common 
intuition people in general have about nationalism.
Chapters 5 and 6 conclude the discussion on nationalism by focussing on the question of 
national self-determination: the nationalist understanding of this concept, its view on the 
right to national self-determination and the political role o f self-determination are dealt with 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concentrates on the significance that nationalists ascribe to the 
notion of homeland and their attitude to foreigners as well as to conational political and 
ideological rivals. On the whole, Chapters 4-6 try to show that nationalism is inherently 
oppressive, not only towards foreigners but also towards conationals.
A theory of democracy is elaborated in Chapters 7-11. Chapter 7 addresses some key issues 
concerning democracy such as popular sovereignty, decision-making procedures, public 
deliberation, majority rule, power and equality. A special weight is given here to the 
problems inherent in unfair choice situations which democracy, it will be argued, ought to 
surmount. Chapter 8 examines the social and political conditions that are required in order
19
to deliver fair choice situations for all, i.e., for democracy to prevail. It then moves on to 
ponder over a few conceptions o f the nation that have been commonly employed by 
democratic theorists, and concludes in outlining a democratic conception of the nation that 
may be consistent with the democratic requirements that were depicted before. The subject 
of national self-determination is addressed in Chapters 9 and 10: while Chapter 9 
concentrates on the democratic understanding of the idea of self determination in general, 
Chapter 10 focusses on the democratic bearing on the right to national self determination, 
national territory and foreigners.
Chapter 11 outlines an argument in favour of socialist democracy:25 it maintains that such 
form of democracy involves what we shall call ‘the collective ownership o f the means of 
identity production’ which practically enables (among other things) a free and equal public 
discourse throughout the process of national identity formation (which, in principle, is never 
deemed to have finished). The idea is that, socialist democracy is not merely the fu ll form 
of democracy (understood as liberal democracy being sublated), but also the only 
sustainable bulwark against nationalism.
25In contrast to different theories of democratic socialism and social democracy, socialist democracy 
implies that socialism is a precondition for democracy and not the other way around. It will be indicated, 
however, that socialist democracy does not bear any affinity with communitarianism nor does it adhere to 
any substantive conception of the good.
20
‘The old is dying and the new cannot be bom,’26 said Gramsci. We are living in an era in 
which old conceptions of democracy are dying and new ones are yet to be born 
institutionally, that is, to materialise and be entrenched into the basic structure of actual 
societies and regimes. A normative theory of democracy, like the one I wish to offer here, 
then, is not only an observation or reflection upon reality. It also purports to be a call and 
prescription for action. It is indeed up to us as human beings to determine what will be bom 
out of the current conditions, where we are bound for and how things are to be pursued: 
globalisation could indeed spread any ideas, but it is still up to us to decide which ideas will 
eventually win the political agenda. As E. Caird, a British idealist, noted (already in 1897), 
The horizon of politics has widened, so that the ebb and flow of reforming or conservative 
influences in every nation become part of one great movement. And we can see that these 
causes will go on operating in still more decisive ways in the future, till it shall become 
impossible to avoid a kind of co-operation and even union of all nations, of which we now 
see only the beginnings...[T]he problem of the modem world is to turn these necessities 
into freedom. It is, in other words, to make them the means of improving our lives, instead 
of allowing them to crush us.27
In the face of modem conditions (especially globalisation), 1 would argue, old forms of
26A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1992), p.
276.
27E. Caird, ‘The Present State of the Controversy Between Individualism and Socialism’, in The 
British Idealists, ed. D. Boucher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 192 (italic original).
21
democracy deserve euthanasia, but the yet to be bom should already be nourished and 
protected from nationalist obstetricians, as it were: ultimately, as Luxemburg famously put 
it, we do have to choose between socialism and barbarism.
22
2 
IDENTITY AND PREMODERN COMMUNITIES
2.1 PRIMORDIALISM AND MODERNISM
More than once, when journalists had asked him about his origins, the Russian nationalist 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii used to answer: my mother is Russian and my father is a lawyer (the 
common rumour is that Zhirinovskii's father is Jewish). This answer implies fewthings: first, 
you may be a Russian citizen or inhabitant, but this alone does not make you a member of 
the Russian nation. Second, to be a citizen or inhabitant in the state of Russia without being 
a member of the Russian nation, at least as a politician, is illegitimate. These concepts of 
habitation or residence, citizenship, nationality, state, legitimacy, and the connections 
between them are essential for the exploration of the relations between nationalism and 
democracy, and will be discussed in length later in this study. But taken within his broader 
expressed system of beliefs and political views, Zhirinovskii’s answer also involves two 
additional aspects, which altogether constitute his apparent conception of the nation upon 
which his political agenda is built.
First, if Jews who live in Russia are not, as it were, real or authentic Russians, it is not 
because they did not choose to be Russians or to identify themselves and be considered as 
such. Rather, they simply cannot be Russians because they were bom into another 
nationality, Le., the Jewish one, and cannot alter their belonging by an aspiration or act of
23
wilL In short, national membership is regarded here as a given status, not a volitional or 
chosen one. Nationality as a given status, however, also supposes (at least in Zhirinovskii’s 
case) that the nation is a fixed group that has existed for centuries, if not from time 
immemorial, and to which one belongs in virtue of one’s ancestors. Thus, ‘persons who are 
Jewish by descent...but they have no connection whatsoever of their choosing -  religiously, 
culturally, philanthropically or emotionally -  with the Jewish people...are [still] Jewish only 
because a label has been attached to them (by the non-Jewish world) which they have not 
actively sought to remove or, having tried, have failed.’1
It is the second proposition which I would like to refer to now: is the nation ’as old as 
history,’ as W. Bagehot claimed,2 or at least the “natural”, relatively uninterrupted 
continuation and development of old cultural units and communities and the manifestation 
of their, as it were, maturity? Or is the nation after all a pure modem phenomenon, the
:M. Davis, I  Am A Jew (London & Oxford: Nowbrays, 1978), p. 61. It must be emphasised, though, 
that such a label is not attached solely, let alone universally, by the ‘non-Jewish world’. Many persons who 
were born into Jewish families but do not have any affinity with Jewishness are still considered as Jews 
primarily by self-identified Jews or Jewish institutions, not by non-Jews. Paradoxically, it is in the state of 
Israel where such a label is especially prominent and legally attached to individuals: a Jew, according to 
the Israeli law, is basically a person whose mother is a Jew (and, accordingly, whose own mother is a Jew), 
not a person who simply identifies himself as a Jew. Consequently, a bom-Jew who does not identify 
himself as such is still considered by the state as being Jewish, and therefore cannot, e.g., marry or be 
buried in Israel but in a Jewish orthodox ceremony. Equally, persons who identify themselves as Jews but 
their mother is not a Jew and were not converted into the Jewish religion by a recognised authority, are 
legally labeled as non-Jews. Not in vain a respected Israeli sociologist argued that some laws in Israel 
‘define the boundaries of Judaism...more or less in accordance with the broader definition oftheNuremberg 
laws.’ B.Kimmerling, Neither Democratic nor Jewish', in Newsfrom Within 13/2 (Jerusalem & Bethlehem: 
AIC -  Alternative Information Centre, 1997), p. 29.
2W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), p. 49.
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substitution of premodem loyalties and communities that modernity undermined rather than 
their continuation? It is around this question that scholars of nationalism are divided into 
two main camps, primordialism and modernism. Primordialists, it is normally assumed, 
claim that nations are the crystallisation and developed form of premodem definite groups, 
which A. D. Smith, J. Armstrong and W. Connor refer to as ethnic groups or ethnies? 
Premodem ethnic groups, then, are thus seen as ‘embryonic’ (Smith), ‘incipient’ 
(Armstrong) or ‘potential’ (Connor) nations, which preceded nationalism both as modem 
ideology and movement. Modernists, as the term itself suggests, are taken to argue that 
nations are strictly the creation of nationalism; and since nationalism is itself a modem 
phenomenon, the nations it creates cannot be but modem: a departure, even a break, from 
premodem communities. As E. Gellner put it, nationalism ‘invents nations where they do 
not exist,’4 and it ‘is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural 
and given units [i.e., premodem cultures and ethnies; O.C]. It is, on the contrary, the 
crystallization of new units [i.e., nations; O.C], suitable for the conditions now 
prevailing...’5
But is the dispute between primordialists and modernists so substantial as it may appear and
3 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995); J. Armstrong, 
Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1982); W. Connor, 
Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 40-41,103 & ch. 8.
4E. Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 168.
5E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 49.
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is normally claimed to be? Is there any dispute at all? Consider for example the following 
citations and paraphrases, for now deliberately without references:
1. Nations are ‘a product of European thought in the last 150 years...[Yet] 
nationalism derives the greater part o f its strength [to create nations] from the 
existence of ancient communal and religious ties...’
2. ‘It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around. 
Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of 
cultures or cultural weahh...[Nations as new units are thus] using as their raw 
material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist 
world.’
3. ‘...why, having lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this 
particular type of replacement [i.e., the nation]. One reason may be that, in many 
parts of the world, states and national movements could mobilize certain variants 
of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, 
as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modem 
states and nations. I shall call these bonds ‘proto-national’.’
4. ‘...traditions are invented and social realities constructed...[P]olitical and
economic elites who make use of ethnic group attributes are constrained by the
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beliefs and values which exist within the group and which limit the kinds of appeals 
which can be made... [T]he ethnic community or nation created in this way does not 
necessarily constitute an entirely new entity but one that has been transformed...A 
nation, therefore, may be seen as a particular type of ethnic community or, rather, 
as an ethnic community politicized...9
5. The nation is an imagined community that was created ‘towards the end of the 
eighteenth century.’ But this modem phenomenon of nationalism still ‘has to be 
understood by aligning it...with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of 
which -  as well as against which -  it came into being.’
6. ‘Usually, there has been some ethnic basis for the construction of modem 
nations...Nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modem 
phenomenon, even if, as we shall see, the ‘modem nation’ in practice incorporates 
several features of pre-modem ethnie and owes much to the general model of 
ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the ‘modem 
era...[Ethnicity] sets limits to elite attempts to manipulate and mobilize populations 
in their strategies of national construction.’
7. ‘...the key to the significance of phenomena of ethnic identification is persistence
rather than genesis ofparticular patterns... [Widespread intense ethnic identification,
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although expressed in other forms, is recurrent...One result has been that modem 
nationalist thought...has sought permanent “essences” of national character instead 
o f recognizing the fundamental but shifting significance of boundaries for human 
identity... [There was a] slow emergence of nations in the premodem period. The 
primary characteristic o f ethnic boundaries is attitudinal. In their origins and in their 
most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their 
subjects...Acting through nostalgia, an earlier life pattern conditions the attitudes 
of subsequent generations...Nostalgia was not just a folk memoiy...Like most 
identity themes, it was systematically manipulated by elites.’
8. ‘An ethnic group may be readily discerned by an anthropologist or other outside 
observer, but until the members are themselves aware of the group’s uniqueness, it 
is merely an ethnic group and not a nation... [T]hose who have successfully 
mobilized nations have understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense 
of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it... [Accordingly, a nation] 
is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related.’
It seems to me that these arguments constitute different nuances of a similar view regarding 
nationalism and the emergence of nations rather than a substantial dispute. Could one easily 
identify, if ever, which of these arguments were made by primordialists and which by 
modernists? I do not think so. The feet remains, though, that the first five points were made
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by modernists6 and points 6-8 were put forward by primordialists.7 In that sense, D. D. 
Laitin is totally right in indicating the blindness of these schools, although their blindness 
is not, as Laitin implies, to the partial truth that each school represents but rather to the 
similarities between them and the beliefs they actually share.8
How should we assess these similarities and, even if quite minor, disagreements that still do 
exist between modernists and primordialists? I believe that the theory of path-dependence, 
which is normally used to assess economic and institutional change, will be quite useful 
here.
A
2.2 PATH-DEPENDENCE AND PRIMORDERNISM
The very idea of path-dependence is not monolithic and is interpreted in various ways. Here, 
however, I would like to refer only to two of these interpretations, the first contrasts path- 
dependence with path-shaping approach, whereas the second places path-shaping within the 
theory of path-dependence. The first interpretation thus argues that,
6See, respectively, E. Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 68 & 71; Gellner, Nations 
and Nationalism, pp. 55 & 49; E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 46; P. R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (New Delhi, Newbury 
Park & London: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 14,16, 17 & 20; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities 
(London & New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 7 & 12.
7See, respectively, Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 17 & 18; Armstrong, Nations before 
Nationalism, pp. 4,7,16 & 17; Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 103, 197 & 202.
8D. D. Laitin, Identity in Formation (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 20. 
Incidentally, Laitin himself is rather blind to these similarities and ultimately refers to a debate that 
basically does not exist
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Path-dependency suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of current 
possibilities and/or options in institutional innovation...At some earlier time, when different 
routes were possible, a specific developmental path was instituted; and it then tends to be 
re-established...This position does not exclude various developmental leaps, lags, or 
reversals. But these are seen as pro-given possibilities in what could be regarded as a game 
of institutional ‘snakes and ladders9...Conversely, the path-shaping approach implies that 
social forces can intervene in current conjunctures and actively re-articulate them so that 
new trajectories become possible...[T]he path-shaping approach implies that, within 
specific, historically given, and potentially malleable limits, social forces can redesign the 
‘board* on which they are moving and reformulate the rules of the game.9
Both path-dependence and path-shaping approaches, then, agree that (i) the past matters 
and sets limits on present possibilities, and (ii) within the limits o f the past there is still 
enough room for social forces to intervene, change and innovate by exploiting the different 
possibilities the past bequeathed. But while path-dependence asserts that these changes and 
innovations are limited by a fixed structural path, necessarily take place within it and cannot 
exceed or transform it, path-shaping argues that changes and innovations within a path can 
eventually exceed and transform the path itself.10 The differences between path-dependence
9J. Hausner, B. Jessop & K. Nielsen, ‘Institutional Change in Post-Socialism*, in Strategic Choice and 
Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism, ed. Hausner et al. (Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 6-7.
10Qne may recall here Hegel’s and Marx’s ‘dialectical law’ of die transformation of quantity into 
quality -  the process by which gradual changes within a system results in a sudden change of the system 
itself As Hegel illustrated, a man who successively plucks single hairs from his head undergoes in the 
beginning only a quantitative change, but eventually he becomes bald, a qualitative change in his condition.
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and path-shaping, then, are basically quantitative rather than qualitative. In other words, 
what divides them is neither a disagreement about the importance of the past and its 
influence on the present, nor a quarrel regarding the possibility of changing and 
reconstructing past experiences. The disagreement is rather a question of degree: how much 
does the past influence the present and the fixture? What is the scope that the past, as it 
were, immunises against changes, or the boundaries the past sets within which changes take 
place and beyond which changes are impossible?
If the differences between path-dependence and path-shaping are basically quantitative, I 
believe that it would be legitimate (if not required) to place them together in a common 
theoretical framework. Such incorporation is made by H. Hakansson and A. Lundgren who 
distinguish between a strong version of path-dependence (paths as structures) and a weak 
one (paths as processes).11 In the first case,
...paths carry history through the fact that the pre-existing structure controls or governs 
future action...The dynamics o f a system are not only governed by where it is, but also by 
where it is coming from. In path dependent dynamics, history is transmitted through a series 
of positive feedbacks, through which the system gains momentum: pushing it forward in a
For a detailed exposition of the dialectic and the Marxist tradition, see J. Rees, The Algebra o f Revolution 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1998).
UH. Hakansson & A. Lundgren, ‘Paths in Time and Space -  Path Dependence in Industrial 
Networks’, in Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence, ed. L. Magnusson & J. Ottosson 
(Cheltenham & Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 119-137.
31
direction set by the past12
In this case, then, present and future are strictly controlled (not only influenced) by a path 
set by the past, which in itself cannot be transformed as an established structure. Thus, 
‘Viewing paths as structures inevitably leaves us with history as a restriction.’13 Paths as 
processes, argue Hakansson and Lundgren, ‘points at totally different ways in which history 
matters.’ Here, the present is not derived from the past nor is the future from the present: 
...we are not slaves of the past, but we are its children. Progress is propelled by 
circumstances embodied in history...Here it is a possibility, something that can be exploited. 
The question is how much an individual actor can and will take advantage of it... This means 
that it [i.e., the structure of the path; O.C] has been translated or framed into a picture 
which is partly determined by how the individual organisation reads its past and 
present...The past, or rather the path through the past, defines the range of possible actions, 
while the decision of what action to take is always determined by the perception of the 
present state of affairs. One important aspect must be our ability to exploit the past..But 
since we ourselves are the carriers of history we have a choice...14
Here, then, the past does not control but influences the present and the future: it opens
12Ibid.,p. 128.
13Ibid., p. 132.
14Ibid., pp. 132-133.
numerous possibilities that can be exploited and out of which people can choose how to 
pursue. While the strong version is thus closer to determinism -  as it asserts that present 
and future actions are determined by the past and are thus, to a great extent, predictable -  
the weak version is closer to voluntarism -  as it claims that actions are influenced by the 
past and take place under given conditions, but these conditions still allow us to choose 
between different courses of action and shape the future, including by creating new paths: 
‘All roads do not lead to Rome but as way leads onto way, the particular path ‘chosen’ will 
make all the difference.’15
What could be said here about primordialism and modernism? First, both, as we have seen, 
agree that (i) the nation is a construction o f modem nationalism, and (ii) modem nationalism 
uses premodem social bonds and attachments as the raw material out of which it creates the 
natioa Secondly, the differences between them are quantitative rather than qualitative. Like 
the strong version ofpath-dependence, primordialism talks ofpremodem fixed and definite 
existing groups (those it categorises as ethnic communities or ethnies) as the only structure 
out of which nations emerge.16 The path, then, is a strong one: the nation cannot be but a 
new form within an old path, a continuation of an existing structure. As such, the nation is
15Ibid., p. 123. As to the possibility o f‘breaking paths’ and ‘escaping history,’ as the authors call it, 
seep. 135.
16Note that primordialism does not assert that all ethnic groups eventually turn nations. However, it 
does suggest that all nations originate in ethnic groups, so once a nation is formed, it must be a continuation 
of preexisting ethnie.
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understood as a positive feedback through which the ethnic unit gains momentum: ‘pushing 
it forward in a direction set by the past.’
Modernists, on the other hand, bear close affinities with the weak version of path- 
dependence; they suggest that (i) the past sets different possibilities that can be exploited, 
of which nationalism is only one, and (ii) the old bonds or raw materials out of which 
nations are eventually created vary from one case to another, are often numerous in the 
same case, and, still more important, by no means constitute one fixed and definite category 
of the kind that primordialists ascribe to ethnie. In other words, here too there are different 
possibilities that can be exploited for the creation of a nation, when ethnie (as primordialists 
characterise it) is hardly one of them.17 There is no path to nationhood, then, there are paths 
to nationhood, which under certain conditions may be joined together or internally divided 
by nationalist movements and turned into a new common path, namely, the nation.18 The
17Note that I emphasise ethnie as primordialists understand it. Some modernists agree that ethnic 
groups are at least one of the raw materials out of which nations are created, but their conception of ‘ethnic 
groups’ and exposition of die transformation of these groups into nations are very different from the 
primordialist one. For primordialists, ethnic groups universally incorporate the same basic and 
quintessentially distinctive markers, which remain intact once the group is transformed into a nation. This 
transformation is thus regarded as being a transformation of a persistent structure qua structure, universally 
applied (see, e.g., Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 22-31, chs. 6-7 & passim). For modernists who 
accept the role of ethnicity in the formation of the nation, however, almost everything could serve as an 
ethnic marker. Accordingly, markers of and boundaries between ethnic groups are strongly contested, 
diverse, variable and normally cut across each other. There are no fixed and definite pre-national ethnic 
groups, then, only loose and fluid ones. Thus, the transformation of some of these groups into nations 
necessarily entails a break of structures rather than persistence, and the formation of new structures which, 
at the most, are presented as if  they were persistent. In that sense, modernists argue that even when a nation 
is created out of a preexisting ethnic group its creation largely involves a simultaneous formation of a new 
ethnic group. See Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, ch. 1, esp. pp. 20-21 & passim.
ieFor the relevant issue of crossing of paths and creation of new ones, see Hakansson & Lundgren,
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type, attributes and boundaries of groups that may become nations, then, are rather flexible 
and not as rigid as in the primordialist case.
Now if the differences between primordialism and modernism (just as with the two versions 
of path-dependence) are quantitative and marginal in comparison to their (qualitative) 
similarities, as I have tried to show, there is good reason to incorporate them into one 
theoretical framework, a framework we shall call primordemism. Consequently, the nation 
would appear as a primordemist body, one which is indeed created by modem nationalism, 
but which is nevertheless created out of old bonds that nationalism uses as the raw material 
for this creation.
If the nation is thus created, a few essential questions immediately arise. First, why is it 
modernity o f all things that engenders nationalism (and, as we shall see, universalist 
democracy)? Second, as what is the nation constructed, i.e., what is the content (or the 
characteristics) that nationalist ‘entrepreneurs’ give to the nation (the nationalist conception 
o f the nation) and in what sense, if ever, is this content different from the characteristics of 
old loyalties? And how, as part and parcel o f this content, do nationalists present the 
historical relations between the nation and old loyalties (Le., do they present the nation as 
a pure new entity, a continuation of old loyalties, or perhaps as one of these loyalties)? 
Third, how do nationalists produce and sell this content (the product and commodity of
‘Paths in Time and Space*, pp. 134-135. Cf. pp. 129-130.
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national identity), Le., what is the process by which the nation is created? All these 
questions will be addressed in Chapters 3-4. Note, however, that my discussion is radically 
different from the way primordialists and modernists normally tackle the issue of the 
relations between old loyalties and the nation. First, my discussion is largely not historical 
(though, of course, not ahistorical) but rather conceptual:19 it concentrates, as said, on the 
nationalist own conception of the nation and on how nationalists themselves relate the 
nation to old loyalties, and does not ask from which groups the nation is actually created. 
There are two reasons for posing the issue that way, one is philosophical and the other 
political.
As we have seen, both primordialists and modernists agree that it is nationalism that creates 
the nation and not the other way around, and that this creation involves the transformation 
of preexisting bonds and their interrelations. If this is the case, it is essentially important to 
examine how nationalists conduct this transformation: what they do and say in order to 
nationalise the relevant population, and how they themselves delimit this population in the 
first place. These delimitation and nationalisation, though, necessarily involve (among other 
things) the employment of a particular conception of the nation, which, in order to 
materialise, must appeal to the very same bonds out of which the nation is supposed to be 
constructed. The questions that a philosophical enquiry into nationalism should ask, then,
19Although conceptual, this discussion is also implicitly theoretical: the analysis of the nationalist own 
conception of the nation will be used as the pillar of my theory of nationalism.
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is not who exactly are the groups that nationalism uses and transforms in the construction 
of the nation (themselves variable), but rather (i) how nationalists themselves determine the 
relevant group, and (if) how the said transformation takes place: how the concept o f the 
nation is presented before the prospective conationals and related to their old identities and 
communities. Having said that, it is also crucial to explore (iii) under what circumstances 
nationalism tends to develop and gain massive support.
But the following line of enquiry is also important politically. Whether we regard 
nationalism as a positive, negative, or potentially both positive and negative phenomenon, 
we should deal with it politically: to actively sustain, oppose or amend it (that is, to 
actualise its positive potentialities and marginalise its negative ones). And dealing with it 
politically requires the understanding of its appeal -  both the ideas, aspirations and activities 
it involves, on the one hand, and the circumstances that make them compelling, on the 
other.
My own discussion, then, also differs from primordialism and modernism as far as historical 
examination is concerned. The debate between primordialists and modernists is essentially 
about the constraints the past imposes on the formation o f the nation, i.e., about the 
pregiven cultural scope within which nationalist ‘entrepreneurs’ can manoeuvre and from 
which they can draw the material for nation-building. The current study, however, does not 
deal with this question of constraints at all Instead, where it examines the past (more
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specifically, the nature of premodem communities and their decline) it does so in order to 
(i) understand the background and circumstances under which nationalism (both as ideology 
and movement) has risen, and (ii) expose the similarities and differences between these 
communities and the nation as these appear in the nationalist image.
It should be clear now, I believe, why primordemism fits the aims of this study perfectly and 
serves its purposes better than any primordialist or modernist approach or methodology 
could. In accepting the qualitative agreement between primordialism and modernism and 
avoiding their quantitative dispute, primordemism allows us to concentrate on the questions 
mentioned before without treading water in focussing on the question of constraints. 
Besides, I have never figured out why there should be only one story: would it not be right 
to say that in some cases the primordialist analysis holds and in others the modernist version 
is valid? In accommodating the seemingly contradictory cases and incorporating them 
within one framework, then, primordemism not only allows the two versions to coexist 
coherently, but also seems to fit reality better than each of them by itself can.
2.3 OLD LOYALTIES AS GEMEINSCHAFTEN
As said before, in examining old loyalties I wish to concentrate on the question of identity. 
Why identity of all things? Is this really the central aspect by reference to which we should 
analyse human associations and social evolvement? Am I not implying here, almost in a
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Weberian fashion, that status groups are the central agents o f collective action?20 Is identity 
the aspect that could help us to differentiate modem groups from premodem ones and, 
perhaps, to understand the rise o f nationalism? These questions are significant and 
interesting and will be touched upon sporadically during this study. Right now I would like 
to beg the reader's patience and move directly to the analysis o f old loyalties.
If identity in old loyalties is the issue, I find F. Tfinnies’s distinction between the concept of 
Gemeinschaft and that of Gesellschaft both analytically usefiil and historically valid.21 
Usually the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are read in English as, respectively, 
community and association (or society). And although sometimes the English use of these 
terms is quite close to the German purport,22 the English terms of community and society 
still often have different connotation from the meaning that Tonnies tried to cast into
20As J. Elster explains, analysing groups as collective actors does not necessarily violate 
methodological individualism: such analyses may well assume that ‘collective action should indeed be 
understood in terms of the propensities of individuals to engage in it/ My question, then, could be 
rephrased as, Am I not implying that individuals tend to engage in collective action with those who share 
the same status as they do as opposed to, say, those who belong to the same class? See J. Elster, Making 
Sense o f Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 336, n. 1. Also, note that what we shall 
henceforth call ‘identity groups' bear some affinities with Weber’s own concept of ‘status groups', i.e., 
groups ‘based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong 
together.’ See M. Weber, Economy and Society vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 40.1 would 
argue, though, that instead of talking about thefeelings of the parties we should talk about their actions and 
the circumstances under which they take place.
21See also E. Gellner, Reason and Culture (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 116-123.
22See for example Rawls's use of the terms in his 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14/3 (1985), p. 241. For a relevant discussion, see also Rawls's Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 40-43.
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shape.23 For this reason I prefer to use the original German words rather than their English 
translation.
So what are the main characteristics of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
1. ‘Gemeinschaft’, says Tdnnies, ‘should be understood as a living organism’ and familial 
body.24 First, its members see themselves as being bound together by common ancestors 
(hence believe that their communal belonging is a natural decree) and thus identify 
themselves as inseparable parts of an organic whole.25 By implication, they share a strong 
sense of belonging, devotion and commitment to their community: they share, as Tonnies
23See C. P. Loomis, ‘Notes on TSnnies’ Fundamental Concepts’, in F. TCnnies, Community and 
Society (Gemeinschaft undGesellschaft) (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1964), p. 284, n. 2.
24T6nnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’, in ibid., p. 35 & passim.
25Ibid., passim, esp. pp. 33-34, 45, 48, 50, 53, 57, 210. This is not to say that members of the 
Gemeinschaft do not have a sense of selfhood as separate individuals. We know, for example, that some 
form of autobiographies already existed in 2nd century BC China as appeared, e.g., in Ch’ien Ssu-Ma’s 
Historical Records (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Similarly, archeological findings show that 
individual graves and funerary ceremonies marked the Early Bronze age from the Neolithic period, and 
Christianity has always emphasised the individual soul. But as far as the individual memberships and social 
positions and roles are concerned (die individual station and its duties), those are predetermined by 
preexisting social norms and are not open to individual will or choice. Ch’ien’s account ofhimselfwas thus 
interwoven with his study of the history of his community, and in antiquity individuals were buried in 
accordance with their social prestige and status as these were predetermined by their group. Even 
conversions to another religion (Christianity and others) normally involved the transformation of entire 
collectives which followed their leaders’ steps rather than the ‘rebirth’ of individuals who ‘found God’ or 
experienced a ‘revelation’. The conversions of Germanic tribes (e.g., the Vandals, Burgundians, 
Ostrogoths) to Arian Christianity and then to Catholicism, of the Franks under and following Clovis, of 
Slavic tribes by Cyril and Methodius, of the Sinhalese to Buddhism under king Tissa -  all of these, among 
others, represented the norm, whereas individual conversion, e.g., of Victorinus (who, according to St. 
Augustine, enraged his community fellows by his conversion) and of Augustine himself epitomised the 
exceptional. On Victorinus, see St. Augustine, Confessions, book 8, ch. 2:4. We should also recall that the 
very term ‘person’ comes from the Latin ‘persona’, which in antiquity referred to the mask that was worn 
by actors (originally by Etruscan mimes, I think), and thus to their role. ‘Persona’ thus denoted one’s social 
position.
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put it, a ‘unity of spirit-family spirit.’26 But, second, these strong feelings and belief in 
common objective belonging are translated into actual behaviour through which the 
Gemeinschaft materialises and turns, as it were, into a real functioning family. For one 
thing, by recognising themselves as kith and kin (making exit inconceivable) and 
distinguishing themselves collectively from outsiders as the other side of the coin (making 
joining improbable), membership in the Gemeinschaft actually becomes an ascribed status, 
Le., it is not open for individual choice; instead, it is determined by birth and by birth 
alone.27 Moreover, like any family (as Tonnies conceives it), the Gemeinschaft is a 
hierarchical order (‘the Gemeinschaft as the unity o f unequal beings’)28 in which, like a 
father in the family, the whole is manifested in one member o f the group, who also controls 
the collective and its wealth;29
26Ibid., p. 208. See also pp. 43,47 & passim.
27This aspect is not incompatible with the mutability of Gemeinschqften, i.e., that they can be 
concocted, dissolve into separate ones, or merge into larger ones. Indeed, Tdnnies does not deny this 
possibility, nor does he disregard such historical transformations. The point is that membership in the 
Gemeinschaft remains objective even when its boundaries change, and is not open to individual will or 
choice. For an identical argument regarding the plasticity of ethnic identities and still the impossibility of 
the individual to choose or alter his ethnic belonging, see B. Barry, ‘Self-Government Revisited’, in The 
Nature o f Political Theory, eds. D. Miller & L. Siedentop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 134. To be 
sure, there were some cases of individual change of membership, as was the case of individual metics who 
were granted Athenian citizenship. But as already implied, these were extremely exceptional: ‘the ideology 
that distinguished metics from citizens seems to have been widely accepted among metics and citizens alike. 
The dominance ofbirth and blood over political membership was part of the common understanding of the 
age.’ M. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 55. And this common 
understanding, accompanied by what Z. Bauman calls ‘heterophobia’ (resentment of the different), went 
beyond Athens as well as beyond the 5th century BC. See Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 62-66.
28T0nnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’, pp. 46,210,255 & passim. The phrase is from p. 46.
29Ibid., pp. 39 & 183. See also pp. 59-62.
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2. Gemeinschaft can never be wrong: 'the expression bad Gemeinschaft violates the 
meaning of the word.'30 Because the individual social memberships and positions are 
predestined by the community whose norms are conceived not only as mandatory but as 
unquestionable, a criticism of the community or its norms by its own members amounts to 
a contradiction in terms.
In contrast, Gesellschaft
1. is ‘a mechanical aggregate and artifact;'31 it is an aggregation of individuals considered 
as equals, who have chosen to live together in an act o f contract and whose status is 
acquired rather than ascribed. Here each individual is a manifestation of himself only, and 
everyone controls himself and his own property. Thus, the Gesellschaft reflects neither 
devotion and commitment nor a sentiment of belonging, but isolation and alienation;32
2. can be good or bad. Because it is an aggregation of individuals who have chosen to live 
together upon their separate autonomous will, each individual is detached from the whole 
and can judge it from the outside, as it were, as a free agent and bearer of individual rights 
vis-a-vis his society.33
30IbiA, p. 34.
31Ibid., p. 35.
32Ibid., p. 65 & passim.
33Ibid., pp. 34,71,214-216 & passim.
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As we know, TQnnies used these concepts to distinguish between what he saw as the two 
main epochs in human history and to characterise their different course. In the first 
(premodem) epoch people have conducted their lives mostly (if not solely) as members of 
Gemeinschaften and only marginally (if ever) as fellows of Gesellschaften.34 First, 
throughout this era as a whole the overwhelming majority have lived only in 
Gemeinschaften and hardly even known any kind of Gesellschaft. But, second, even the 
Gesellschaften themselves (and the small portion of the population they comprised) were 
always confined and subordinate to a particular and closed Gemeinschaft and constituted 
only part of its internal structure (consider, e.g., mediaeval guilds and other associations 
that followed the 12th century urban revolution in Europe).35 With modernity and the 
Enlightenment, which Tflnnies identifies with the rise of capitalism and Hobbes’s idea of the 
social contract,36 the social world was inverted as Gemeinschaften and their social 
significance have declined while Gesellschaften have become the central form of human 
associatioa37
34Ibid.,p. 34.
35The exclusion of Jews from guilds (and other Gesellschaften) demonstrates this point: they were 
disallowed to join precisely because and where they were not considered as members of the Gemeinschaft 
to which these associations belonged.
36See also R. Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 99.
37T0nnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’, esp. p. 259. TOnnies does not ignore the existence of 
distinct stages and changes within each epoch; his theory is an evolutionary one and aims at die sociological 
interpretation of what he (rightly) conceives as a gradual rather than a quantum-leap-like development of 
human societies throughout tibte times. He thus does indeed agree that the form of Gesellschaft is not wholly 
modem, that some elements of it already existed in the period of Gemeinschaft (or at least in some of its 
phases) and certainly influenced the Gemeinschaften within which they arose: in that sense, to paraphrase
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As Tonnies argues, the Gemeinschaft is a family. In saying that, though, he does not identify 
the Gemeinschaft solely with the family as the smallest unit of kinship or blood relations 
(the nuclear family). Indeed, this kind of family is Gemeinschaft as well, but not the only 
one. As Tonnies claims, those Gemeinschaften that predominated the premodem era went 
much beyond the nuclear family, although all of them were based on and resembled this 
family in the ways mentioned before, essentially in sharing its “organic” and “natural” 
character.38 In that respect, then, each Gemeinschaft, apart from the nuclear family itself 
is understood as a sort of extended family, be it a village, a clan, a tribe, a town or even a 
city-state.39 Naturally, each and every Gemeinschaft that is wider than the nuclear family 
encompasses other, smaller, Gemeinschaften (each of which a “natural” entity in itself) up 
to an ultimate Gemeinschaft, which embraces the other Gemeinschaften as a whole and
the famous Hegelian phrase, the seeds of the period of Gesellschaft already germinated in the womb of the 
old Gemeinschaften themselves. The distinction TOnnies makes between the two epochs, then, is about the 
relative balance between die two forms of grouping and their importance in individual and social life: the 
transition from the first epoch to the second, then, is not marked by the emergence of Gesellschaften as a 
new social form (though their modem substance might be different from the older one), but by the 
autonomy they gained and superiority they wen over Gemeinschaften in commanding people’s loyalty, and 
thereon by the withering away of the latter. The sharp conceptual distinction Tdnnies makes, however, 
accurately represents the differences between the two epochs. Applying the Hegelian/Marxian dialectic 
again, the gradual changes in the balance between opposite moments within a system (itself a manifestation 
of the dominant moment) eventually result in a rapid transformation and negation of the system itself. The 
changes in the balance and mutual influence between Gemeinschaften and Gesellschaften within the period 
of Gemeinschaft Tbnnies seems to suggest, still (by definition of ‘period of Gemeinschaft’) took place 
within the dominant structures of Gemeinschaft and were gradual indeed. But the change in that balance 
in favour of Gesellschaften embodied a rapid transition to a qualitatively distinct form of society and era, 
even if the changes that preceded and led to it were in themselves gradual and quantitative.
38As Tonnies adds, the Gemeinschaften were also based on the nuclear family in the economic 
sense,‘as domestic economy and as community co-operating in work and consumption.’ See ibid., p. 54. 
See also Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, ch. 3, note esp. p. 49.
39See ibid., pp. 53-64 & passim.
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incorporates them into, as it were, one big family. As T6nnies put it, every Gemeinschaft 
(apart from the nuclear family itself) is then simply ‘a community of houses [Le., families; 
O.C], which is itself like a more comprehensive house [family; O.C].’40 On the whole, then, 
the different parts of the ultimate Gemeinschaft (and more generally, the different parts 
within any Gemeinschaft), whether they constitute Gemeinschaften in themselves or 
Gesellschaften, are conceived as inseparable and integrated parts o f the same “natural” and 
“organic” whole.41
As many a scholar noted, premodem communities were prominently characterised by lack 
of social differentiation, Le., the absence of separation between different spheres such as 
economy, politics, religion, morality and so on.42 As M. Walzer suggests, in that sense too 
Society was conceived as an organic and integrated whole. It might be viewed under the 
aspect of religion, or politics, or economy, or family, but all these interpenetrated one 
another and constituted a single reality. Church and state, church-state and university, civil 
society and political community, dynasty and government, office and property, public life 
and private life, home and shop: each pair was, mysteriously or unmysteriously, two-in-one, 
inseparable.43
40Ibid., p. 54.
41 See ibid., pp. 208-216 & passim.
4 2 See for example Weber, Economy and Society; E. Durkheim, The Division ofLabor in Society (New 
York: the Free Press, 1964); T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: the Free Press, 1951).
43M  Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the Art of Separation’, in Political Theory 12/3 (1984), p. 315. Note,
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It should be added, though, that not only did social spheres permeate one another. They 
were also, in themselves, monolithic: each sphere or formal social category (e.g., religion) 
was ruled by one substantial social category (e.g., Catholicism). It was therefore the 
particular uncontested content of different spheres that interpenetrated one another and 
altogether constituted one whole. In this situation, centrifugal tendencies within 
communities (whether along religious, political, cultural, and other lines, or along different 
spheres) were extremely rare, whereas the centripetal forces within them remained rather 
solid.44
TSnnies's theory not only conforms perfectly to assumptions of different scholars 
(primordialists as modernists) as to the characteristics of tribes, clans and other ancient 
loyalties, but it also seems to fit history. In ancient Greece, for example, the family was 
taken as the basic unit of loyalty, while all the other loyalties -  from villages through clans 
and city-states up to the Hellenic society at large -  were based on the family ties and 
conceived as their expansions.45 Similar patterns could be found in other European societies
however, that in contrast to Walzer I am referring here to communities in general and not necessarily to 
states.
44This, of course, is not to say that there were no conflicts within communities (e.g., class conflicts 
or quarrels between sub-communities within a larger Gemeinschaft). But these were not centrifugal ones, 
i.e., they did not involve the question of separation, neither between spheres nor between communities.
45See A. Andrewes, Greek Society (Middlesex & New York: Penguin Books, 1986), ch. 5. See also 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 48 & 99-100; and his National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 
1991), p. 24.
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up to the 17th century (and in some areas till much later),46 as well as in non-European ones, 
e.g., Japan, Brazil, the Aztecs, and India -  in which the five varnas (Brahmans, Kshalriyas, 
Vaisyas, Shudras, and Pancamas) were subdivided into thousands of castes and sub-castes 
(or jatis),47 themselves further divided into villages and joint-families.48
2.4 GEMEINSCHAFT AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
Tfinnies’s depiction of old loyalties as Gemeinschaften gives us a clear picture as to the 
social identities of individuals in premodem times. If the different parts of the ultimate 
Gemeinschaft, from which the individual social identities were constructed, were conceived 
as inseparable and altogether constituted one “organic” whole, then it seems only natural 
that the individual social identities within the ultimate Gemeinschaft were also related in 
such a way and altogether constituted the individual social identity in its totality and 
integrity. The multiple identities that coexisted within a person constituted after all one
46See for example H. Brody, Inishkillane - Change and Decline in the West o f Ireland (London: Allen 
Lane -  the Penguin Press, 1973), esp. chs. 4-6, and E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1976), esp. chs. 11 & 15. For the influence of Gemeinschaft divisions in Europe on 
patterns of settlement in the Middle-East during the crusades, see J. Prawer, The Crusaders-A Colonial 
Society (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1985), passim. (In Hebrew).
47The term itself is derived from die Sanskritjata, ‘bom’, and indicates a form of existence determined 
by birth.
4 8 See, respectively, K. Yoshino, Cultured Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1992), ch. 5; E. Bradford Bums, Nationalism in Brazil (New York, Washington & London: 
Fredrick A  Praeger, 1968), ch. 2; J. Soustelle, The Daily Life o f the Aztecs (UK: Pelican Bocks, 1964), esp. 
chs. 2,4-5; L. Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), see esp. pp. 61- 
64. See also J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 49-53 & 147-150. See 
also E. L. Schusky (ed), Political Organization o f Native North Americans (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1980).
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whole, namely, the undivided or, to use G. Lukdcs’s phrase, unreified person:49 one’s 
memberships in a family, village or town, clan or tribe, religion and sometimes even 
occupation, interpenetrated one another and constituted inseparable and integrated parts 
of one’s total and definite social identity.50 And it was the encompassing category (the 
ultimate Gemeinschaft) that supplied the social fixed and all-embracing label of the 
individual.51
Moreover, Tdnnies’s depiction also gives us a clear notion as to the relations between the 
personal identity of individuals in the premodem era and their social identity and the value 
that was attached to each of them by society. Personal identities, explains Laitin, ‘are firmly 
entrenched in primordial or genetic discourse realm. A person who is x today will surely be 
x  tomorrow. My name, my gender, the fact that 1 am the father o f two children, and my
49See G. Luk&cs, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat*, in History and Class 
Consciousness (London: Merlin Press, 1990), part I, esp. p. 99. For a comprehensive discussion on the 
divided or split self from philosophical, psychological and economic perspectives, see a series of essays in 
J. Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
50Indeed, in many premodem societies occupation itself was conceived as natural or given. There were 
two prevailing, not necessarily separate, norms that reflected such a status of occupation. One is an ethnic 
division of labour, according to which, like in the traditional Indian caste system, one’s accessibility to 
metiers depends on one’s ancestry. The second is hereditary metiers, according to which a specific 
occupation is handed down from parent to child. See E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, ch. 2, and his 
Nationalism (New York: New York University Press,1997), ch. 4,
51The ultimate Gemeinschaft supplied the individual with an encompassing identity both in space and 
time. In other words, it is not only that it integrated the individual actual multiple identities into one whole; 
it also, as it were, inlaid him in a continuous historical collective, hence gave him a sense of eternal and 
stable identity.
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credit history have a DNA-like continuity to them’.52 Social identities, on the other hand, 
...are labels that people assign to themselves (or that others assign to them) when they claim 
membership (or are assigned membership) in a social category that they (and others, 
whether members of that category or not) see as plausibly connected to their history and 
present set of behaviors. It is further implied that this assignment has powerful emotional 
appeal, both to its holder and to others in the society.53
1^ as said, in old loyalties social memberships and roles were predetermined by society and 
ascribed to individuals rather than acquired by them, then it is clear that social identities 
were basically assigned to individuals in accordance with what society saw as plausibly 
connected to their history and present set of behaviours. From this, I believe, we can infer 
two things. First, in the era in question the individual was not conceived and treated as a 
free agent who may choose his memberships, roles and identities (i.e., as an autonomous 
human being), but was evaluated or valued according to his social positions that the 
community itself dictated. In that sense, the community held ethical primacy over its 
individual members. Secondly, despite the differences and separation (analytically and 
historically) between personal and social identities, it seems that in Gemeinschaft societies 
the individual social identities were also entrenched in a genetic discourse realm and had 
a DNA-like continuity to them. This is because, as already suggested, the individual various
52Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 14.
53Ibid., p. 16.
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memberships and positions in the age of Gemeinschaft were given and determined by birth 
and were not open for individual choice or alteration. In other words, social identities were 
themselves unconvertible, just like personal identities. In that sense, to borrow Laitin’s 
words, ‘the two realms of discourse, personal and social, at times overlap’,54 and in the said 
age they did indeed recurrently overlap. And as Marx noted, in premodem tribes and estate 
societies ‘a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always a commoner, a 
quality inseparable from his individuality irrespective o f his other relations.’55
We saw, however, that some Gesellschaften did exist in the premodem era, which means 
that not all social identities were predetermined, ascribed and unconvertible. As Marx and 
Engels put it,
The difference between the individual as a person and what is accidental to him is not a 
conceptual difference but a historical fact. This distinction has a different significance at 
different times...It is not a distinction that we have to make for each age, but one which each 
age makes itself from among the different elements which it finds in existence.56
54Ibid.,p. 15.
55Marx, quoted in Elster, Making Sense o f Mane, p. 334. One may argue that Marx’s claim is too 
exaggerated, but in my view it is not blatantly wrong. The crucial point here is the real historical feet that, 
in premodem times (taken as a whole) social mobility was extremely limited, though not entirely 
impossible. In that sense, stripping a nobleman of his rank and ennobling a commoner (to use Marx’s 
example) were perhaps viable, but far from frequent
56Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, in MSW, p. 180.
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The important point, however, is that despite the existence of some accidental social 
identities (i.e., identities that are not conceived as a natural part o f the individual personality 
and which therefore can be chosen and altered by him), throughout the premodem era as 
a whole the individual was still tagged by other (“natural”) social identities that prescribed 
his roles and positions and from which he still could not withdraw at will. In prehistoric 
communities, Marx points out, individuals exhibited ‘herd consciousness’: ‘each individual 
has as little tom himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or community as a bee has 
from his hive.’ With the beginning of division of labour a ‘long and tormented historical 
development’ has begun, through which ‘can groups and individuals break down the 
material, geographical, and cognitive barriers restricting their potential for new and wider 
forms of self-determination.’57
Individuals, then, are gradually liberated from “natural” or ascribed belongings: in each age 
other social identities appear as being accidental rather than natural.58 Throughout 
premodem times, however, it was still the existence of an ultimate Gemeinsckaft that 
supplied the individual with a “natural” encompassing identity -  a constitutive substantial 
essence, as it were, which permeated all aspects of one’s life and allowed him to manage
57Marx, quoted and paraphrased in E. Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 66.
58Indeed, the development of the individual and that of community cannot be separated: the evolution 
of the former necessitates the evolution of the latter and vice versa. The changes within an epoch and then 
its transition to a new one as sketched above, then, necessarily involve changes of human beings as well, 
the ways they see themselves and are related to each other.
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his other commitments (accidental as natural) and to see that they fit in with one another. 
Such an “essence”, then, binds one’s multiple identities together and, to use Waldron’s 
words, keeps the whole house in order.59 As Marx says, it was only in the 18th century that 
the individual as a person and his social identities were totally separated, that all social 
identities appeared as being accidental to him, and that the individual was completely 
detached from any sort of “organic” whole.60 In short, the liberal (and, I will argue later, the 
democratic as well as the socialist) conception of the person, according to which the 
individual is not identified by (or ought to be treated in accordance with) any of his social 
stations and should therefore be regarded and treated as an autonomous (though social) 
subject, is essentially a by-product of the modem material conditions out of which the 
liberal, democratic and socialist views emerged.
As Laitin suggests, multiple identities ‘can coexist within a person only insofar as choice is 
not necessaiy,’ Le., only when one’s identities are not contradictory or mutually exclusive.61 
If  as said, the multiple identities of the individual in the premodem era interpenetrated one 
another and inseparably formed the individual identity in its totality and integrity, then it 
seems that these identities as a whole (social as personal) were not contradictory or
59Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative*, p. 111.
60Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 180, and K. Marx, Grundrisse, in MSW, p. 346.
61Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 23. It should be stressed that contradictory identities cannot coexist 
within a person if and only if the person is aware of this contradiction. Clearly, only when such awareness 
exists the person is compelled to choose.
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mutually exclusive: generally, then, there was no need to choose between incompatible 
identities and thereby to wonder where one realty belonged; there was, that is, an 
equilibrium between identities, and ‘At any equilibrium, it appears to actors that the world 
is completely stable. In this situation, identities are not under question. There is (by the 
definition of equilibrium) no incentive for anyone to explore new identities. It is obvious to 
people who in fact they are.’62
On the face of it, then, it seems that our premodem predecessors have hardly suffered any 
identity crisis: a situation in which one’s identity is divided into disparate and conflicting 
elements, which cannot be bound together into one coherent and integrated personality, and 
in which, by implication, one’s identity and individuality are ambiguous and uncertain as one 
still cannot decide which of these elements fits one better, Le., where one belongs.63 But 
could this realty be the case? Can we seriously claim that identity crises hardly occurred in 
the period of Qemeinschafft Allow me to elaborate (to refine and defend) my point in 
further detail.
As said, people hardly suffered splits in their identity as the encompassing communities to
62Ibid., p. 22.
63See ibid., pp. 14,17-19 & passim. Cf. E. H. Erikson’s concepts o f‘identity diffusion’ and ‘negative 
identity’ and their relation to identity crisis (a term that Erikson himself coined) in his Identity and the Life 
Cycle (New York: International Universities Press, 1959), See also Erikson’s ‘The problem of ego identity’, 
in Journal o f the American Psychoanalytical Association 4 (1956), pp. 56-121.
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which they belonged supplied them with an integrated encompassing identity, or a sort of 
substantial essence as it were that allowed them to integrate their multiple identities into one 
coherent whole. Within the ultimate Gemeinschaft, then, the individual obtains ‘for himself 
a certain degree of coherence or integrity. The coherence which makes his particular 
community a single cultural entity will confer a corresponding degree of integrity on the 
individual self that is constituted under its auspices.’64 ‘But,’ Waldron argues, ‘this can be 
exaggerated. However we define and individuate cultures, can we simply assume that each 
culture is coherent in this sense? Aren’t some cultures, even some traditional ones, riven by 
contradictions?’65
Whether Waldron refers here to logical contradictions or simply to intra-community 
quarrels (he does not elaborate his remark further), his point is compelling: surely 
contradictions and quarrels existed in premodem communities too. Contradictions in a 
society, however, may well remain latent without being observed or affecting people’s 
beliefs and behaviour: ‘Where public discourse is itself inconsistent...people may not even 
notice the contradiction.’66 It may well be the case, then, that some identities in old 
communities did contradict one another but were not conceived as being contradictory,
64W. Kymlicka, paraphrased in Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p.
110.
65Ibid., p. 118, n. 61.
66T. Kuran, Private Truths^  Public Lies (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p.
184.
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hence were not translated into any tension within individuals*67 The existence of such 
contradictions, then, does not undermine my suggestion that the members o f premodem 
communities hardly suffered identity crises.
It is manifestly true that intra-community quarrels (even bloody ones) also occurred. But 
these were basically about the character or conduct of a community that was still conceived 
(by the contending parties themselves) as a familial body to which they “organically5’ (that 
is, inseparably) belonged. And indeed, in The Peloponnesian War Thucydides referred to 
the war between the Greek city-states as a war between brothers,68 Horatius viewed the war 
between Octavianus and Sextus Pompeius within the Roman Republic in a similar way, and 
in the Jewish tradition the bloody dispute between the followers o f the house of Hillel and 
the disciples of the house of Shammai was always considered, again, as a war between 
brothers. The mediaeval conflicts between church and state also fall under this description. 
Consider for example the Investiture Crisis as an exemplar o f these conflicts. The dispute 
between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry IV and their respective followers involved a 
conflict between religious and political loyalties, but neither of the parties intended to
67Perhaps Sophocles's Antigone demonstrates this point. Socially, religious and political identities in 
Thebes were conceived not only as compatible but rather as inseparable. There were nevertheless some 
logical tensions between the two, and these were exposed and brought into public attention once Antigone 
had to choose between them (Antigone herself then, did face an identity crisis). See G. W. F. Hegel, The 
Philosophy o f History (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), part II; and R. Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology 
-  a Philosophical Introduction (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), pp. 74-77. C£ G. W. F. Hegel, 
Phenomenology o f Spirit (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 212-217.
68Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War, book HI, chs. 82-83. C£ Plato, The Laws, 744c &
757.
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renounce either of these loyalties. Moreover, the quarrel was not even about the separation 
of state and church and basically occurred precisely because they were inseparable. Despite 
the church-state quarrel, then, one’s identity as a Christian and one’s identity as a state 
subject did not contradict each other: one needed not wonder where one really belonged 
and could certainly integrate one’s religious and political identities into a coherent whole, 
Le., one did not face an identity crisis. The existence of intra"Gemeinschaft conflicts, then, 
does not pose any problem to my discussion on identities and identity crisis either.
There is, however, a more serious challenge to my account o f old loyalties and the 
individual identity in them. As we have seen, in his reference to the Gemeinschaft as an 
organic and familial body TSnnies never claimed that it was actually a biological unit. As 
he stressed, his ‘study does not deal with genus and species, Le., in regard to human beings 
it is not concerned with race, people, or tribe as biological units. Instead, we have in mind 
their sociological interpretation, which sees human relationships and associations as living 
organism or, in contrast, mechanical constructions.’69 And, ‘The social collective has the 
characteristics of Gemeinschaft in so far as the members think of such a grouping as a gift 
of nature or created by a supernatural w ill’70 Tonnies, then, also seems to agree that both 
Gemeinschaften and Gesellschaften (and thus human associations at large) are human-made 
entities, and that the only difference between them in that matter amounts to whether those
69T8nnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’, p. 37 (italic mine).
70Ibid., p. 255 (italic mine).
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who form them are aware of this bare feet or not.
The last two citations, however, reveal one basic shortcoming in Tflnnies’s work, which 
seems to “infect” my own discussion too. In the first phrase Tfinnies suggests that the 
Gemeinschaft (and other communities) is constituted by individual actions or behaviour, 
in the second, he argues that it is constituted by individual beliefs. There are two related 
problems here. First, beliefs or feelings are things that go on in people’s minds or hearts and 
thus cannot be easily discerned;71 we thus cannot oflhandedly say that communities are 
formed by the beliefs of their members without falling prey to baseless speculations, futile 
metaphysical idealism, or psychological reductionism- ‘the assumption that the structure 
of any society can be reduced to the wishes and motivations of its members.’72 Many 
scholars of nationalism also erred in arguing that nations are constituted by beliefs. D. 
Miller, for example, asserts that ‘nations are not things that exist in the world independently 
of the beliefs people have about them...peopIe's own beliefs about their nationhood enter 
into the definition;’ and ‘national communities are constituted by belief: nations exist when 
their members recognize one another as compatriots.’73 Yet again, we can only rarely know
71See Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, pp. 78-79.
72R. Vanneman & L. Weber Cannon, The American Perception o f Class (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987), p. 15.
73D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 17 & 22. Miller goes on and adds 
to this subjective conception of the nation another four features, three of which are objective: common 
history, common territoiy, and common culture (pp. 23-25). For a criticism of such features as 
characteristic of the nation and especially of die conjunction Miller makes between objective and subjective 
features, see D. George, 'National-Identity and National Self-Determination’, in National Rights,
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how people think or feel towards their communities, let alone nations.
Apparently, looking at how people behave, hence at their concrete interrelations, is what 
should count, them On the surface, then, it seems that Tfinnies’s first suggestion is sound. 
But it seems that this suggestion of his is inseparable from the second one: as we have seen, 
Tonnies implies that people’s behaviour necessarily follows (hence reflects) their beliefs, so 
by looking at the former we will also get a clear picture of the latter. Among scholars of 
nationalism, Connor makes a similar point: when analysing sociopolitical phenomena like 
the nation, he says, ‘what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is,9 
because ‘it is not what is but what people perceive as is which influences [their] attitudes 
and behavior.’741 find this line of thinking rather odd. As L. Festinger has shown in his 
study on cognitive dissonance,
There are circumstances in which persons will behave in a manner counter to their 
convictions c m * will publicly make statements which they do not really believe...[A] person 
changes his overt behavior or overt verbal expression of his opinions while privately he still 
holds to his original beliefs...[and does so under] a threat o f punishment for 
noncompliance...[or in order to obtain] a special reward for complying.75
International Obligations, eds. S. Caney, D. George & P. Janes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 15- 
19.
74Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 93 & 197 (italic original).
75L. Festinger, A Theory o f Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 84- 
85 (italic original).
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Kuran takes this point even further and extensively shows that it may well be the case that 
the vast majority in a community do not believe in the prevailing norms of that community 
and perhaps do not even feel that they belong to it, yet under specific conditions behave as 
if they did, thus not only give the wrong impression as to their identifications, but in feet 
preserve the very same structure they privately reject.76 In his explanation of the 
phenomenon of collective conservatism, as opposed to personal conservatism, Kuran adds 
that ‘A community might display a collective attachment to the status quo even if none of 
its members has any affinity to the status quo as such.’77
TSnnies and the theorists mentioned before (among many others) look at individual 
behaviour, then deduce a system of beliefs from this behaviour and ascribe it to the actors, 
and then conclude that these beliefs must have been the cause of the course of action that 
was taken by the actors in question. These theorists, however, overlook the circumstances 
in which people act and therefore cannot really introduce any mechanism through which this 
seeming causality could be explained or even shown -  they simply take it for granted. We
76Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, esp. chs. 6 & 11. It has thus been suggested, for example, that 
most Druse in the Golan who publicly identify themselves as Syrians do so for fear of Syrian retribution if 
(or when) the Golan is returned to Syria, and that they privately do not see themselves as Syrians at all. 
Indeed, such a suggestion has been made by the Israeli right and used to justify the continuation of the 
occupation of the Golan, i.e., it is a politically motivated assertion that should raise many doubts about the 
integrity of those who make it. But whatever their motivation is, it is still possible that they are right. This, 
of course, does not sap the stance (which I personally share) that the Golan should be liberated from Israel; 
after all, even if the Druse there do not really see themselves as Syrians, they do not automatically identify 
themselves, let alone are treated by Israel itself as Israelis either.
77Ibid„ p. 106 (italic mine).
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could equally say that the behaviour of a raped woman who did not fight back her attacker 
necessarily shows that she believed in the legitimacy of the assault; indeed, such an assertion 
(apart from being mean) is as ridiculous as the said reasoning about behaviour being an 
obvious indication of beliefs, pure and simple. Note, however, that I am not saying that 
beliefs are irrelevant and do not influence (and sometimes indeed determine) people’s 
behaviour at all. What I am saying, then, is that (i) behaviour and expressed views are 
driven by a complex of incentives o f which (under certain circumstances) beliefs might play 
only a marginal role, or even no role at all; and accordingly, (ii) one’s behaviour and 
expressed views may well be at odds with one’s beliefs, so one’s actions do not necessarily 
reflect one’s convictions.
In his extensive study of crime and punishment in both premodem and modem societies, the 
sociologist E. Durkheim shows that social norms in premodem societies were very strict 
and rigid. Accordingly, any violation of a norm was conceived as an offense to society as 
a whole, as a collective, and led to serious sanctions.78 Obviously, under such conditions the 
incentives of individuals to comply with social rules and norms and refrain from infracting 
them were rather strong. It looks more than reasonable, then, that people in the age of 
Gemeinschaft often behaved or acted in a way counter to their real convictions and 
identifications. So it may also be the case that people did often suffer identity crises but did
78Durkheim, The Division ofLabor in Society, ch. 2. Note that Durkheim’s conception of premodem 
societies -  societies which are based on mechanical solidarity, in Durkheim’s terminology -  resembles 
Tonnies’s conception of Gemeinschaft.
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not “translate” them into any visible course of action for fear o f retribution.
On what basis, then, can I claim that identity crises hardly occurred in premodem 
communities? Do I not, just like the scholars I criticised before, underestimate the 
circumstances under which people act and overestimate their feelings or beliefs? I do not 
think so. Indeed, my argument about the rareness of identity crises did not refer to 
individuals’ actions but only to their identifications, but this argument of mine was based 
on the circumstances under which such identifications were formed, Le., on the conditions 
of identity formation. As already suggested, ‘social identities are constructed from the 
available repertoire of social categories...’79 If, as said, in the age of Gemeinschaft such 
categories interpenetrated one another, were conceived as inseparable and altogether 
constituted one “organic” whole (namely, the ultimate Gemeinschaft), then it is logically 
clear that the individual identities that were constructed from those categories also 
interpenetrated one another and constituted an integrated identity of the individual Now 
since multiple identities can coexist within a person only when they are not consciously 
contradictory, and identity crisis is defined as ‘a situation in which one’s identity is divided 
into disparate and conflicting elements’, then it follows that identity crises could not occur. 
Only when a really existing contradiction between identities came to the fore, Le., to public 
knowledge (as pictured in the case of Antigone, and an exception in itself in the era in
79Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 17. As said (and Laitin also notes), it is not only that identities are 
constructed from social categories; social categories are also in-themselves human-made constructions.
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question) could identity crisis prevail. Thus, I have been quite cautious in arguing that 
identity crises hardly occurred and not that they did not emerge at all. Another question that 
should be answered, then, is, Why existing (Le., objective) contradictions between identities 
only exceptionally or rarely came to the fore in the period of Gemeinschaft and normally 
remained dormant without being observed by people and affect their beliels and behaviour? 
Since the following thinking is going to be readdressed and used in chapters to follow, I 
would like to dwell on it at length already now.
Following Mohammed Arkoun’s study o f public discourse in the Islamic world, Kuran 
makes a distinction between unthinkable and unthought beliels and applies it to public 
discourses at large:
An unthinkable belief is a thought that one cannot admit having, or even characterize as 
worth entertaining, without raising doubts about one’s civility, morality, loyalty, 
practicality, or sanity. An unthought belief is an idea that is not even entertained. Underlying 
Arkoun’s interpretation of Islamic history is the notion that a belief treated as unthinkable 
eventually disappears from human consciousness, that it moves from the realm o f the 
thought to that of the unthought.80
As Kuran shows extensively in his theory and in its application to the cases of the caste 
system, Eastern Europe’s communism and affirmative action -  under conditions of social
80Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, p. 176.
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pressure, socially unpopular beliefs and ideas (the unthinkable) gradually vanish from public 
discourse, thereon frompublic knowledge, and thereafter fiomprivate knowledge, Le., from 
individuals’ consciousness; those beliefs and ideas thus become unthought.81 Kuran, 
similarly to Festinger, identifies three basic incentives in people’s preference and belief 
formation as well as in their behaviour:82
(1) Self-assertion or expressive utility: people need to express their own genuine inner 
beliefs and opinions, i.e., they ‘derive utility from candor...’83
(2) Social approval or reputational utility (outer peace): people need to be socially 
acceptable and enjoy public esteem.
(3) Inner peace: individuals need, and seek, cognitive consistency (or consonance, in 
Festinger’s words), i.e., consistency between one’s various private beliefs and preferences 
and themselves and between one’s private beliefs and preferences and one’s outer 
behaviour, including the public expression of one’s beliefs and opinions.
Now, very often (1) conflicts with (2), i.e., one’s inner beliefs are socially unpopular 
(unthinkable), so any public expression of them will put one in a socially unpopular position 
which, in Kuran’s words, will raise ‘doubts about one’s civility, morality, loyalty, 
practicality, or sanity’. In such a situation, and given the three incentives mentioned above,
81Ibid., ch. 11 & passim.
82Ibid., passim.
83Ibid., p. 189.
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one will face two alternative strategies: first, to hold on to (1) and thus lose (2) or, second, 
to give in to (2) and repress (1). An adoption of the second strategy, though, will also lead 
to lack of inner peace, i.e., it will lead to cognitive dissonance as one’s genuine beliefs will 
be at odds with one’s expressive beliefs. In this situation, then, the individual will either 
express his private beliefs and thus renounce the second strategy altogether and adopt the 
first one, or he will adjust his private inner unthinkable beliefs to the public thinkable ones 
-  in Kuran’s words, ‘she will brainwash herself thereby bringing her private preference in 
line with her public [expressed; O.C] preference.,84 Obviously, the more the society in which 
the individual lives is intolerant to unthinkable beliefs and therein practices rigorous social 
pressure towards conformity, the more will the individual in it be motivated to adjust 
himself to social beliefs and norms and ‘brainwash himself in order to avoid inner 
inconsistency.85
When individuals hide their genuine beliefs and express what they think that others expect 
them to express (preference falsification, in Kuran’s conceptualisation), they distort public 
discourse: they create the (wrong) impression as to what people are expected to express, 
i.e., what is within the bounds of the thinkable and, accordingly, what amounts to the 
unthinkable. Now, since public discourse carries information on public preferences, beliefs 
and thoughts, a distortion of public discourse leads to knowledge distortion: beliefs that are
84Kuran paraphrasing Festinger, in ibid., p. 182.
85See ibid., p. 88 & passim.
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not expressed in the public discourse eventually become unknown or unthought and thus 
distort ‘private knowledge and private opinion.’86 In this argument, however, ‘Beliefs get 
abandoned in response to transformation of the corpus of public information, not because 
individuals decide to change their own mindsS*1 The question is, What could motivate 
individuals to decide to abandon their private inner beliefs and change their minds? The 
answer, I believe, lies in the third incentive mentioned above, i.e., the aspiration to avoid 
cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger’s logic, when there is disharmony between 
one’s private and public beliefs or preferences, one will adjust ‘his beliefs deliberately in an 
effort to minimize the tensions they create.,8S And under a threat ofgreat hardship, ‘she will 
try harder to adapt her private preference to her chosen public preference.’89
Kuran, then, introduces two mechanisms of belief transition from the realm of the 
unthinkable (thus, the thought) to that o f the unthought: (i) lack of information or 
knowledge, Le., unawareness of some ideas or beliefs, and (ii) deliberate decision on the 
part of individuals to submit to public beliefs at the expense of their private ones. These two 
mechanisms (themselves interconnected) have two consequences-one is wtfragenerational, 
the other wtergenerational -  each of which, as we shall see, relevant to our current
86Ibid.,p. 178.
87Ibid., p. 181 (italic mine).
88Ibid., ibid.
89Ibid.,p. 182.
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discussion, /w/rngenerationally, as said, individuals will abandon their private beliefs and 
give in to public ones in order to attain inner consistency (cognitive consonance); 
m/ergenerationally, the abandoned beliefs will simply disappear from individuals 
consciousness: ‘by withholding its reservations about the status quo, a community can keep 
its descendants unaware of ideas for reform. Once sustained because people were afraid to 
challenge it, the status quo might come to persist because its alternatives are no longer 
known.’90
As said, following Durkheim, the age of Gemeinschaft was characterised by strict social 
values and norms. Accordingly, there existed an immense social pressure towards 
conformity, whereas any act of nonconformity was strictly punished -  either legally or 
socially.91 Surely this drive towards conformity did not slop the issue of identities, so, as 
argued before, it may well be the case that people in old communities did repeatedly suffer 
identity crises but were too afraid to externalise them. In other words, some individuals 
might have become aware of an objective contradiction between their socially consistent 
identities but still believed that their companions or society at large would perceive such a 
contradiction, once revealed, as unthinkable; those individuals thus refrained from 
displaying it in public. Moreover, under the circumstances such individuals might have well
90Ibid.,p. 186.
91For a relevant discussion, see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968).
66
taken part in the common social pressure they privately rejected, apparently because there 
was also pressure towards pressure, i.e., to exert pressure on apostates.92 Such individuals, 
then, not only suffered a contradiction between their different inner identities but also 
between their private and public ones -  between the way they genuinely identified 
themselves and the way they presented themselves to others.
It should be clear now why really existing contradictions between identities only rarely came 
to public knowledge, but it should also be clear why an awareness to such contradictions 
within individuals (identity crisis) could not last. Following Kuran’s mechanisms I will argue 
that (i) individuals who became aware of a contradiction, and forbore from revealing it in 
public, eventually repressed their personal contradiction and privately submitted to public 
truism in order to avoid cognitive dissonance or identity crisis (which is, I would argue, one 
type ofcognitive dissonance); accordingly (ii) the contradiction itself remained out of public 
discourse and knowledge and thereon ofprivate knowledge (both intragenerationally and 
intergenerationally); the contradiction thus became unthought. My previous argument, then, 
should be refined and say that, in the age of Gemeinschaft there was hardly any continuous 
identity crisis, neither within individuals nor across generations.
92As Kuran shows, under enormous social pressure people who privately oppose the common social 
beliefs or preferences are normally terrified of being exposed, hence very often become the most zealous 
persecutors of those who publicly oppose the very same beliefs, or are suspected of challenging them. See 
Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, pp. 62-63 & passim.
67
To conclude my argument I would like to add yet another point. As said before, echoing 
Walzer, the multiple identities the individual had in the era in question interpenetrated one 
another and constituted a single reality, namely, an encompassing identity that permeated 
all aspects of one’s life, bound one’s sub-identities together and saw they fit with one 
another, and, as Waldron put it, kept the whole house in order. In the rare cases of identity 
crisis, then, it was that encompassing identity that assisted the individual in bringing back 
his inner order, that is, in adjusting his sub-identities to one another and overcoming his 
identity crisis. It should be noted, though, that the encompassing identity not only bound 
one’s identities together but also consisted in those identities and largely depended on 
them.93 Adjusting sub-identities to one another, then, could materialise only when the 
contradiction between them was relatively minor and not overflowed, Le., only when most 
of them were mutually consistent (or, rather, perceived as being consistent) and only a 
smidgen was out of line; if sub-identities were wholly contradictory, the encompassing 
identity itself would lose its force and dissolve.
Now due to the simple structure of old Gemeinschaften, especially their little division o f 
labour,94 each and every member o f them featured within himself quite limited social 
identities (both in number and scope). In such conditions (limited social identities and their 
interpenetration), it would be more reasonable to assume that an identity crisis (if occurred)
93See pp. 45-46 above.
94On this matter see the following discussion.
68
typically involved a minor contradiction between identities and not an overflowed one. In 
saying that the encompassing identity sustained one’s integrity, then, we are actually saying 
in other words that the individual could confront a recalcitrant sub-identity, as it were, by 
appealing to his other sub-identities, themselves attached by the encompassing identity and 
therefore consistent with one another. I£ for example, one shared identities al9 a2, a3 and 
a4 under the auspices of one’s encompassing identity .<4, and one discovered that a{ did not 
fit a2, a3 and a4 (themselves coupled by A), one actually found out that ax did not fit A. In 
the attempts to overcome the crisis, then, one would concurrently adjust ax to A and to a2, 
a3 and a4. Obviously, a minor contradiction is much easier to solve than an overflowed 
one,95 so it may be added that in the age of Gemeinschaft people hardly suffered any 
continuous or serious identity crisis -  serious being a crisis that cannot be overcome or 
solved by an appeal to one’s other own identities.
Now allow me to sketch out, as briefly as possible, what were the conditions that led to the 
domination of the structure of Gemeinschaft throughout the premodem era, hence to the 
sense of natural and organic belonging that people in that era shared. Despite the differences 
and development in time,96 the economic and social structure of premodem communities 
remained rather simple: they were mostly characterised by little division of labour and were
95See Festinger, A Theory o f Cognitive Dissonance, p. 17 & passim.
96As already noted, the age of Gemeinschaft in itself was not monolithic or static but passed through 
various stages and phases.
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based on small, largely self-sufficient (autarkic), units of production and consumption.97 
Under these material conditions of the premodem world, the undeveloped means of 
production, transportation and communication, there was hardly a need or an ability o f 
constant or manifold interactions between such small communities, or at least between 
distant ones.98 Consequently, premodem states were, as Connor puts it, ‘poorly integrated,’ 
and as such they neither interfered in the lives o f these communities nor did they lead to 
varied or intensive contacts between them.99
Under such conditions, then, ‘meaningful identity of a positive nature remains limited to 
local, region, clan, or tribe.’100 With regard to any wider group identity, Connor adds,
97See Tfinnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’, pp. 53-64 & passim. C£ Marx & Engels, The 
German Ideology, pp. 161-163, and K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte, in MSW, p. 
317.
98In a way this is a tautological statement: the very notion of distance is dependent upon the ability 
to interact, which appeals both to geography and means of transportation as well as to the means of 
communication. The inability of two communities to interact, then, already implies that they are distant.
We may still say (not purely metaphorically) that if today we are living in a global village, in the epoch in 
question the village was the globe.
"Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 36. An identical argument is put forward in Smith, The Ethnic Origins 
o f Nations, pp. 154-155. See also G. R  Sabine, A History o f Political Theory vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1955), pp. 331-332, and A. Hastings, The Construction o f Nationhood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 29. Even in many cases of wars and conquests (e.g., in areas that 
were conquered by the Roman Republic and the Macedonians), new rules constituted no more than remote 
political roofs for preexisting Gemeinschaften, whose intra structures and interrelations remained more or 
less the same as before. In other cases, though, wars and conquests led to the physical destruction of 
Gemeinschaften by genocide and exile (often accompanied by their intentional disintegration and 
enslavement).
100Ibid., p. 103.
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‘peoples [were] not yet cognizant of belonging to a larger ethnic element.’101 To the extent 
that interrelations between such small communities did exist (e.g., in trade, rituals or cases 
of warfare) and constituted wider Gemeinschaften, as Smith for instance indicates, they 
were basically conducted by relatively small elites (‘the educated upper strata’, in Smith’s 
words) who communicated the communal sense of belonging to the masses without, as 
Smith implies, interfering in the internal life of the sub-Gemeinschaften or posing any threat 
to their integrity.102
The inter-community isolation and intra-sufficiency also involved a communal sense and 
strong feelings ofcommon identity and destiny which embodied the belief in a given, natural 
and organic belonging; they have led old communities, to use Anderson’s words, to 
conceive ‘ofthemselves as cosmically central...’103 AndasP. Bourdieu explains, ‘when there 
is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles 
of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-evident. 
This experience we shall call doxa, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox 
belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility o f different or antagonistic
101Ibid.,p. 102.
102Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 30-31. See also TOnnies, ‘Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft’, pp. 210-211.
103Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 13.
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beliefs.’104 In Smith’s words,
Out of this economic pattern of local ties and local exchange, there developed characteristic 
‘folk rhythms’ and Little Traditions...These include local myths and legends, patois and 
dialects, rites and customs which tend to persist for generations in the countryside, and 
which complement the work patterns and residence patterns of the peasantry. This round 
o f weekly, seasonal and life cycles, with their associated feasts and customs and rites de 
passage, comprises the religious and folk cultures o f peasants and tribesmen in many 
ancient and medieval societies everywhere...103
A belief in a given, natural and organic belonging (self-evident social order, in Bourdieu’s 
words) should be associated with an equilibrium between identities for sure, but it is not in 
itself bom “automatically”, without further human intervention. Such a belief then, is a 
product of identity formation, of the incorporation o f various identities (themselves 
constructed) into one coherent encompassing identity, by those who Laitin identifies as 
cultural entrepreneurs. Thus, ‘Cultural and political elites o f a group in equilibrium, by 
giving meaning to the equilibrium -  that is, by providing it with the “beliefs’ principles and 
constraints” that Harre identified -  make it into a focal point’, that is, ‘A point of 
coordination, in which there is a tacit understanding among all people in a community that
104P. Bourdieu, Outline o f A Theory o f Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
164 (italic original). It is interesting to note the resemblance between Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa, 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy and, respectively, Kuran’s concepts of unthought, unthinkable and thinkable.
105Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p. 33.
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this is an aspect of their identity...’106
The material conditions, then, may boost the equilibrium, but cultural entrepreneurs advance 
it and give it meaning -  they ‘naturalize, or essentiaiize’ it, thus ‘make that equilibrium look 
like a law of nature’ so it ‘will be thought of as natural, or inevitable.’107 In premodem 
communities that were characterised by little division oflabour and little professionalisation, 
such ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ constituted a highly homogeneous stratum with little 
competition on identity formation.108 Accordingly, the social spheres, categories and 
identities they produced were easily incorporated and seen as natural and inseparable, Le., 
they constituted Gemeinschaften.
2.5 NOTES ON HEGEMONY AND ALIENATION
Any social category or identity, society or community is a social creation or scheme -  it is 
not formed and materialise exclusively by one elite or another but by all the people who are 
associated with it and consists of the total interrelations of those people. The point is that, 
the formation of those schemes and their materialisation in the era in question (and, I will
10 6Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 22. Casting a meaning to preexisting “objective” equilibrium would 
be identified by Marxists as an ideology, i.e., the rationalisation of preexisting state of affairs, normally a 
tasteless and irrational one.
107Ibid.,p. 23.
108C£ A. Gramsci, ‘The Different Class of the Urban Intellectuals and of the Rural Intellectuals* and 
‘Traditional Intellectuals*, in On Hegemony (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2004), pp. 42-52. (In Hebrew).
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argue later, still at present) were not made under conditions o f liberty and equality but 
rather under hierarchical and oppressive ones. The influence of different people on the 
character of those schemes, then, was far from being equal. Thus, as Smith puts it, the 
economic subjection of the peasant masses also led to their passivity in and exclusion from 
active influence on their group identities.109 And in Connor’s words, ‘the masses, until quite 
recently isolated in rural pockets and being semi or totally illiterate, were quite mute with 
regard to their sense of group identity(ies),’no i.e., they were not actively involved in the 
determination of their identities. But those masses were still involved in that formation 
passively, i.e., by accepting their lot as a law of nature: ‘Acceptance and a spirit o f 
resignation was often bred in these circumstances...’111
Following Kuran’s arguments, I would like to make here two clarifications. First, in my 
view the passivity of the masses stemmed not only from economic subjection and illiteracy, 
but also from the intolerance and pressure towards conformity (driven and conducted by 
elites), a pressure characteristically typical of small traditional communities.112 Secondly, 
such pressure was indeed driven and conducted, even imposed, by elites, but not totally
109Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p. 155.
u0Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 223.
u lSmith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p. 155.
112See Kuran, Private Troths, Public Lies, pp. 98-99.1 would argue, though, that one’s economic 
position, literacy or illiteracy and location on the ‘pressure scale’ (i.e., one’s power in pressing towards 
conformity) are deeply connected.
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unilaterally, i.e., without some active contribution by some of the masses themselves. So 
alongside the ‘muteness’ and passivity of some of the masses, some o f them were at least 
partly actively involved in the formation and preservation of their group identity and of their 
station within it, hence in their own subjection in it.
As we have seen (following Kuran’s study), the active involvement of the masses found 
expression primarily in the sanctions imposed by the masses on nonconformists -  those who 
deviated from the conventional credo of their community with the intention of reforming 
it and improving their kismet. Accordingly, as Kuran shows, under the pressure towards 
conformity the abovementioned involvement of the masses ultimately really benefited the 
elites and their economic, cultural and political agenda. In that sense, and in that sense 
alone, we may say that the elites were those who determined their group identity. In other 
words, the elites did not form, consolidate and preserve their group identity exclusively and 
unilaterally, but they indeed were more powerful in dictating that identity -  that is, they 
enjoyed hegemony in those formation, consolidation and preservation, and in the lives of 
their community at large.113
As Kuran notes in his discussion on the caste system:
U3Following Gramsci, I understand hegemony as the power to manufacture consensus. See Gramsci, 
On Hegemony, passim. C£ E. S. Homan & N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1988). According to Gramsci, as well as Herman and Chomsky, the power to manufacture consensus 
is primarily the ability to brainwash others, i.e., the ruling classes use their power to imbue beliefs and 
opinions into the minds of the ruled ones. In my view, though, the power to manufacture consensus 
(hegemony) is also the ability to make others brainwash themselves (see pp. 62-65 above).
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My own explanation does not deny the brahmans’ role in imposing and preserving 
inequality. It insists, however, that the subjugated castes contributed to the system’s 
persistence through their willingness to uphold caste regulations and to sanction their 
nonconformist peers.
\
There is much truth to the view that the minds of Indians, including those of the lower 
castes, have been shackled by an ideology that exalts hereditary differences...Hinduism has 
reinforced India’s social stability by weakening individual Indians* inner resistance to 
discrimination. Many brahmans have been among the beneficiaries of various Hindu 
tenets.114
At a later stage Kuran asks the inevitable question,115 ‘Does my explanation amount to
“blaming the victim”?’ and he answers:
If by this one means that victims contribute to their own victimization, the answer is an 
emphatic yes. The victims of oppressive, misguided, and counterproductive policies invite 
the perpetuation of their misery whenever they hide, shade, or distort their convictions. That 
they face very strong pressures to conform does not deny them free will. They are not 
passive objects caught in the toils of a machine made and preserved entirely by others...The
U4Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, p. 135.
U5Note that this question of Kuran’s does not refer to the caste system wily but to the general 
phenomenon of collective conservatism -  when ‘a society perpetuates a structure that is widely disliked and 
resented...because reform-oriented individuals refrain from publicizing their views, thus reinforcing the 
social incentives for such preference falsification.’ Ibid., p. 153. Note that according to Kuran those 
‘reform-oriented individuals* are normally victims of that ‘disliked and resented’ structure.
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pressures that weigh on victims of a policy are sustained at least partly by their own 
choices.116
My only reservation is from Kuran’s assertion that ‘very strong social pressure’ of the kind 
he specifies does not deny people free will. As T. M. Scanlon rightly observes, ’once the 
people are placed in disadvantageous circumstances, circumstances which themselves make 
it very unlikely that anyone would make the choices necessary to escape, offering these 
people the opportunity to exert themselves does little to improve their position.'117 Similarly, 
I believe that the circumstances of immense social pressure that Kuran describes also ‘make 
it very unlikely that anyone would make the choices necessary to escape’, even if Kuran is 
kind enough to offer the people in these circumstances ‘the opportunity to exert 
themselves’. In other words, such circumstances cannot be described as conditions of free 
choice, hence they do indeed deity people free will.
In feet, I think that in the second answer Kuran gives to his question -  ‘Does my 
explanation amount to “blaming the victim”?’ -  he actually contradicts his assertion on the 
free will o f people who face ‘veiy strong social pressure’. As he says, ‘if “blaming the 
victim” is taken to mean that the victim is unequivocally wrong to engage in preference
U6Ibid., ibid.
117T. M. Scanlon, 'The Significance of Choice', in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII, ed. 
S. M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: Univarsity of Utah Press, 1988), p. 185.
falsification, the answer is no. It is not immoral to avoid social isolation, material 
deprivation, and physical injury...’118 According to this contention, we cannot blame people 
for falsifying their preferences, and thus preserving their own oppression, when they do so 
in order to avoid dire sanctions. Obviously, the threat of such sanctions rules out any 
possibility of free choice or will Moreover, in order to say that people did not act 
immorally, we should be able to show that they could not truly act but in the way they did, 
i.e., they did not really have any other choice or alternative, hence they did not make a free 
choice. On the other hand, in order to say that people acted immorally, we should be able 
to show that they could truly act otherwise and chose the wrong way. In saying that people 
who free grievous sanctions are not immoral in the actions they take in order to avoid those 
sanctions, Kuran actually implies that those people cannot truly do otherwise, i.e., they are 
indeed denied free choice and will.
As I said, any social category or identity, society or community is formed and materialise 
by all the people who are associated with it and consists of the total interrelations of those 
people. Given my arguments thus far, it seems that in the age of Gemeinschaft the victims 
of different social schemes were also sociologically responsible for the preservation of their 
communities, categories and identities, but they were not morally responsible for it (at least 
not to the same extent that the elites were) because they acted under social conditions that 
they did not choose or agree upon, although, as said, they surely did contribute to their
U8Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, p. 153.
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existence. In that sense, the victim ‘is as much a prisoner o f an oppressive situation as he 
is a perpetrator, for he cannot correct it unilaterally.’119 The victims are both prisoners and 
perpetrators because they are ‘unaware of their collective power to institute reforms,’120 
they are unaware of this power of theirs because under the pressure they (individually) 
falsify their preferences, hence suppress any knowledge about the viability o f reforms and, 
consequently, refrain from any individual endeavour to reform. Eventually, the oppressed 
individuals themselves conceive the social order that oppresses diem as inevitable and self- 
evident, that is, as natural121
The oppressive social order (categories, identities and communities), then, was to a great 
extent an unintended by-product o f individual actions on the part of the oppressed 
individuals themselves, who foiled to engage in collective action in order to reform and 
amend it. Far from being nice, cosy homes, old communities constituted an alienated form 
in the Marxist sense. As Elster explains, according to Marx alienation is ‘the fact that the 
products of human activity may take on an independent and even hostile form vis-a-vis their 
creators.’122 People are alienated ‘from the aggregate result o f their activities when (i) they 
do not realize that these aggregates are the result of their own activities and (ii) they are
119Ibid., ibid.
120Ibid.,p. 134.
m See ibid., pp. 198-201.
122Elster, Making Sense o f Marx, p. 92.
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unable to control or to change the outcome.’123 And as Marx himself put it, the social power 
...appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about 
naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside diem, of the 
origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the 
contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and 
the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.124
The oppressed individual is thus also alienated from his own activity that creates the 
alienated social order: the individual is related to ‘his own activity as something that is alien 
and does not belong to him; it is activity that is passivity, power that is weakness, 
procreation that is castration... an activity directed against himself independent o f him and 
not belonging to him.’125
In this chapter I have concentrated on the character o f premodern communities and the 
individual identity in them. The next chapter concentrates on the modem conditions and the 
unique advantages as well as disadvantages they pose on the individual in general and on 
his identity in particular.
123IbicL, p. 100.
124Marx, The German Ideology, p. 170.
125Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in MSW, P. 81. Note that Marx is talking here 
about the worker’s alienation from die act of production. I would argue, though, that Marx’s theory of 
alienation in general and in regard to production in particular may coherently be extended to cover any 
social activity and construction, including the formation of communities, categories and identities.
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3
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY
3.1 MODERN CONDITIONS AND THE DECLINE OF OLD GEMEINSCHAFTEN
Nationalism, says T. Naim, derives a considerable part of its power from its ability to supply 
an identity: 'It [nationalism] supplies peoples and persons with an important commodity, 
'identity'...Whenever we talk about nationalism, we normally find ourselves talking before 
too long about 'feelings', 'instincts', supposed desires and hankerings to 'belong', and so on. 
This psychology is obviously an important feet about nationalism.'1 Now if, as said, in the 
premodem era this 'commodity of identity was supplied and the people in that era hardly 
suffered any identity crisis, and nationalism is a modem doctrine whose power lies in its 
ability to supply an identity, then it seems that prior to its emergence an identity crisis (as 
a widespread, social phenomenon) did pervade, otherwise there was no need to have a 'new 
supply. And if an identity crisis did pervade, it also seems that those old loyalties that 
supplied people with certain and stable identities could not deliver these goods anymore and 
declined as Gemeinschaften. But how did it take place? How did modernity dissolve 
preexisting Gemeinschaften? And how exactly did nationalism and universalist democracy 
emerge out of these decline and crisis? The answers, I believe, lie primarily in the rise of 
modem capitalism and the contradictions it brings along.
1T. Naim, The Break-up o f Britain (London: Verso, 1981), p. 334.
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In his All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, Marshall Berman writes:
There is a mode of vital experience -  experience of space and time, of the self and others, 
of life’s possibilities and perils -  that is shared by men and women all over the world today. 
I will call this experience ‘modernity’. To be modem is to find ourselves in an environment 
that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of the ourselves and the 
world -  and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we 
know, everything we are. Modem environments and experiences cut across all boundaries 
of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, 
modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: 
it pours us into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and 
contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To be modem is to be part of a universe in which, 
as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts into air’.’2
Modernity, then, should be understood as a unique combination of expansion in space and 
contraction in time, each of which and the two together, as was suggested in the 
Introduction, are strongly associated with capitalism: it is only under capitalism that the 
growing division of labour, specialisation and professionalisation, development o f the 
productive forces, means of communication and transportation, growth-oriented economies 
and technological innovations -  all take an unprecedented rapid and pervasive form. It 
should not be too difficult to imagine what kind of contradictions and tensions Berman finds
2Quoted in A. Callinicos, Against Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 31.
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in these developments and what sort of ideas these contradictions could give rise to.
The primary contradictions are necessarily those that are inherent in capitalism itself, as a 
specific mode of production: its conduciveness to economic growth, on the one hand, and 
the chronic economic crises, recessions and uncertainties it entails, on the other; its 
simultaneous creation of enormous wealth and horrific poverty; the technological 
advantages it produces, potentially beneficial for all, together with its inability to prevent 
their misuse and marginalise the dangers they inherently bear and of which masses ofpeople 
are actual and we are all potential victims; its enlargement of human needs and the means 
to satisfy them, alongside its M ure to actually satisfy them. But these contradictions and 
tensions go beyond the capitalist mode of production itself and pervade into realms other 
than the economy. As Marx and Engels put it (in the paragraph on which Berman relies), 
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.3
The constant and, it should be stressed, uncontrolled and unplanned changes that capitalism
3Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 224 (italic mine).
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brings about,4 upset the applecart and give rise to social uncertainties which involve (among 
others) the decline o f well-known attachments and the solid sense of belonging and identity 
they supplied. At the same time, however, the individual is at last liberated from ‘all fixed 
and fast-frozen relations,’ ‘venerable prejudices and opinions,’ and any sort o f “organic” 
whole, i.e., from Gemeinschaften:5 he is ‘compelled to face with sober senses, his real 
conditions o f life, and his relations with his kind.’ That is, the individual is compelled to 
evaluate his social situation and relations not, as it were, as an organ of this or that 
community, but ‘from the outside’, as an autonomous subject; he thus can break down the 
old material, geographical, and cognitive barriers and reach ‘wider forms of self- 
determination. ’6 Indeed, as G. Kateb puts it (although in another context), when everything
4In ‘uncontrolled and unplanned* I primarily mean, just like Marx, that the changes that capitalism 
brings (and capitalism itself as a specific mode of production) are not an intentional or deliberate product 
of cooperation between freely associated individuals, but the unintentional by-product of their separate 
uncoordinated actions. And as long as individuals do not {voluntarily) coordinate their actions and act 
collectively in order to control their common conditions, the consequences oftheir doings will always differ 
from their intentions and forevermore remain out of their control. See, e.g., Marx & Engels, The German 
Ideology, esp. pp. 178 & 181; Marx, Preface to A Critique o f Political Economy, in MSW, p. 389; and 
Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, ch. 2 & passim.
5Recall Marx’s claim that in contrast to premodem times, in which individuals belonged, as it were, 
to largo* wholes, in modernity the individual as a person and his social memberships are totally separated.
6C£ G. Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 
1971), ch. 15. As will be touched upon in ch. 11, Marx did indeed celebrate these developments undo 
capitalism. He nevertheless still saw the limited nature of these developments under capitalism and believed 
that only socialism could deliver them fully. For one explicit statement in support of ethical individualism 
(the moral priority of the individual) and individual liberty and the positive role of capitalism in their 
development, see Marx, Grundrisse, p. 372. C£ Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, pp. 46,58 & 67. For 
a comprehensive discussion on the development of individualism and the concept of the individual, see C. 
B. MacPherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); C. 
Taylor, Sources o f the Self{Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. parts I-H; and L. Dumont, 
Essays on Individualism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also Giddens, The Third Way, 
pp. 57-60.
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is unsettled, the growth of individuality becomes inevitable.7 The upshot is that, human 
identities and associations can no longer appear as “natural” and “given” but are conceived 
as artificially constructed, premeditated, and thus negotiable and changeable: they become, 
in other words, Gesellschaften.
If this is the contribution of capitalism in the temporal sense (contraction in time), the same 
should be said as to its contribution as far as the spatial dimension is concerned (expansion 
in space), o f which Marx was also well aware. As E. Nimni explains in his analysis of Marx 
and Engels’s treatment of the national question, capitalism causes ‘the destruction of local 
peculiarities...[and intensifies the] interdependence among units ofproduction...Capitalism 
breaks the isolation of feudal units, increasing the interaction of the various participants in 
the newly formed market.’8 And as Elias observes,
...as the series o f actions and the number of people on whom the individual and his actions 
constantly depend are increased, the habit of foresight over longer chains grows stronger. 
And as the behaviour and personality structure of the individual change, so does his manner 
o f considering others. His image of them becomes richer in nuances, freer o f spontaneous 
emotions: it is “psychologized”.9
7G. Kateb, ‘Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics’, in Political Theory 12/3 (1984), p.
339.
8E. Nimni, ‘Marx, Engels, and the National Question’, in Kymlicka, The Rights o f Minority Cultures, 
p. 59.
*N. Elias, The Civilizing Process (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), p. 477.
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Similar to temporal contraction, then, spatial expansion also leads to the emancipation of 
individuals -  their liberation from closed forms of Gemeinschaften and the dominant 
experience of doxa; the individual multiplicity and complexity of statuses, identities and 
dependencies allow nothing else as they involve his exposure to various and distinct, 
perhaps even infinite, identity projects from which he is compelled to choose, again, as an 
autonomous self-choosing subject.10 Paraphrasing Virginia Woo If inherit Room o f One’s 
Own, it seems that modernity makes it more difficult than ever to put gates, locks, or bolts 
upon the freedom of the mind.
From what I have said so far, it is easy to see in what sense the modem conditions are 
conducive to the development of epistemological, ontological and methodological 
individualism.11 Epistemologically, the individual comes to recognise himself (and human 
beings at large) as an autonomous self-choosing agent, i.e., as a (perhaps the only) creature 
that can come to have knowledge and act upon it; ontologically, social practices and 
structures come to be seen as constructed by individual human beings and not the other way
10In evaluating and choosing his social relations and identities as an autonomous subject, I do not 
mean that the individual makes these evaluations and choices in a vacuum, out of any context. Rather, I 
mean that for the first time in history the individual is both able and bound to evaluate his social identities 
and affiliations as a whole, including those in which he makes his evaluations and choices. It is precisely 
this possibility that characterises the modem individual.
uAccording to Bobbio, one of the main incidents that led to the ‘crystallisation of the individualistic 
conception of society and state and to the undermining of the organic conception’ was the birth of the 
modem capitalistic political economy, which put the individual in the centre ‘as homo economicus and not 
as politikon zoon like in traditional thought, according to which the individual is not counted for himself 
but only as a member of community.’ Bobbio, The Future o f Democracy, p. 6.
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around -  any social reality thus consists only of individuals who make choices and act and 
has no reality independent of their choices and actions; methodologically, social realities 
come to be explained in terms of individuals’ actions and not in terms of social wholes or 
‘organisms’.
But out of this triple individualism and the modem conditions in general also emerge 
various normative ideas and theories that celebrate those developments, pushing them into 
the ethical and political realms. Such ideas and theories thus acclaim the centrality of the 
individual and prioritise his nature and value as an autonomous self-choosing being. 
Accordingly, these ideas and theories put the individual interests at the centre o f ethical and 
political concern, arguing that the only criterion for evaluating social and political practices 
is by reference to their contribution to the interests of those individuals who are affected by 
them.12 As will be elaborated in Chapters 7-11, democracy is indeed one theory o f this kind, 
i.e., a theory that puts the individual and his interests at the centre and tries to devise a 
reasonable way of advancing them. Indeed, as Bobbio puts it,
Democracy was bom out of an individualistic conception of society, and it is opposed to the 
organic perception that dominated the Ancient-Age and the Medieval-Age, perception 
according to which the whole is superior to the individual. Democracy sees in any form  o f  
society, particularly in the political society, an artificial product -  an outcome of
“ Obviously, the concept of interests is widely controversial and I shall refer to it in later chapters. For 
the moment, however, I would like to put this issue aside. For a relevant discussion, see Barry, ‘Self- 
Government Revisited*, p. 124.
87
individuals’ will.13
Note that according to Bobbio democracy sees any form of society as a product of 
individuals’ will. In later chapters I shall argue that this claim is also true as far as the nation 
is concerned, and that the democratic conception o f the nation is indeed subjective, Le., it 
sees the nation as constructed by individuals and by individuals alone. But in the quoted 
phrase Bobbio seems to make an ontological observation and not a normative claim -  
democracy, he says, sees any form of social practice as an outcome of individuals’ will, but 
he does not say how, following this observation, democracy should act and treat 
individuals. This flaw is revealed in Bobbio’s failure to address three essential questions, 
which will be dealt with primarily in Chapters 8 and 11: (i) what are the origins o f people’s 
will to form a common social form? (ii) are those people who belong to a common social 
form themselves aware of its artificiality and of their role in creating it? and (iii) what 
conditions should be met in order to make the will of those people reasonably free? In 
overlooking these questions, Bobbio also fails to distinguish between private will and public 
will. In talking of will in general, without making this distinction, Bobbio ignores the 
possibility that the people who construct a social practice act or express specific wills or 
preferences and beliefs because of the social circumstances they face and not because they 
really (i.e., privately) endorse them. In other words, he overlooks the probability that
13Bobbio, The Future o f Democracy, p. 6 (italic mine). As Bobbio adds, the basic principle of 
democracy says that the source of power in a democratic system is the individuals iuti singoli* {qua 
individuals). Ibid., p. 128.
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individuals’ actions and expressed wills will be at odds with their true convictions and 
aspirations. Following Kuran’s theory, then, I will maintain that it would be more accurate 
to say that the nation (and social practices at large) is constructed by individuals’ actions 
or public will and not simply by will
As already suggested, though, it is exactly the above-mentioned modem developments that 
entail the agitations Marx talks about, of which, I would argue, identity crisis constitutes 
a major part. In place of the well-known Gemeinschaften, the communal values and strong 
sense of belonging and identity they supplied (primarily the encompassing identity that was 
furnished by the ultimate Gemeinschaft), the modem conditions engender a chaotic self 
whose identity consists of a disintegrated eclectic hotchpotch: ’myself disintegrated, 
everyone disintegrated,’ as W. Whitman puts it.14 The self, the managerial entity of this 
melange, thus itself appears ambiguous and unclear: ‘it has none of the ethical unity that the 
autonomous Kantian individual is supposed to confer on his life; it is a life of kaleidoscopic 
tension and variety...[It is] pluralism internalized from the relations between individuals to 
the chaotic coexistence of projects, pursuits, ideas, images, and snatches of culture within 
an individual.’15
14Quoted in G. Kateb, ‘Walt Whitman and the Culture of Democracy’, in The Self cmd the Political 
Order, ed. T. B. Strong (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), p. 215.
15Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p. 94 (paraphrasing Salman 
Rushdie; italic original). C£ C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 1, note 
esp. p. 23.
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In my view, however, Waldron is too reckless in conflating cultural variety and social 
pluralism with tensions and, as he does in other places, conflicts, dissonances, confusions 
and antagonisms within individuals.16 Why should cultural variety and pluralism engender 
any tension, chaos or antagonism within the individual? Why should they lead to a 
schizophrenic and disintegrated self? Why cannot the individual choose from the various 
options he feces and incorporate within himself a coherent order or ‘coexistence ofprojects, 
pursuits, ideas, images, and snatches of culture’? Indeed, as Weber realises, modernity 
produces and exposes us to numerous irreconcilable values and identities and cannot answer 
Tolstoy’s question: what shall we do and how shall we live? In that sense, it is up to 
individuals to choose or invent their own values and identities out of the available 
contradictory materials (social categories).17 Yet again, it is fer from being self-evident that 
tensions and contradictions between social categories are necessarily translated into 
tensions and contradictions within the individual
As we have seen, multiple identities can coexist within a person only insofar as choice is not 
necessary, Le., only when these identities are not conflicting or contradictory. On the fece
16See ibid., pp. 110-112. A similar conflation is made by Whitman, who argues that in the (modem) 
democratic age we all carry within ourselves a nearly unlimited, and thus conflicting, set of identity 
possibilities: ‘Our potentialities are not only numberless but -  and for that reason -  conflicting. We are 
inhabited by tumultuous atoms. We are composite, not even composed. ’ Whitman thus concludes that there 
is no clear self -  no single, transparent entity to know -  but only a multiple, unfamiliar and contradictory 
one. Kateb, ‘Walt Whitman and the Culture of Democracy’, pp. 215 & 218-219.
17M  Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills 
(London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 143 & 152-153.
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of it, then, it is not only that social pluralism and the existence of contradictory social 
categories are not necessarily translated into a chaotic, let alone contradictory, identities 
within the individual; rather, it seems that they necessarily are not translated into such a 
chaotic or contradictory self: each individual incorporates within himself multiple and 
changeable identities, that is true, but (in principle) they are so incorporated insofar as they 
can coherently coexist. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Laitin, Festinger and Kuran (among 
others) persuasively argue that in feet there is a human natural incentive to sustain the 
coherence and integrity of the self. Far from being a “natural” or desirable condition, 
ambiguous or contradictory identity, as Laitin puts it, ‘indeed represents a “problem”, or 
more commonly a “crisis”.’18 Identity crisis, then, is primarily the frustration ofthe incentive 
for a coherent and integrated self the failure of the individual to integrate his multiple 
identities into one coherent and certain or clear personality.19
An identity crisis, then, is not a result of pluralism and variety as such, nor is it a 
consequence of the loss of an ultimate Gemeinschaft -  a single cultural entity that may 
confer a corresponding degree of integrity on the individual self that is constituted under 
its auspices, to use Waldron’s words. An identity crisis, that is to say, occurs not simply 
because the modem individual is exposed to numerous and irreconcilable categories and 
identities from which he has to choose in absence of any encompassing identity; rather, such
18Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 18.
19See pp. 52-53 above.
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a crisis arises only when the individual is compelled to choose between categories and 
identities that he concurrently would like to embrace but cannot because these particular 
categories and identities are contradictory. In other words, it is not the necessity to make 
choices in general and in itself that represents the crisis but the specific circumstances under 
which the said pluralism and contradictions materialise, Le., the specific social conditions 
under which individuals construct and choose their social identities (the choice situation the 
modem individual feces). In such a situation the individual will have to renounce one or 
more of the conflicting identities with which he actually identifies himself in order to 
endorse others and to sustain his inner coherence.20 When the individual in such a situation 
is unable to make the necessary choice because he cannot decide which of these conflicting 
identities fits him better, Le., where he really belongs, then he will fece an identity crisis -  
most probably a serious and continuous one.21
3.2 SOURCES OF IDENTITY CRISIS
As noted above, the social conditions that capitalism brings along are en masse unregulated 
and unplanned: they are not created consciously or willfully and on which, in practice, 
people have no control. Under these conditions, and in the absence of any global
20As Laitin explains, ‘when the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those 
of another identity held by the same person, as they do when the two identities represent antagonistic groups 
on the political stage, people are compelled to give priority to one identity over the other.’ Laitin, Identity 
in Formation, p. 23.
21For the meaning o f‘serious’ and ‘continuous’ identity crisis, see sc. 2.4, esp. pp. 65-68.
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cooperation or united attempt to transform and overpower them, the associations and 
identities people form are still abandoned to chaos and subject to unintentional 
consequences of uncoordinated actions. They are, so to speak, consciously human-made 
elements within a totality ruled by chance. Here too we can divide the impact into temporal 
and spatial dimensions. For one thing, the said conditions not only sweep away all ancient 
‘fixed, fast-frozen relations,’ they also antiquate ‘all new-formed ones before they can 
ossify.’ New, consciously human-made identities (Gesellschaften), then, can deliver neither 
stability and certainty nor a sense of continuation. In that sense, the individual identity is 
unclear and fragmented in time.22 As far as the temporal dimension is concerned, then, the 
chaotic self is better understood as a by-product o f chaotic conditions and not simply of 
multiple and changeable identities or snatches o f culture as such. On top of that dimension 
there is the spatial fragmentation of identities, which also involves the chaotic and 
contradictory conditions to which capitalism is conducive. Before moving on to this 
dimension, though, there is one point that should be clarified.
A contradiction between identities may be logical or social23 In logical contradiction, the 
different identities are inherently incompatible irrespective of how society treats them or 
understands their interrelations, e.g., one cannot be at the same time a homosexual and a 
bisexual. Such a contradiction, then, cannot be solved by political means and is of no
22C£ Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, pp. 234-235.
23See Festinger, A Theory o f Cognitive Dissonance, p. 14.
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interest to us here. Social contradiction, on the other hand, refers to situations where 
identities are mutually exclusive only because society conceives them as being 
contradictory, Le., it is an artificial or constructed contradiction. Thus, for example, any 
individual can logically be at one and the same time a Catholic priest and a homosexual, but 
if these two identities are socially structured and considered as incompatible, then an 
individual who would like to embrace the two but under the circumstances (the choice 
situation) is forced to choose between them will clearly face an identity crisis.24 This kind 
of crisis, however, can be resolved by social action or political means -  people may 
collectively transform the situation and bring those socially contradictory identities in line 
with one another -  and it is therefore this type that deserves our attention in this study.
As for as the spatial dimension is concerned, I believe that the modem conditions contribute 
to such social contradictions in two basic (and connected) ways. First is the separation 
between social identities or categories and themselves, Le., the differentiation of formerly 
interpenetrating social identities (itself a by-product of the growing division o f labour) and 
the loss of any encompassing one.25 Second is what Marx calls the separation between the 
individual as a person and what is accidental to him, i.e., the liberation of the individual from
24See B. McMahon, ‘Vatican to Toughen Rules on Homosexuals with Ban on Gay Men Joining 
Priesthood*, The Independent, September 23,2005.
25See Durkheim, The Division o f Labor in Society, pp. 266-270. C£ Parsons, The Social System, pp. 
48 Iff As Durkheim adds, the process of differentiation and the varied culture it creates is an unintentional 
consequence of division of labour and competition: people receive it ‘without having desired it’ (p. 273).
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any sort of ascribed or organic belonging. The idea I have in mind is in a way both a 
revision and an expansion of Lukacs’s idea of reification and its application to the question 
of identities. For Lukacs, the capitalist division of labour and fragmentation of the 
production process into disparate elements ‘invaded the psyche’: they entail the division of 
the individual personality and its psychological compartmentalisation (reification).26 In my 
view, however, the important point is that, in the context of production and labour some 
of the individual ‘compartments’ are regarded as part o f his personality while others (his 
labour-power) are treated as external, even opposed, to it, and only used to sustain 
production as an external end: ‘Therefore, we should not say that one man’s hour is worth 
another man’s hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as 
another man during an hour.’27 The individual is thus not regarded as a person but as a 
producer whose capacities and needs as a person are left behind the factory gates.28 In other 
words, in production and labour the individual is unable to realise his humanity in full or to 
achieve full self-realisation.
Applying the idea o f reification to the question of identities,29 we might have said that the
26Lukacs, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, part I, esp. scs. 1-2.
27Ibid., pp. 88 & 99. The quotation is from p. 89.
28This attitude was well expressed by Henry Ford who complained: ‘How come every time I want a 
pair of hands I get a human being?’ A “scientific” method for the separation between the worker and his 
mental skills was (in)famously offered by F. W. Taylor in Scientific Management (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1947).
29Note that applying Luk&cs’s idea of reification to the question of identities does not imply that there
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fragmentation of society into disparate identities leads to the reification of the person and 
its internal division. Had we confined ourselves to this, however, we would have inevitably 
admitted that it is social pluralism itself that creates the schizophrenic self But, as said 
above, in my view the main problem in the production process is not the fragmentation of 
the process itself nor is it the compartmentalisation of the individual as such. Instead, the 
main difficulty is the interrelations between the individual as a person and his labour 
‘compartment’, i.e., the opposition between the individual as a human being and the 
individual as a worker. As far as social categories and identities are concerned, then, it 
seems that the major trouble is the separation between the individual as a person and his 
social identities, as sketched above. Yet again, had we said that this was the issue, we 
would have implied that it is after all the necessity of the modem individual to choose his 
identities by himself that causes the crisis. The primary cause of the crisis, as already 
suggested, lies therefore not merely in the differentiation of formerly interpenetrating social 
categories but in their constructed antagonistic interrelations, i.e., in posing them as 
mutually exclusive.30 Accordingly, nor is the crisis a consequence of the separation between 
the individual as a person and his social identities as such but of the antagonism that is 
created between the individual ‘compartments’ (his identities) themselves and therein 
between each and every one of them and the individual as a person.
is necessarily any causal relation between the division of the self in the production process h la Lukacs and 
the division of the self in the sphere of identities as I present it.
30See p. 91, n. 20 above.
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But, still, why should differentiated categories and identities come to conflict or 
antagonism? After all, differentiation is not identical to conflict or contradiction, nor does 
it necessarily lead to such conflicts and contradictions. As Laitin suggests,
...issues of social identity become part of public discourse only when the categories 
themselves become fuzzy. Self-appointed boundary-keepers arise to redefine these 
categories so that rules of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the behavioral implications 
of belonging to this or that category, can be clarified.
One of the main reasons there is so much talk of identity in the press on our times is that the 
boundaries and behavioral implications of many of our social categories are being 
contested.31
Note that in the first paragraph it seems that Laitin means that the rise o f those ‘self- 
appointed boundary-keepers’ may solve identity crises, themselves a by-product of the 
fuzziness of categories embedded in the destruction of clear-cut boundaries between them. 
In the second paragraph, though, Laitin seems to imply that due to their disagreement and 
contest on the boundaries of categories those boundary-keepers actually create, or at least 
escalate, that fuzziness. As we shall see, these two possibilities are complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive and together explain both the prevalence of identity crisis and the 
rise of nationalism as a solution to that crisis.
31Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 16.
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As mentioned above, under the uncertain circumstances that modernity creates (temporal 
contraction and spatial expansion), social categories do indeed become fuzzy, so the once- 
stable boundaries and equilibrium between identities is undermined. The modem conditions 
(primarily the immense division of labour and professionalisation and the differentiation of 
social categories and spheres), however, also give rise to new, varied and competing elites 
and classes among which we could count those that Laitin identifies as cultural 
entrepreneurs or group boundary-keepers.32 Consequently, ‘All societies -  perhaps 
especially today -  have cultural entrepreneurs who offer new identity categories (racial, 
sexual, regional), hoping to find “buyers.” If their product sells, these entrepreneurs become 
leaders of newly formed ethnic, cultural, religious, or other forms of identity groups.’33 In 
contrast to premodem times, then, in the modem age these cultural entrepreneurs and 
boundary-keepers constitute a highly heterogenous stratum with a continual competition 
on identity formation,34 or, as Laitin shows, with competing claims about the desirable new 
equilibrium.35
32Cf. Smith’s concept of the intelligentsia (‘the new priesthood’, as he calls it) and his analysis of its 
rise and role in the modem age. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp, 157-161.
33Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 11 (italic mine). Similar to Gramsci and Bourdieu, I would argue 
that these cultural entrepreneurs and boundary-keepers are primarily those intellectuals who rule the sum 
total of the superstructures (Gramsci) and those who control the cultural capital and symbolic production 
(Bourdieu). See Gramsci, ‘The Formation oflntellectuals’, in On Hegemony,pp. 35-41, esp. pp. 38-41, and 
P. Bourdieu, Questions o f Sociology (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2005), pp. 68,239 & passim. (In Hebrew).
34See p. 72 above.
35See Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 23. Laitin refers here specifically to the competition between 
old elites and new emerging ones, but obviously the same contest exists between the new elites and 
themselves.
98
The fiizziness o f categories may well cause an identity crisis. In other words, the crisis does 
not arise because the individual has to choose his identities by himself or because there are 
too many options to choose from (pluralism), but because the available options (and 
therefore the choice situation) are themselves unclear or chaotic. One might think, then, that 
it is merely the uncertainty of categories that leads people to look for some kind of identity 
that would supply stable and clear belonging and to embrace nationalism as that kind of 
identity. M. Ignatieff thus argues that it is the destruction of boundaries between identities 
that prods people to be ‘insisting ever more assiduously on the margins of difference that 
remain,’ and that nationalism is that type of identity that turns such margins into clear and 
primary belonging.36
Ignatieff is surely right in saying that in conditions of uncertainty and chaos (partly 
characterised by lack of clear identities)37 people tend to look for some clear and stable 
identities, but in saying that people under such conditions are ‘insisting ever more 
assiduously on the margins o f difference that remain’ he seems to take those margins of 
difference for granted, as if they were self-evident. Ignatieff thus ignores both the 
constructed nature o f identities and the contest between different elites on the boundaries 
of categories, i.e., he overlooks the feet that the margins of difference are themselves 
contested and constructed by various cultural entrepreneurs or group boundary-keepers.
36M. Ignatieff quoted and paraphrased in ibid., p. 17.
37See M. Ignatieff Blood and Belonging (New York: the Noonday Press, 1998), p. 9.
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In my view, then, we should carefully examine the role of those elites in the evolvement of 
identity crises as well as their place in their solution.
Given the vagueness of categories, the competing elites tend to point up, magnify and 
emphasise the differences between their respective categories rather than their similarities 
in order to make the boundaries between them (and therefore the categories themselves) 
clearer. In this way, they hope to mobilise followers and mould them into a cohesive group, 
to attain power and take control of those groups, and, perhaps, to promote the collectivities 
with whom they identify.38 In so doing, though, those elites recurrently create social 
antagonisms between categories that may logically be in line with one another, hence force 
people to choose between them. In that sense, the contending elites only intensify identity 
crises whose originations might well lie in the obscurity of categories itself. Moreover, in 
mobilising prospective followers by deepening the differences and clarifying the boundaries 
between categories, the elites also emphasise (perhaps even invent) the peculiarities of their 
respective categories and, accordingly, bring into prominence and appeal only to those 
individual qualities that are taken to match the relevant category and advance it.
Like in production and the context o f labour a la Lukacs, in each and every category and 
identity group only some of the individual attributes are considered while others are
38See Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 22. Cf. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Introduction and ch.
1.
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disregarded if not dismissed altogether: it is only those attributes that are taken to sustain 
the category or group in question that are endorsed, divorced from and advanced at the 
expense of the personality as a whole. In other words, in each and every category and 
identity group only some of the individual ‘compartments’ are regarded as part of his 
personality while others (the properties that seem to fit the group) are treated as external, 
even opposed, to it, and only used to sustain the group as an external end. The individual 
thus feels that his capacities and needs as a person are required to be left out of the group 
boundaries: the person and his social identities are thus not only separated, they are 
practically contradictory. In practice, then, the individual as a person is unable to integrate 
his identities into a coherent self: on the one hand, the social categories from which his 
identities are constructed are repeatedly posed against one another and are not attached by 
any encompassing one; on the other hand, since his identities are separated from and posed 
against his personality, he cannot unite them together within himself. On the whole, then, 
the upshot is an identity crisis: a schizophrenic self whose social identities appear as 
contradicting each other and altogether contradicting the individual as a person.39
39On the influence of identity crisis (partly understood as a contradiction between various cultural 
elements and cultural discontinuity) on European Jews and on Francophone Quebeckers, see respectively 
P. Mendes-Flohr, Divided Passions (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), and M. A. Tremblay, 
‘Ethnic Profile, Historical Processes, and the Cultural Identity Crisis among Quebeckers of French 
Descent’, in Ethnicity and Aboriginally, ed. M. D. Levin (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 111-126, esp. pp. 122-125.
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3.3 TWO REACTIONS TO MODERN CONDITIONS: DEMOCRACY AND 
NATIONALISM
‘The kind of society that, retrospectively, came to be called modem,’ says Bauman, 
‘emerged out o f the discovery that human order is vulnerable, contingent and devoid of 
reliable foundations. That discovery was shocking. The response to the shock was a dream 
and an effort to make order solid, obligatory and reliably founded.’40 However, the 
development of individuality, on the one hand, and the prevalence of identity crisis (strongly 
connected to the vulnerability, contingency and lack of reliable foundations Bauman 
mentions) on the other, give rise to alternative dreams and attempts (that is, various political 
ideas, theories and practices) to attain solid, obligatory and reliably founded order. Some 
theories and practices endorse ethical individualism and, accordingly, aspire to found social 
order on individual interests, but either totally ignore the problem of identity crisis or badly 
tackle it. Other theories and practices may confront the crisis by seeking to found social 
order on a clear, stable and (ostensibly) coherent identity, but ultimately do so at the 
expense of individual interests and at the cost of ethical individualism.
There are, however, two things that should be clarified here. First, saying that some theories
40Z. Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodemity (London & New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xi. If in 
‘retrospectively’ Bauman means that modernity is a thing of the past, I must disagree. As will become 
clearer throughout this study, the solution to the problems and contradictions of modernity are still to be 
found within modernity itself -  in what Habermas and Callinicos call ‘the radicalisation of the 
Enlightenment’ -  neither in a mythical past nor in a ‘postmodern’ figment. Note, however, that the 
radicalisation of the Enlightenment need not take the same form that Habermas or Callinicos offer. See 
Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, ch. 5, and J. Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity (London: Verso, 
1992), passim.
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or practices may confront the crisis by seeking to found social order on a clear, stable and 
coherent identity does not necessarily mean that the motivation or aim of those theories and 
practices is to confront the crisis or to satisfy the individual need for a coherent identity. 
In other words, their endeavour to found social order on a clear and coherent identity need 
not stem from their view of individual interest or good and may well follow, e.g., their will 
to ‘aestheticize politics and thus resolve a crisis of cultural decadence and decline,’41 or to 
revitalise a lost authentic community ‘in which certain absolutes such as blood, race, and 
soul were placed beyond rational justification,’42 or to promote the good of some group 
(understood as a living organic whole) where ‘power belongs to the whole. The individual 
serves this whole. The totality is sovereign,’ and thus to ‘reverse this [modem; O.C.] state 
o f chaos and decadence...’43
In an age of widespread identity crises, such theories and practices might unwittingly satisfy 
individuals’ interest or need for a coherent identity (thus being welcome by them) while 
(perhaps by) violating other individual interests. Second, then, it is indeed possible that 
theories and practices that deliver a coherent identity will still do so at the expense of 
individual interests and at the cost of ethical individualism. After all, as we have seen, old
41J. Herfj Reactionary Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 71 
(paraphrasing Ernst Jflnger).
42Ibid.,p. 13.
43IbicL, pp. 51 & 57 (quoting and paraphrasing Oswald Spengler).
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Gemeinschaften also delivered coherent identities but were thoroughly oppressive towards 
their own members.
Democracy, as already suggested and will be further elaborated in later chapters, 
unequivocally belongs to the ethical individualist tradition. In Chapter 11, however, I shall 
suggest that liberal individualist theories o f democracy fail in addressing the significance of 
identities and therefore also fail in tackling the problem of identity crisis, i.e., the individual 
need for a clear and coherent identity.44 I shall also point out that other (Le., not liberal) 
democratic theories may offer a remedy to the problem of identity crisis but eventually slide 
into ethical collectivism, thus not only infringe on democracy but also (at least in some 
cases) undermine their own democratic pretensions and (sometimes) individualist premises 
and rhetoric. In that sense, I find Waldron’s words very compelling: ‘It is no secret that the 
old individualist paradigms are in crisis and that something must be done to repair or replace 
the tattered remnants of liberalism’ As sectarian and communal exclusiveness and violence 
persist, Waldron concludes, ‘people have a right to expect something better from their 
political philosophers than a turn away from the real [i.e., diverse and mixed; O.C] world 
into the cultural exclusiveness of the identity politics o f community.’45
44It will also be indicated that in foiling to appreciate the importance of identity and inner coherence, 
liberal democrats unintentionally pave the way for sectarianism, particularism and collectivism that they 
actually reject. For a relevant discussion, see Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, pp. 241-255, and S. 
Ziiek, Looking Am y (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2005), pp. 160-171. (In Hebrew). C£ Callinicos, Against 
Postmodernism, pp. 37-38.
45Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative*, pp. 113-114.
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In the concluding chapter I shall follow Waldron’s recommendation suit and sketch out a 
repair for those ‘tattered remnants of liberalism’, a repair which is at one and the same time 
a replacement for those ‘remnants’. The relevant concept here is the German notion 
Aufhebung, which often gets translated as ‘sublation’. In German, Aufhebung means 
concurrently ‘to cancel out’, ‘to preserve’ and ‘to transform’. According to Hegel (and 
Marx), in the historical evolvement (dialectically understood) old orders46 are not wholly 
destroyed, but neither are they continued in their prior forms. Instead, they are aufgehoben 
or sublated, i.e., they are transformed into different (generally, according to Hegel and 
Marx, higher) forms of existence, thus they are both cancelled out and preserved. In other 
words, in the transformation of an order the fundamental or innate characteristics o f that 
order are preserved while its older form (the prior manifestation of those innate 
characteristics) is cancelled out My intention, then, will be to sublate liberal democracy: (i) 
to unreservedly cling to its ethical individualism, (ii) to expose its internal fallacies and 
weaknesses that undermine some of its own premises and values as well as its potential 
realisation, and (iii) to offer a transformed form of liberal democracy, Le., one which will 
preserve its fundamental requirements and values but will cancel out its fallacies and 
weaknesses, hence make it both a higher and more realisable and stable form of 
democracy.47
46By ‘order’ I mean to include social structures, systems and institutions as well as theories and ideas.
47Whereas in chs. 7-10 I will be offering and defending a rather “conventional” liberal theory of 
democracy, in ch. 111 will be trying to show that the intrinsic qualities of liberal democracy itself logically 
necessitate its transformation into a socialist democracy. It will also be suggested that such a transformation
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If liberal democracy is ethically individualist but cannot deliver a coherent identity, 
nationalism, as we shall see shortly, might supply a coherent identity but does so by 
sacrificing essential individual interests on the altar of a new Gemeinschaft-Mke identity 
group, i.e., the nation; nationalism, that is to say, turns its back on ethical individualism in 
favour of ethical collectivism.
Capitalism, as we have seen, develops a sense o f autonomous individuality among people: 
the modem individual conceives of himself as a sovereign self-choosing being and not as 
an organ of larger wholes. Such an individuality, as suggested above, becomes meaningful 
and sustainable only if the individual feels that his inner coherence is preserved, Le., if he
does not face a continuous and serious identity crisis. As Benner shows, ‘most people will
' \ , +
remain dissatisfied with freedoms which unsettle, or prevent them from acquiring, 
satisfactory social and personal identities.’48 Following my foregoing characterisation of 
identity crisis, I believe that a sense of inner coherence is achieved once the individual feels 
(even if falsely) that he is regarded and treated (recognised, in I. Berlin’s words)49 as a
is required if liberal democratic values and virtues are to be realised. It might be said, then, that if 
liberalism and individualist paradigms at large ought to be ‘socialisised’ (i.e., transformed into socialism) 
in order to pursue ethical individualism, socialism itself must be individualised for the very same purpose. 
Indeed, as Hillel Steiner has put it: ‘the left badly needs to recover its cosmopolitan individualist roots.’ See 
my ‘In What Sense Must Socialism Not Be Communitarian?’, p. 1 (an unpublished paper given at the 
annual meeting of the British Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, Edinburgh, April 1997; and at 
the Graduate Conference in Political Thought -  Brave New World, Manchester, June 1997).
48Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, p. 247.
49See I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1971), pp. 204-211, esp. pp. 205-207. 
(In Hebrew).
106
person in his entirety in actual social contexts, i.e., only when the relevant social group 
gives him the hunch that he is a full member of (or fully belongs to) it as a complete person 
irrespective of his other social identities and affiliations. My usage of the term ‘recognised’, 
however, by no means implies that I accept the so-called ‘politics of recognition’ or Berlin’s 
own view regarding people’s ‘longing for status’. In feet, in saying that the individual may 
falsely feel that he is regarded and treated as a person in his entirety or as a full member of 
a group irrespective of his other social identities and affiliations, I mean quite the opposite 
to Berlin’s view.
According to Berlin, people may (and indeed normally do) prefer to be bullied, maltreated 
and persecuted by their peers (i.e., by members of their own group) for who they are and 
what they choose than being tolerated and well treated by aliens (i.e., those who do not 
belong to their group). This inclination, claims Berlin, stems from the individual longing for 
status or recognition, i.e., the desire to be ‘recognized as a man and a rival -  that is as an 
equal’, which can be delivered only by one’s (even if oppressive and terrorising) peers who 
understand and therefore recognise him as such, hence give him ‘a sense ofbeing somebody 
in the world.’50 Now, I do not deny Berlin’s statement that individuals often prefer to be
50Both citations are from ibid., p. 207. The belief that only one’s peers can truly understand him is of 
course highly controversial. For a philosophical rejection of the Berlin-like idea of linguistic Gemeinschaft, 
see D. Davidson, ‘On fee Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974)’, in D. Davidson’s Inquiries into Truth 
and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 183-198. For Wittgenstein’s adherence 
to linguistic Gemeinschaft, see S. Kripke’s 'community interpretation1 in his 'Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language', in Perspectives on the Philosophy o f Wittgenstein, ed. I. Block (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1981), pp. 238-312. For an alternative interpretation, see G. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules 
and Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). See also Gellner, Reason and Culture, pp. 116-123.
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oppressed by those they consider as their peers (internal oppression) than being well-treated 
by foreigners (benevolent external rule).51 Nor do I disclaim Berlin’s allusion that people 
may subjectively feel that they are recognised as equals by their professed peers even if the 
latter bully and persecute them, but I cannot for the life o f me see how being bullied, 
maltreated and persecuted can objectively be considered as being recognised as a human 
being (‘as a man’, in Berlin’s words), let alone as an equal or ‘entirely independent human 
being.’52
Moreover, if a person is persecuted by his peers for who he is and what he chooses (as 
Berlin puts it), then he is actually persecuted for some of his identities by people who share 
some other identity/ies of his. In other words, such a downtrodden person is actually bullied 
for who he is and what he chooses by people who with him share part of who he is and 
what he chooses. Now if, as Berlin suggests, people are ready to be bullied by their peers 
for who they are and what they choose in order to be recognised as equals and entirely 
independent human beings (i.e., as human beings in their entirety), then they are actually 
ready to be maltreated for who they are and what they choose in order to be recognised as
51Following J. S. Mill’s discussion of benevolent despotism, however, I would argue that benevolent 
external rule is only a ‘supposed good despot’ which ‘abstains from exercising his power’ but is still 
‘holding it in reserve.’ If such an external rule is, eventually, to be resisted by its alien subjects, then it will 
have to (i) exercise its reserved power and therefore become, as it were, a fully-fledged despot, or (ii) 
abstain from exercising its power and whither away, i.e., collapse altogether or give in to the rebellious 
aliens and allowthem, e.g., to secede. C£ J. S. Mill, Representative Government, in Utilitarianism, Liberty, 
and Representative Government (Great Britain: 1926), pp. 204-205.
52Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 207 (italic mine).
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who they are and what they choose. Putting it that way, Berlin’s argument seems to be 
logically self-defeated from the start. In contrast to Berlin, then, I would argue that if a 
person feels that he is regarded and treated (recognised) as a person in his entirety by 
people (or a group) who actually maltreat and abuse him, then that person falsely feels so.
As mentioned above, I do agree with Berlin that people may feel that they are recognised 
as full human-beings by groups and peers, as it were, that bully and persecute them. The 
question is, How come? Why should any sane individual feel that he is regarded and treated 
as a person in his entirety by those who maltreat and abuse him, hence (perhaps) accept 
such a treatment? And why should one’s persecutors be conceived by him as peers in the 
first place? Furthermore, if people really long for inner coherence, how can any abusive 
group whose oppressive nature lies primarily in the suppression and exclusion of some of 
its own members’ identities (i.e., in creating a social contradiction between identities) 
deliver such coherence?
A subjective feeling of full belonging as a complete person, hence of inner coherence, may 
be attained in two different ways:53 (i) by democratising all social categories and identity 
groups so in each and every one of them the individual will be treated as a person in his 
entirety (Le., as entirely independent or autonomous human being) and so as to bring those
53C£ F. HOlderlin, quoted in Taylor, Hegel, p. 35.
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categories as a whole into line with one another;54 or (ii) by supplying the individual with, 
as it were, a sort of objective (that is, ontologically independent of individual-subjective- 
volitions),55 qualitatively superior and encompassing identity that will outweigh all other 
identities and where the individual personal identity and his social identity are supposedly 
congruent or merged into one another. If it sells, such an encompassing identity will allow 
the individual to bound his multiple identities together and (using Waldron’s words again) 
will confer a sense of integrity and coherence (both in time and space) on the individual self 
that is constituted under its auspices.
The first strategy, then, aspires to base social categories and identities on the individual 
voluntary identifications, and understands full belonging as the possibility of the individual 
to fully, equally and freely participate in determining the identities and agendas o f his 
groups. The second strategy insists that people fully belong to a group once they share 
some “objective” characteristics that define the group and set its boundaries (e.g., common 
culture, religion, mother -  or, rather, parents tongue, mythical ancestors and the like), by 
virtue of which those people are, as it were, identical to one another; this strategy thus 
strives to base the encompassing identity (at the very least) on such “objective”
54This, of course, is true only insofar as social contradictions are concerned; obviously, logical 
contradictions cannot be overcome that way.
55In objective identity I mean an identity that is widely conceived as i f  it were objective. As already 
suggested before, all human associations are in feet human-made entities, but people are not always aware 
of this reality. See pp. 55-56 and sc. 2.5 above.
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characteristics which people allegedly share independently of their choice or will. The first 
strategy is characteristically democratic and will be dealt with in later chapters. The second 
strategy, as we shall see in a moment, is typical of nationalism.
From what I have said thus far, it seems quite clear that some of the contending elites 
(whose competition, as mentioned above, amplifies identity crises) may solve the crisis by 
offering people an encompassing and objective identity; those elites, then, ‘purposefully 
reify categories, giving people with complex pasts a single dominant label..’56 This is 
exactly what nationalist entrepreneurs do, but here also lies a puzzle: ‘nationalism is a 
fiction of identity, because it contradicts the multiple reality of belonging. It insists on the 
primacy of one of these belongings over all the others. So how does this fiction of the 
primacy of national identity displace other identities? How does it begin to convince?’57 
Ignatieff answers these questions in another of his texts: ‘Faced with a situation ofpolitical 
and economic chaos f  he writes, ‘people wanted to know whom to trust, and whom to call 
their own. Ethnic nationalism provided an answer that was intuitively obvious: Only trust 
those o f your own blood.959 And he then continues:
56Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 18. Note that Laitin identifies those elites as intellectuals who 
themselves perfectly ‘know those categories are constructed.’ Ibid., ibid. Although I do agree that some 
elites are really aware ofthe constructed nature of their categories, I simultaneously feel that ascribing such 
awareness to the elites as a whole ultimately amounts to conspiracy theory, which I find highly unrealistic 
and simplistic. In my view, then, while some elites are truly aware of the constructed nature of their 
categories, other elites really believe in their objective status.
57Ignatief£ quoted in ibid., p. 17 (italic mine).
58Ignatief£ Blood and Belonging, p. 9 (italic mine).
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When nationalists claim that national belonging is the overridingly important form of all 
belonging, they mean that there is no other form of belonging -  to your family, work, or 
friends -  that is secure if you do not have a nation to protect you. This is what warrants 
sacrifice on the nation’s behalf. Without a nation’s protection, eveiything that an individual 
values can be rendered worthless...{T]he nationalist claim is that full belonging, the warm 
sensation that people understand not merely what you say but what you mean, can come 
only when you are among your own people in your native land59
In contrast to IgnatiefF,60 though, I do not think that the protection that national belonging 
is supposed to give is primarily from violence; as we already noted (following Berlin), 
people may well be intolerant, oppressive and violent towards their own conationals. In fact, 
Ignatieff himself stresses that ‘nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled toward 
maintaining unity by force rather than by consent.’61 In my view, then, national identity 
chiefly secures the individual inner coherence and sense of continuity, and here lies the 
power of nationalism which induces people to believe that
...distinctive cultures, languages, and ‘ways of life’ embodied in nations do in fact permeate 
all aspects of people’s lives, shaping their other commitments and interests. The 
‘constitutive’ character of national attributes fosters a singular depth of attachment which
59Ibid.,p. 10.
60See ibid., pp. 9-10.
61Ibid., p. 8 (italic mine).
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cannot be replicated in other social groupings...National identities...do provide a sense of 
continuity in a world where older bonds are brittle and other social roles transient...National 
identity gets its resilence [sic] and mobilizing power from its capacity to withstand these 
turbulent waters.62
There is, however, yet another difficulty that should be addressed. On the face of it, 
nationalism also seems to infringe on the individual autonomy as it claims ‘that an 
individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community that 
defines the individual, not individuals who define the national community.’63 How, then, can 
nationalism convince and be sold to the modem individual who, as said above, conceives 
of himself as a sovereign self-choosing being and not as an organ of larger wholes? As 
already suggested, many people will be ready to give up their freedoms in order to attain 
a clear, stable and coherent identity: ‘it seems clear that people do not always make freedom 
their top priority even when their basic [i.e., physical and material] wants are largely 
satisfied.’ There is
...another set ofvalues that may conflict with freedom, sometimes- but not always-through 
strong nationalism. The values I have in mind are usually clustered together under the term 
‘identity’, although this term covers many desires that are at least partly distinct: desires to 
know who I am, on whom I can rely, and how others see me...Many baulk at the prospect
62Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, p. 224.
63Ignatief£ Blood and Belonging, pp. 7-8.
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of having to define themselves anew in unpredictable circumstances, not knowing what 
competing identities will be asserted against theirs or how the revamped society will 
evaluate them. This fear, moreover, may be just as acute in established liberal democracies 
as in newly ‘democratizing’ countries, especially during periods of rapid social and 
economic change. [Thus, t]he old western democracies today are facing a veritable epidemic 
of personal and collective identity crises...64
Under these circumstances, then, people ‘have scant control over their own destinies’ and 
feel helpless, ‘and helpless people will cheer nationalist promises o f protection if no other 
credible protectors are available.’ In these conditions, then, people’s fears and anxieties are 
easily ‘exploited by leaders anxious to preserve their power from democratic assaults.’65 In 
my view, then, nationalism (pace Naim) does not derive its power simply from its ability to 
supply an identity, but from (i) its ability to supply a sort of encompassing and interminable 
identity to confer a sense of integrity and coherence on individuals, and (ii) the unavailability 
of any other ‘credible protectors’ which, in my view, has to do with the M ure in promoting 
the first strategy mentioned before, i.e., the lack of any tenable theoretical or practical 
endeavour to democratise all social spheres, categories and identity groups so as to abolish 
all social contradictions. In that respect, I find Bauman totally right in saying that in modem 
societies ‘The marriage between freedom and insecurity was prearranged and consummated
64Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, p. 246.
65A11 citations are from ibid., p. 235.
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on the wedding night,’ and that ‘all subsequent attempts at separation proved vain, and the 
wedlock remained in force ever since.’661 surely hope that the foregoing first strategy, 
which this study wishes to promote, will succeed in divorcing the two and in wedding 
freedom and security after all.
66Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodemity, p. xii.
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4
NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY
4.1 SOME ACADEMIC OBSERVATIONS ON ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY
As we have seen in the last chapter, Ignatieff argues that it is ethnic nationalism that offers 
people a solution to their identity crisis. But what exactly does ethnic nationalism mean? 
And must nationalism be ethnic or is there another type of nationalism? In this and the 
following Section I would like to clarify the concept o f ethnicity and ethnic groups and to 
examine how both scholars o f nationalism (current Section) and real-world nationalists 
(Section 4.2) see the relations between ethnicity and nationality, ethnic groups and nations. 
Section 4.3 will enquire into the role that nationalists ascribe to nationalist movements and 
figures (Le., to themselves), and the final Section will analyse the common academic 
distinction between two different types of nationalism. It will argue that this distinction is 
invalid primarily because it is at odds not only with real-world nationalism (our locus of 
examination) but also with the dominant (or “popular”) intuition about the nationalist 
phenomenon.
It seems that the number of definitions that are given to ethnicity is larger than the number 
of existing ethnic groups themselves, whatever definition one chooses to employ. There is 
considerable dispute ’within the camp’, as Smith puts it. There is, however, one thing that 
almost all scholars of nationalism (modernists and primordialists alike) do agree upon, Le.,
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that ethnic groups are characterised by a myth of common descent and kinship relations.1 
The differences between scholars, then, have to do with subjects such as the reasons for the 
formation, durability and dissolution of ethnic groups, the power o f ethnic identity, the 
flexibility of ethnic identity (to what extent ethnic identities are open to change) and the 
political and social implications of ethnic identities. I have no intention to address these 
additional aspects here, though -  this is a matter for a deep scrutiny which this study cannot 
afford.
What is important for my present purpose, then, is that the common academic conviction 
that ethnic groups are (mythical) kinship groups shows in what sense they should be 
regarded as Gemeinschaften? First, their members identify themselves as parts of a natural 
and organic whole as they believe, or act as i f  they believed,3 in their belonging to a 
common descent, i.e. to a shared extended family.4 But, second, the group also appears as
1See, e.g., C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution’, in Old Societies and New States, ed. C. Geertz 
(New York: the Free Press, 1965), p. 109; Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 19; D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 2; Smith, 
The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 24-25 & passim. See also Barry, ‘Self-Government Revisited’, p. 134, 
and Miller, On Nationality, p. 19. For a comprehensive presentation of various approaches to ethnicity, see 
J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See 
also I. Shapiro & W. Kymlicka (eds.), NOMOSXXXIX: Ethnicity and Gimp Rights (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997).
^Note that in German ethnic membership is translated as Gemeinsamkeit, which evidently resembles 
the concept of Gemeinschaft.
3H. Seton-Watson defines the nation in a similar way, arguing that a nation exists where a large 
amount of people see themselves as constituting a nation or behave as i f  they constituted a nation. See H. 
Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 5.
4RecalI TCnnies's contention that a group should be sociologically interpreted as Gemeinschaft when
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if it were natural, organic and familial in the objective sense. To use Anderson’s main 
argument about nations in his Imagined Communities, the ethnic group might be imagined 
or constructed, yet it is also 'realistic' as the individual’s membership in the group is not 
open to conversion by will: 'it may be all in the mind,' says M. Canovan, again, in regard to 
nations rather than ethnic groups, 'but it is not all in my mind and I cannot alter the situation 
by an act of will.’5 One example of many for such an understanding of ethnic groups as 
objective entities is reflected in the list of objectives o f the ethnic movement Association de 
la Jeunesse Togolaise in Ouagadougou: being a Togolese, claims this movement, is a 
matter of origins and not o f choice. Consequently, each member, whatever his aspirations 
and wills are, is compelled to pursue the honour of his ethnic group.6 Here, then, we can 
also see the conjunction commonly made by ethnic boundary-keepers between ethnicity (the 
group objective characteristics, as it were) and ethnicism (the ideology which turns the 
alleged group characteristics into supreme values).7
As already noted in Chapter 2, many scholars o f nationalism assert that ethnic groups are 
the specific Gemeinschaften from which nations emerge. In other words, ethnic groups are
its members believe (or behave as if they believed) in their natural belonging to this group.
5M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham & Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1996), p. 
55 (italic original).
6See E. P. Skinner, 'Voluntary Associations and Ethnic Competition in Ouagadougou', in Ethnicity 
in Modern Africa, ed. B. M. du-Toit (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 205.
7G. Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology (Jerusalem: Magnes & Zionist Library Press, 2001), pp. 5,44-47 
& passim. (In Hebrew).
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often understood by theorists and researchers as the raw material from which modem 
nationalism forms nations.8 In that respect, then, the academic distinction between ethnic 
groups and nations boils down to two: a conceptual distinction and a historical distinction. 
Conceptually, the nation is described as a transformed ethnic group, which means that the 
nation (and nationality) and ethnic groups (and ethnicity) might be related but are far from 
being the same. Also, since the nation is an ethnic group being transformed, it is clear that 
ethnic groups are historically marked off from nations and precede them. But what does this 
transformation consist of?
Connor, for example, argues that ethnic groups are collectivities with some common unique 
characteristics that ‘may be readily’ discerned as such by outside observers, e.g., by 
anthropologists.9 The transformation of these ethnic groups into nations, Connor continues, 
is strictly embedded in the transition of the self-identity of the co-ethnics -  from 
identification with regions, clans or tribes (sub-Gemeinschaften) to an identification with 
their larger ethnic group (ultimate Gemeinschaft). Once the ethnic group is self-aware, it 
is a nation.10 Conceptually, then, ‘While an ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined,
8See,e.g., Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, esp. pp. 154-157; Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 103; 
L. Greenfeld, Nationalism (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 13; Gellner,Nations 
and Nationalism, pp. 49 & 55; and H. Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1945), pp. 13-14. Cf Miller, On Nationality, p. 20.
9Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 103.
10lbid., ibid. See also Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 6ff.
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the nation must be self-defined.’11
As opposed to Connor, Smith identifies the transformation of ethnic groups (ethnie, in his 
usage) into nations with politicisation: the nation, that is, is a politicised ethnic group, the 
politicisation of which also creates a sense of political identity and civic bonds among its 
members in addition to their preexisting ethnic ones. If in premodem eras ethnic survival 
was dependent primarily upon the community ‘distinctive priesthoods,’12 Smith explains, 
the modem conditions13 have weakened that stratum and the integrity of their respective 
ethnies. Accordingly, there emerged a need to find an alternative force to equip and 
reenforce individuals with a renewed identity, and thus to unite them and preserve the 
declining ethnic groups.14 Nationalism provided this renewed identity by inviting the masses 
into history, Le., by mobilising the masses and politicising them, hence moulding them into 
a renewed ethnic group, namely, a natioa In short, in order to survive in the modem age 
ethnic groups should adopt a civil bond and turn into active communities whose members 
are mobilised for a political goal, Le., they should become nations:
u Ibid., ibid (italic original).
12Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, ch. 5, see esp. pp. 119-125. The quoted phrase is from p. 119.
13Smith identifies those conditions with a 'triple revolution’ which, all in all, created and embodied 
a new form of centralised state characterised by a unified and integrated economic system, administration 
and bureaucracy, and public mass education and culture systems. See ibid., pp. 130-134, 138 & passim.
14Note that the emphasis here is not on the individual need for a renewed identity but rather on the 
aspiration to preserve the declining groups.
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What is required is a sense of political purpose to mobilise members and create the new 
bond of citizenship...The mobilization of a religio-ethnic community some of whose 
members [i.e., the intelligentsia; O.C.] aim to transform it into a 'nation' is predominantly 
political: it aims to achieve a measure of secular power for the community in a world o f 
nations, and to ensure its survival and prosperity by turning a passive 'object-community' 
into an active 'subject-nation'...[T]oday [the] members [of ethnic groups] have all armed 
themselves with a new vision o f what survival and success entail in the modem world of 
nations, and are no longer content to suffer [the] effects o f rule by members o f other 
ethnie.15
Indeed, Smith argues, the identity of conationals is imagined through the application to 
ethnic sentiments and built around ethnic cores. Nevertheless, the “pure” ethnic identity is 
transformed into a new identity that also includes a sense of common citizenship, laws and 
legal codes, economic institutions, and even political culture.16 So eventually, in the 
concluding chapter o f his book, Smith can infer that both ethnic groups and nations aspire 
to preserve their collective identities and survive as distinct communities, and in that they 
both share the same ends. The main difference between them, then, refers to the means they 
use for achieving their identical ends, as well as to the scope and content of their communal
15Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p. 168 (italic mine). See also p. 216 & passim.
16Ibid., p. 144 & passim.
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identity.17 Thus, conationals have a different self-identity from the one that co-ethnics have, 
given that the national identity, as mentioned above, includes political awareness as well. 
In that, concludes Smith, 'there is a remarkable continuity between nations and ethnie, 
nationalism and ethnicism; continuity, but not identity.'18
The theories of Connor and Smith are indeed interesting and illuminating, yet they do not 
really explain how nationalism itself conceives of the nation and sees the relations between 
ethnic groups and nations. In the following Section, then, I would like to concentrate on 
real-world nationalism itself and to introduce its own conception of ethnicity and nationality 
and thereby its perception of the individual identity vis-a-vis his nation.
4.2 THE NATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE NATION 
We saw that both Connor and Smith (among others) argue that the main difference between 
ethnic groups and nations involves, in one way or another, a change or a transformation of 
individuals' self-identity. But does nationalism accept that? What is the role o f individuals' 
se/^identity (or personal identification) in the nationalist conception of the nation? Would 
nationalism argue that a social categoiy whose members do not feel themselves as parts of 
it and are not devoted to it cannot be a nation at all? Can a nation exist independently of 
individuals’ will? For nationalism, I shall argue, the self-identity of individuals or their sense
17Ibid., pp. 214-217. See also p. 154 & passim.
18Ibid., p. 216,
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of solidarity and devotion have nothing to do with the definition or formation of the nation. 
Such an identification is conceived by nationalists as a veiy important component in the 
vitality and "healthy" life of the nation, yet it does not define or form the nation. Nations, 
that is to say, are understood as ‘’’objective”...social forces which act through and move 
individuals, who are in turn regarded as their vehicles and representatives. The behavior of 
individuals and their beliefs, in this framework, are determined by this “objective” 
reality...’19 National identity, in its turn, is thus recognised as ‘an involuntary fete which is 
imposed upon the individual like a beautiful or an ugly body.’20 Such a nationalist stance 
was well expressed by J. G. Herder, who is commonly regarded as the harbinger o f the 
nationalist credo.
Herder, S. H. Bergman tells us, was the first to use the term nationalism (Nationalisms) 
while applying it to Volk, which emphasises the organic nature o f a people.21 Thus,
...Herder's nation is a natural creation. He regarded nationalities not as fee product o f men, 
but as fee work o f a living organic force feat animates fee universe...National culture...is, 
as Herder puts it, ‘inexpressible’ and closed to foreign eyes...We can assimilate or adopt 
what is similar to our nature and remain cold, blind, and even contemptuous of and hostile
19Greenfeld, Nationalism, p. 19.
20C. G. Jung, quoted in J. Singer, Boundaries o f the Soul (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973), pp. 
136-137.
21S. H. Bergman, A History o f Philosophy (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1978), pp. 94-95. (In Hebrew).
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to anything which is alien and distant.22
The nation, then, is presented as a “natural” and “organic” entity to which people belong 
independently o f their will, choice, or consciousness. If  there is any room for will at all, it 
is the will ofthe nation as an “organic” collective rather than the will of the individuals who 
constitute the nation. As Smith puts it, ‘For nationalists, will and aspiration are predicated 
o f the pre-existent nation. It is not your will and my aspirations that matters; it is the 
nation’s, however embryonic... [N] ations are distinct and natural entities, which thereby 
embody the collective w ill’23
As far as I can see, Smith puts forward two different arguments here. First, for nationalism 
the nation has its own will as a body, as a sort o f a self, and therefore it is not the 
individuals’ will that forms the nation. The second assertion, to which I shall return in 
Chapter 5, suggests that the supreme importance for nationalism is the nation's will, so the 
wills of the individuals should be subordinated to the collective will o f the nation. This, I 
will show, is exactly what the ethical collectivism of nationalism is all about.
Now if the nation is a “natural” and “organic” entity, then national belonging is an ascribed
22M. Viroli, For Love o f Country (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 121-123.
2 3 A. D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism (London & Southampton: the Camelot Press Ltd., 1971), p.
19.
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status, one that is a matter of birth. The familial connotation is quite clear, and indeed 
Herder defines the nation as a sort o f extended family: ‘a nationality is as much a plant of 
nature as a family, only with more branches.’24 But this bond between the family and the 
nation is far from being unique to Herder’s ideas. L. W. Doob, for instance, argues that the 
understanding of the nation as a family is in fact the basic idea of nationalism at large; 
nationalism, he says, is
...almost always extolled through the use of some sort o f familial metaphor. In fact almost 
anyone who has ever written on patriotism and nationalism contends that much of their 
strength can be traced to such symbolism, which in turn exists because o f a close connection 
in fact between nation and family...Members o f the nation are really considered to be a 
family, or they are viewed as though indeed this were die actual situation.25
For Herder, as for some other nationalists, the organic and familial nature of the nation is 
embodied in its unique culture, mainly in its language (when language here does not mean 
what individuals actually speak but their ‘parents tongue’).26 But for many other nationalist 
thinkers and movements the national organism is revealed in the group's unique race,
24Herder, quoted in Viroli, For Love o f Country, p. 123.
25L. W. Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 
183-184. In sc. 4.4, though, I will distinguish between nationalism and patriotism and show in what sense 
any equation between them (like that of Doob’s) is essentially flawed.
26See J. G. Herder, 'Essay on die Origin of Language', in J. G, Herder on Social and Political Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 117-179. C£ F. M. Barnard, Self-Direction and 
Political Legitimacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 224.
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history, or religion. Yet each of these aspects, when employed by a specific nationalism, is 
understood as an objective entity in itself and as such as an exclusive characteristic o f the 
national family. As Barry puts it,
It is notorious that almost anything may serve to differentiate those who see themselves as 
belonging to one nationality from others. But why should phenotype, language, religion, or 
place of residence (among others) save as markers o f nationality in some cases and not 
others? The answer is that for almost all real-life nationalists, a differentiating feature serves 
as a marker of nationality when it is thought to coincide with a distinctive descent group.
This does not necessarily entail that the members o f an ethnically defined nationality (as we 
may call it) actually believe in the myth of a common ancestor. But it does mean that the 
nation is thought o f as a sort o f extended family.27
Indeed, it seems that different nationalist thinkers and movements do conform to this picture 
of nationalism. This could be seen in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini, the Italian 
nationalist, in the old cult of Nativism and the modem nationalism of figures such as 
Gilberto Freyre and movements like the 'Antropofagia' in Brazil, Peron's Hispanic 
nationalism in Argentina, Lithuanian nationalism, different nationalist movements in 
Africa,28 or Japanese nationalism (in which even the nation state was regarded as the 'family-
27Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', p. 17.
28Gn Mazzini, see Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, pp. 6-9. C£ Kedourie, Nationalism, 
p. 101. As to nationalism in Brazil, see Bradford Bums, Nationalism in Brazil, esp. chs. 1-2 & 4. In regard
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state': kazoku kokka).79 An identical perception o f the nation is also characteristic of 
Zionism and, some say, even of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, in his extensive study of 
Zionist ideology Shimoni shows that for Jewish nationalists
The Jewishness of a person is a natural thing, just as a child belongs to his natural parents. 
Any attempt of a bom-Jew to substitute his people for another nation amounts to self 
humiliation and self failure. Assimilation is nothing but a form of inner slavery and spiritual 
decadence. The nation is a growing and evolving organic entity, and not a contractual 
association that can be joined to or left by will or caprice.30
And as S. Zubaida argues, Islamist movements combine ‘a populist nationalism with 
‘Islam’,’ when Islam itself is used as ‘the identifying emblem of the common people against 
the ‘alien’ social spheres intheir own country which had excluded and subordinated them.’31
to Peron's nationalism, see D. Rock, Authoritarian Argentina (Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford: University 
of California Press, 1993), pp. 139-145, 146 & passim (for a discussion about cultural nationalism in 
Argentina generally, see particularly ch. 2). Concerning Lithuanian nationalism, see W. Roszkowski, 
'Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past and Present', in Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. P. Kruger (Marburg: 
Hitzeroth, 1993), pp. 47-59. For discussions about different nationalist movements in Africa, see C. 
Rosberg, 'National Identity in African States', in The African Review (1971), pp. 79-92; and W. Miles, 'Self- 
Identity, Ethnic Affinity and National Consciousness: an Example from Rural Hausaland', in Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 9/4 (1986), pp. 427-444.
29Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, pp. 90-91. C£ B. Stranach, Beyond the 
Rising Sun (Westport & London: Praeger, 1995), ch. 2.
30Ahad Ha’am, paraphrased in Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology, p. 253.
31S. Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989), p. 33. The argument that 
Islamic fundamentalism is connected to nationalism is strongly contested. D. Zaks, for example, argues that 
Islamic fundamentalism is in feet anti nationalist and serves as an alternative ‘tool for group identification, 
in an age of fuzzy identities...’ See D. Zaks, ‘Fundamentalism: the New Totalitarianism’, in State, 
Government and Politics, ed. B. Neuberger, I. Kaufman & K. Shimshi (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999), pp. 
153-158. (In Hebrew). The quotation is from p. 153.
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To conclude this point, then, we can see that from the nationalist point of view there is a 
close connection between the nation and old Gemeinschaften. From what has been said so 
far, we can see that nationalism attributes to the nation the very same “objective’’ features 
that characterised old Gemeinschaften. In that respect, nationalism does not draw any 
conceptual distinction between old Gemeinschaften (including those Gemeinschaften that 
scholars term as ethnic groups) and nations: the same “organic” and “familial” nature 
applies to both alike. In that sense, there is indeed a similarity and a sense o f continuation 
between old Gemeinschaften and the nation. But what about the historical distinction? 
Does nationalism diverge from academic researchers on that matter too?
As Smith himself admits, the attempt to study the emergence of nations is in itself strange, 
and I would add estranged, to the nationalist belief for whom the nation is eternal: 'the 
nationalist belief [is] that nations have existed from time immemorial, though often in 
prolonged slumber. To the nationalist...there was therefore no special problem about the 
origins and causes of nations, no need to explore the processes of their formation.'32 And 
as Anderson indicates, I f  nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new* and 'historical', the 
nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, 
still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn 
chance into destiny.'33
32Smith, National Identity, p. 43.
33Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 11-12.
/
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Historically, then, nationalism does not distinguish between the nation and anything of the 
kind that scholars identify as ethnic groups that preceded it. This, of course, should not 
come as a surprise: if  as said, nationalists believe that the nation is not formed by human 
deeds, consciousness or will but by a sort of natural or living organic force (always veiled 
in mythical, not to say mystical, past and heroes),34 then it is only logical that the nation 
could not be created due to any twist in individuals’ self-identity or by any process of 
politicisation and mobilisation. Thus, for example, the French nationalist painter Jacques- 
Louis David, when he appealed to the French nation, did not see himself as if he were 
participating in the formation of this natioa Rather, he believed that the nation has existed 
for centuries,35 felt obliged to it, and saw himself as taking part in its vitalisation by creating 
for it:
Each of us is accountable to the fatherland for the talents which he has received from 
nature; if the form is different, the end ought to be the same for all...It is thus that the traits 
o f heroism, of civic virtues offered to the regard o f the people will electrify its soul, and will 
cause to germinate in it, all the passions of glory, o f devotion to the welfare of the 
fatherland...David! take up your brushes...avenge M arat.'...I heard the voice of the people, 
I obeyed... jTJhe livid and blood-stained features of M arat will recall to you his virtues, 
which must never cease to be your own...I vote for M arat, the honors o f the Pantheon...36
34See Smith, National Identity, pp. 19-20.
35J. L. David, dted in Texts for Introduction to Modem Art, ed. Z. Am ishai-Maisels (Jerusalem, 1977),
p. 63.
36Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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Similarly, when composers such as Dvorak, Borodin, Liszt or Grieg were tracing back, and 
to some extent influenced by, what they believed to be the authentic melodies o f their 
nations, neither of them was looking for these melodies in the 17th or 18th centuries. For 
them, these melodies were brought up within and by an ancient nation and were not 
originated by any previous ethnic group.37 Likewise, neither Dostoevsky nor Ernst Moritz 
Arndt referred to any ethnic source that preceded the emergence of the Russian or the 
German nations. A similar point, though much more intricate for its metaphysical character, 
was put forward by Hegel, for whom the nation is an eternal spirit that exists whether 
individuals are aware of it or not.38 The examples for this kind of nationalistic attitude to 
the concept of the nation are infinite, and it is not held by intellectuals and influential figures 
only. As B. Akzin has put it, for the people ’in the street’ ’nation’ means what 'ethnic group’ 
means for scholars.39 If we moderate Akzin’s claim and stress instead ’most people’ and 
'some scholars’, I think that Akzin’s statement would be quite correct.
37 As (me example for a nationalist composer Smith mentions, very justly, the Russian Mussourgsky. 
However, when Smith refers to Mussorgsky's operas 'Boris Godunov* and 'Khovanschina' he fails in noting 
the nationalist nature of Mussorgsky's tune because he concentrates only on the libretto. Besides the fact 
that the libretto of'Boris Godunov' is actually based on Pushkin's (a nationalist in himself) historical drama, 
it is Mussorgsky's music to be nationalistic too: it combines, rather as a matter of principle, folk Russian 
scales with old melodies of the Orthodox chrch. In my remark, then, I refer only to music, e.g., Dvorak's 
'Slavic Rhapsodies', Borodin's 'Prince Igor', Liszfs 'Hungarian Rhapsodies', and Grieg's 'P ictres from the 
life of the People’. Incidentally, in a CD ofNordic Romantic salon music it was mentioned that much of 
the popularity of this music ‘is due to a nostalgic longing and die need of many for an idyll in times of 
unrest.’
38G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History (Cambridge, London, New York & 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 52.
39B. Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), p. 30.
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Nationalism, then, does not see the nation as a new entity that continues one or another 
ancient loyalty but rather as an entity that has always been there, as part and parcel o f those 
ancient groups:
It is in it that we were bom, it is our mother;
We are men because it reared us;
We are free because we move in it;
If we are angered, it soothes our pain with national songs.
Through it we talk today to our parents who lived thousands of 
years back;
Through it our descendants and posterity thousands of years later 
will know us.40
So far I have been showing that nationalism does not distinguish between the ethnic origins 
of the nation and the nation itself Yet this does not mean that nationalism makes no 
conceptual distinction between ethnic groups and nations whatsoever. In other words, 
nationalism may see the nation as nothing but an ethnic group, but it does not necessarily 
claim that each and every ethnic group is a nation. In that sense, nationalism distinguishes 
between two types of non-national ethnic groups: (i) those groups that are neither nations 
nor ethnic 'fragments' of a wider nation,41 and (ii) those groups that constitute ethnic
40A Romanian poem, cited in Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 205.
41 The Roma is (me example of such a group. As M. Kohn shows, nationalists who perceive nationhood
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’fragments' o f a wider ethnic natioa42 Nationalism, then, believes that the nation (itself 
ethnically homogeneous) can comprise diverse ethnic groups which, obviously, are not 
nations. The differences between these groups, though, are within the bounds of the 
national common features and sometimes only reflect different quantities of the same 
quality, as it were. In that respect, as A. R. Zolberg claims, "’Ethnicity" appears to be to 
"nationalism" what, in common parlance, "dialect" is to "language."143
As we have seen, nations and ethnic groups have at least one common denominator: both 
alike are understood as groups of common descent. But as we have also seen, the markers 
o f ancestry are not the same in every case and different nationalisms employ different 
features to mark off their national families from others. Thus, Doob mentions three 
differentiating features of this kind: birthplace (or homeland), consanguinity, and culture.44 
Barry, as mentioned above, recognises that nationalists use much more differentiating 
markers, and adds to Boob's list features such as phenotype, language, religion and so forth.
as a bond between blood and soil have not seen the Roma as a nation, nor as a part of another nation, for 
its nomadic way of life and lack of a ‘homeland.’ See M. Kohn, The Race Gallery (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1995), p. 194. The Roma also consider themselves as a group with no land of their own: they Tiave no 
home, and, perhaps uniquely among peoples, they have no dream of a homeland.' See I. Fonseca, Bury Me 
Standing (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 5. For a relevant discussion see R. Kawczynski, Nationality: Roma, 
Citizenship: Europe’, in Roma Rights, ed. D. Petrova (the European Roma Rights Center, Spring 1997), 
pp. 3-4.
42The idea of'ethnic fragments in a wider ethnie' is borne out in Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, 
p. 156 & passim.
43A. R. Zolberg, 'Ethnic Regionalisms in Western Europe', in The State in Europe, ed. A. Cyr 
(Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 111, n. 1.
44Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism, pp. 183-187.
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But if in specific cases some features are supposed to represent common national ancestry, 
while other features are disqualified for this aim, the disqualified features themselves can 
still be used to distinguish between different groups within the nation. If religion, for 
example, is understood by a particular nationalism as a marker of its nation, it does not 
necessarily mean that the nationalism in question rules out language, for instance, as a 
marker of ethnicity and descent altogether. Religion, then, can differentiate the nation from 
other nations, while language can still distinguish between descent groups within the nation. 
If  we recall that ethnic groups and nations are Gemeinschaften, and each and every 
Gemeinschaft (apart from the nuclear family) consists of different Gemeinschaften, then 
ethnic groups can definitely be incorporated into one nation while keeping their own ethnic 
status without causing any problem to the ethnic uniformity of the nation itself As Smith 
indicates, individuals may
...feel allegiances to different ethnic communities a t different levels o f identification 
simultaneously. An example o f this in the ancient world would be the sentiment o f ancient 
Greeks as members o f a polis, or foe 'sub-ethnic' (Dorians, Ionians, Aeolians, Boeotians, 
etc. -  really ethnic identities in their own right) and of foe Hellenic cultural ethnie. In foe 
modem world foe various clans, languages and ancestral 'sub-ethnies' o f foe Malays or 
Yoruba furnish examples of foe concentric circles of ethnic identity and allegiance.45
As for the Malays, for instance, they indeed share ’a highly cohesive, overarching identity
45Smifo, National Identity, p. 24 (italic mine).
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vis-a-vis the substantial number of Chinese immigrants,' Horowitz suggests, but at the same 
time they also seem to sustain their more particular ethnic loyalties, and therefore 'can still 
divide up by ancestral place of origins': Sumatra, the Celebes, Borneo, Java and Malaya.46 
In the Malays case, then, we can see an example of simultaneous membership in, and loyalty 
to, different ethnic groups. The question, though, is whether nationalism can accept it? 
Does nationalism necessarily repudiate the existence of distinct descent groups within the 
ancestral nation? Indeed, some nationalisms see their nations as entities that cannot be 
subdivided into different descent groups at all. Thus, for instance, when in France language 
became 'an objective characteristic o f French ethnicity,*47 it was imposed by French 
nationalists on different groups in France while rejecting any kind of ethnic subdivision 
within it.48 Other nationalisms, however, while seeing their nations as ethnic wholes, 
simultaneously recognise ethnic subdivisions within their nations and acknowledge their 
multi-ethnic composition.
The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), for example, described the Algerian nation in 
ethnic terms (when Islam was regarded as the main descent marker o f the nation), yet
4 6See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 66-68. C£ Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 165-
166.
47Greenfeld, Nationalism, p. 99.
48See Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p. 136, and Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 220 & p. 226, 
n. 40. Note also that until not too long ago French citizens were compelled to give only Gallic names to 
their children. Some Corsicans, for instance, were punished (fined or even imprisoned) when they insisted 
on giving Corsican names to their kids.
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recognised the ancestral differences between Arabs and Kabyles.49 Likewise, Kurd 
nationalists regard the Kurds as one nation that is marked off from others by common ’race, 
language, lifestyle, and geography,150 but agree that the Yazidis, for instance, belong to a 
distinct ancestry and that there are ethnic differences between the Kurds who originated in 
the plains and those whose ancestors are from the mountains.51 In a similar way Scottish 
nationalists (e.g., Hugh MacDiarmid) refer to the differences between highlanders and 
lowlanders, and pan-African nationalists to distinct tribes and state-nations.52 Another 
example would be the attitude of Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nationalisms to the 
Macedonians. Thus, Serbian nationalism, which considers its nation as a descent group, 
claims that the Macedonian people (as a distinct ancestry in itself) is a branch of the Serbian 
nation, and Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms profess the very same claim.53 Serbian 
nationalists, one can recall, have a similar idea about the Motenegrins as well, and identify 
them as a descent group that constitutes a part o f the Serbian nation.54 Zionism too has
49See A. Home, A Savage War o f Peace (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1989), pp. 35,48-49,78,495 
& passim. (In Hebrew).
50H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p. 199.
51See ibid., ch. 9 (esp. pp. 179, 182, 186, 199) & pp. 484-485.
52 About the Scots see A. Marr, The Battle for Scotland (London: Penguin Bodes, 1992); c£ Connor,
Ethnonationalism, p. 219. On pan-Africanism see O. J. E. Shiroya, Dimensions o f Nationalism (Nairobi:
the Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 1992); cf. J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993), pp. 7-9, 183-198 & 281-287.
53Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 213.
54Ibid., ibid.
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always considered Jews as a specific stock, but never denied that there are, as it were, 
ancestral differences between Ashkenazim (Western Jews) and Mizrahim (oriental Jews), 
themselves further divided into, e.g., American, British or German Jews and Iraqi, Iranian 
or Moroccan Jews.55
If my argument is right, and nationalism can accept the idea o f multi-ethnic nation without 
renouncing the view that the nation is an ethnic group in itself how does nationalism 
distinguish the nation from other ethnic groups after all? There are three related parts in the 
answer to this question. Firstly, nationalism sees the nation as the largest kinship group, ’the 
fully extended family1 beyond which there are no kinship relations.56 Secondly, since the 
nation is the largest kinship group it is ’the supreme and most important, to which therefore, 
in the case of conflict of group-loyalties, [one]...owes supreme loyalty.*57 As R. W. Emerson 
put it, the nation is a 'terminal community -  the largest community that, when the chips are 
down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both o f the lesser 
communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still
55For a relevant discussion, see S. Shaitan Chetrit, The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel (Tel Aviv: Am 
Oved, 2004), esp. chs. 1-2. (In Hebrew).
56Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 80,202,207,212 & passim. The citation is from p. 202.
57See Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 11-12. The citation is from p. 11.
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greater society.’58 Although (alas) this observation has normally been proved right,59 
nationalists would still change the ’effectively commands’ to ’should command’. Thirdly, as 
’the fully extended family1 the nation appears as an encompassing identity: it supplies the 
individual with a total and all-embracing identity while other ethnic groups supply it only 
partly. Thus, it is the nation that supposedly enfolds one’s identities as a whole and fulfills 
‘a deep need in human beings -  the need to belong to a society that provides them with a 
complete form of life.’60 In my view, though, it is not the need to belong itself that the 
ethnic nation satisfies but rather the sense of coherence it may confer on its members.
4.3 AWAKENING THE ‘SLEEPING BEAUTY’
As I said before, while nationalists do not ascribe to the individual identification any role 
in the formation or existence of the nation, they do recognise that such an identification is 
essentially important in the vitality and ’’healthy" life of the nation. So how exactly does 
such an identification, as a vitalising or reviving force, get into the picture o f the ‘eternal 
nation’? In order to explain that I would like to refer to the elements that exist, according 
to Smith, in any national mythology. These elements, or rather a series of them, are:
1. a myth of origins in time; i.e. when the community was 'bom';
58R. W. Emerson, quoted in Geertz, The Integrative Revolution', p. 107.
59As Connor shows (based on empirical studies), when national identity comes to conflict with other 
loyalties ‘nationalism customarily proves the more potent.' Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 196.
60A. Margalit, ‘The Moral Psychology of Nationalism’, in The Morality o f Nationalism, eds. R. 
McKim & J. McMahan (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 83 (paraphrasing Herder).
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2. a myth of origins in space; Le. where the community was horn’;
3. a myth of ancestry; i.e. who bore us, and how we descend from him/her;
4. a myth of migration; i.e. whither we wandered;
5. a myth of liberation; Le. how we were freed;
6. a myth of the golden age; Le. how we became great and heroics;
7 a myth of decline; Le. how we decayed and were conquered/exiled; and 
8. a myth of rebirth; Le. how we shall restored to our former glory.61
In contrast to Smith’s own analysis, for nationalism, which treats these elements as actual 
events rather than myths, the subject in all these stages is the nation. Nationalists seem to 
believe that from its creation (elements one to three) up to the peak of the golden age the 
nation has flourished, despite a possible migration, because conationals have seen 
themselves as parts of their national whole. The nation began to lace problems once its 
members stopped to identify themselves as such, and developed instead a sense of 
individuality, perhaps even the belief that nationality itself is mutable and open to one’s 
choice. Let me elaborate this point a bit and relate it to the more general meaning o f the 
concept o f identity.
As everybody knows, the term 'identity* has two different meanings, which apply to various 
languages such as English, French, Spanish, German and Hebrew. As the OED clarifies:
61Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 192.
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Identity 1. The quality or condition of being the same in substance composition, 
nature, properties, or particular qualities under consideration: absolute or essential 
sameness; oneness.
Identity 2. The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the 
condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else: individuality, 
personality.
Appeals to the second meaning (ipse identity) appear in Leibniz’s idea of the Monadology, 
in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and most prominently in Kant’s 
concept oFthe transcendental unity o f apperception'.62 On the other hand, the first meaning 
of the concept o f identity (idem identity) is commonly employed by nationalists. That is to 
say, nationalism stresses that the nation has its own unique and objective characteristics and 
that conationals are identical to each other in virtue of sharing these characteristics. 
Consequently, one's ipse identity cannot be separated from one's nationality: being 'itself 
and not something else' means after all to be identical to one's conationals in those traits that 
distinguish them from 'outsiders'.63 Furthermore, since one's ipse identity refers to one's
62Cf. the Buddhist teaching of Anatman (Sanscrit) or Anatta (Pali), which means ‘lack of a self or 
‘selflessness’. This teaching stresses that there is no self in the ipse sense, i.e., there is no sameness of 
personality at all times. For a relevant discussion, see S. Collins, Selfless Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982).
63See D. Miller, Market, State, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 238-239. Cf. 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 26-28.
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sameness ’at all times or in all circumstances', and this identity cannot be separated from 
one's nationality, one's nationality is eternal.
The decline o f the nation (the seventh motif in Smith's list), then, is associated by 
nationalists with the detachment of the individual from his national whole and unawareness 
to his idem identity. The factors that led to this detachment, as indicated before, were the 
changes that modernity brought about and not necessarily conquests or deportations, as 
Smith suggests.64 The vitalisation and revival of the declining nations are thus related by 
nationalists to their own attempts to revive the conationals' self-identity, to redeem the 
nation from its decline, and to achieve a new national golden age. Thus, for example, Ben- 
Zion Dinur -  a professor o f History at the Hebrew university (1948-1973), the Israeli 
Minister of Education and Culture (1951-1955) and a committed Zionist -  wrote already 
in 1926 that the task of Zionist historians is to ‘stimulate among the [Jewish; O.C] people 
the feelings of identification with their nation’ and ‘to bequeath a ‘historical sense’... which 
is a proven means to achieve the sublime goal of merging the personal “I” with the general 
“I” of the nation.’65 In 1953, following Dinur and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s push,
64It is true, of course, that modernisation was often introduced to different groups and changed diem 
through occupation, e.g., in the colonialist cases of India, Algeria or Nicaragua. Nevertheless, there were 
other cases in which modernisation was not associated with conquest or deportation. On nationalism and 
colonialism, see P. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998).
65B. Dinur, paraphrased and quoted in U. Ram, ‘Zionist Historiography and the Invention ofModem 
Jewish Nationhood: the Case ofBen-Zion Dinur’, in Zionism: A Contemporary Controversy, pp. 126-159. 
The quotations are from pp. 131-132.
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the State Education Law was drafted. The law called for all Jewish education in Israel to 
be based on ‘the values of Jewish culture and scientific achievement, love of the homeland 
and loyalty to the State o f Israel and the Jewish People...’ (Italic mine).
Nationalists, then, do agree that nationalism as a movement is modem as its task is to cope 
with a problem that emerged only in the modem era. Yet, as I have already explained, this 
does not entail that the nation itself is modem. So in contrast to most scholars of 
nationalism, nationalists believe that the nation precedes the nationalist movement and not 
vice versa. As such, nationalism as a movement is understood as a bridge between the 
nation's past and its future, as a living museum of the past', 'a futurism of the past', or as a 
movement that aims to 'renew the eternal essence'.66 Nationalists, in this way, thus identify 
themselves as ‘the authentic voice of the nation,’67 Le., those who authentically and 
truthfully represent the real will and good of the national whole.
One example of such self-understanding of nationalism could be seen in the formal 
publication ofthe Arab Information Center (as a manifesto of the Arab National Movement, 
or what is often called pan-Arabism):
The deciding factor therefore is the Spirit o f Arab community, a spirit not necessarily
66A11 these phrases are cited, respectively, in Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, pp. xv, 1 & 2.
67 J. Breuilly, ‘Nationalism and the State’, in Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism, ed. R. Michener 
(Minnesota: Paragon House, 1993), p. 21.
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dependent upon a common religious experience.. .Arab Unity, as such, is an end in itself for 
it reflects the community of language, culture, experiences and aspiration which all Arabs 
share despite political boundaries... [The Arab National Movement] aspires to attain the 
same norm of life which the Arab people had shared in the past and which was only 
interrupted. ..when Arab lands were divided by European powers against the will o f their 
peoples.68
According to this manifesto, the Arab nation -  as a community of language, culture and 
other characteristics -  has existed for centuries, and it is absolutely not the creation o f the 
Arab nationalist movement. The role of the movement is to unite the nation and bring it 
back to its authentic nature, as this is revealed in the Arab norm of life before the 
intervention of foreigners. In the same way Zionism has never pretended to be the creator 
of the Jewish nation but its saviour,69 and Mickiewicz’s patriotic society did not claim to be 
the harbinger of the Polish nation but its liberator. Likewise, the Boxers society in China, 
Genchi Kato’s Shinto nationalism in Japan, and different nationalisms all over the globe.
So as Smith acknowledges, nationalism sees itself as the power that has to reawake the
68,Arab Information Center: Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity, 1959’, in The Dynamics o f 
Nationalism, ed. L. L. Snyder (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 313 (italic original).
69As Shimoni shows, the origin of Jewish nationalism (Zionism) was not a defensive reaction to 
antisemitism but, quite the contrary, a response to the (mostly dejure) emancipation ofEuropean Jews. This 
emancipation encouraged many Jews to assimilate into their host societies and was therefore conceived by 
those proto nationalists (and thereafter by Zionists themselves) as a threat to Jewish identity and 
communities and as a manifestation of national decadence. See Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology, chs. 1-2, 
esp. pp. 8-13,43-47 & 60-66.
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nation from its prolonged slumber, to reawake but not to create.70 In its attempts to return 
the nation to its "eternal essence1, nationalism tries to close the gap that was opened wide 
between, as it were, the organic and objective nature of the nation and the unawareness of 
conationals to their inborn membership: to imbue conationals with the understanding that 
their ipse identity emanates from and depends on their idem identity. In other words, 
nationalism strives to revitalise, realise and actualise the national Gemeinschaft in full as 
nationalism believes it was in the past. However, one should note that this kind of 
revivalism does not necessarily mean a regression. As Hutchinson puts it,
By revivalism, I mean more than a conviction that a once-existent nation must be recreated. 
Ethnic revivalists in my sense are those who perceive the nation as a creative force that 
evolves through periods of decay and regeneration in competitive interaction with a world 
of similar groups. For the revivalist, the past is to be used not in order to return to some 
antique order but rather to re-establish the nation at a new and higher level o f 
development.71
Thus, nationalists in our days do not hesitate to use modem means to preserve and enforce 
their nation.72 Chang Chih-tung, a Chinese nationalist, for instance, wrote at the end of the
70Smith, National Identity, pp. 19-20.
71J. Hutchinson, The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism (London: Allot & Unwin, 1987), pp. 9-10. 
For a further discussion see ch. 1 in Hutchinson's book, esp. pp. 30-42.
72 As Herf shows in his study of Weimar and the Third Reich, Goman nationalist intellectuals woe, 
as H of names it, ‘reactionary modernists* to the extent that, they endorsed modem technological means 
for a reactionary irrationalist goal, i.e., the revitalisation of the national Gemeinschaft. Such reactionary
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19th century that in order to survive, i.e., to preserve its religion and culture, the Chinese 
nation should acquire and utilise Western knowledge.73 One may recall Adolph Gottlieb’s 
words about our relations with nature: 'certain people,’ he says, 'always say we should go 
back to nature. I notice they never say we should go forward to nature.’74 In a similar way 
most nationalists argue for the progress o f the nation: the nation should go forward to its 
past.75 This is not necessarily self-contradictory: the traditional and national past, or rather 
what nationalism sees as the authentic nature or essence o f the nation, supplies the route 
and boundaries for the progress, when within these national bounds there is enough room 
for change and evolvement. As Shiroya, himself a pan-African nationalist, puts it: ’What 
remains or what changes very slowly in any given culture is its roots, its core, its "soul”, 
while the other aspects go through varying degrees o f change or adaptation.’76 Accordingly, 
Shiroya calls on the ‘African nation’ to return to its authentic roots and revive its "soul", 
which he finds in the 6th millenium B.C., and to adjust them to the modem world through
modernism, he emphasises, is not unique to Germany: ’As long as nationalism remains a potent force, 
something like reactionary modernism will continue to confront us.’ See Herfj Reactionary Modernism, 
passim. The quotation is from p. x; for the nationalist conception of the nation as Gemeinschaft see esp. 
p. 51.
73C. Chih-tung, 'Essay on Howto Save China, 1898’, in Snyder, The Dynamics o f Nationalism, pp. 
318-320.
74 A. Gottlieb, cited in Textsfor Introduction to Modem Art vol. 2, ed. Z. Amishai-Maisels (Jerusalem, 
1988), p. 350.
75Cf. J. Lele, 'The Two Faces ofNationalism: cm the Revolutionary Potential of Tradition', in National
and Ethnic Movements, ed. J. Dofny & A. Akiwowo (California & London: SAGE, 1980), pp. 201-216.
76Shiroya, Dimensions ofNationalism, p. 108.
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the device of'pan-African cultural nationalism.177
4.4 CIVIC NATIONALISM?
When Mahatma Gandhi was once asked what he thought about British civilisation his witty 
answer was: ‘It would be a good idea.’ If someone asked me what I thought o f civic 
nationalism, I would give a very similar answer. Unfortunately, I do not only think that 
something like civic nationalism does not exist but also that the concept itself is defective 
and misleading. Nevertheless, many scholars distinguish at least between two kinds of 
nationalism and do count something like civic nationalism:
...there are two quite different types o f nationalism -  cultural and political -  that must not 
be conflated, for they articulate different, even competing conceptions o f the 
nation... [Pjolitical nationalists... [have] a cosmopolitan rationalist conception o f die nation 
that looks forward ultimately to  a common humanity transcending cultural 
differences...[For] the cultural nationalist...the essence o f a nation is its distinctive 
civilization.. .Nations are primordial expressions of this spirit; like families, they are natural 
solidarities...[and] organic beings...7*
Hutchinson, o f course, is not the only scholar who makes such a distinction. Similarly,
77Ibid., p. 109. Note that Shiroya also refers to the African nation as a race, and argues that the
academic intellectuals are the ones who have to educate it and bring it back to its roots. On the role of the 
intellectuals, see ibid., chs. 5 & 6.
78Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism, pp. 12-13 (italic original).
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Barry distinguishes between civic and ethnocultural nationalism, J. G. Kellas between social 
and ethnic nationalism, and Greenfeld, Canovan, and R. Brubaker differentiate between 
variant types of nationalism in a similar way.79 In contrast to these scholars, I believe that 
the concept fcivic nationalism' is in itself essentially flawed for three reasons. First, from the 
historical perspective, as Smith indicates, nationalist movements have always incorporated 
a sense of ethnicity, though sometimes expressed it only indirectly, and have never applied 
purely to civic or territorial bonds.80 Secondly, if our object o f examination is real-world 
nationalists, then we have to ask who those figures and movements that are commonly 
regarded as nationalists are. Basically, it seems to be self-evident that people commonly 
ascribe the terms 'nationalism' or 'nationalists' to figures like the Serbian Radovan Karadzic 
or the Austrian Jorg Haider, or to movements like the Italian Neo-Fascist party or the 
French National Front.
Obviously, such figures are not identified as nationalists because of their conception of the 
nation but because of their specific ideologies, policies or deeds of (often violent)
79See respectively: Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', sc. VI, note esp. p. 54; 
J. G. Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity (London: MacMillan, 1991), ch. 4; Greenfeld, 
Nationalism, pp. 9-12 & passim; Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, esp. ch. 2; R. Brubaker, 
Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 5-6 & 32-35.
80Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 134-140 & passim. C£ Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and 
the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p. 96. In saying that sometimes nationalist movements expressed their sense 
of ethnicity only indirectly I refer to Smith's remarks on 'Western territorial' nationalist movements. In 
principle, Smith suggests, these movements have described the nation in civic or political-territorial terms. 
In practice, though, these movements have identified the territorial nation as a specific ethnocultural group, 
and often recognised the political-territoiy as an ancestral marker of the nation.
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particularism and exclusion.81 It is therefore not surprising that people normally refer to 
nationalism in negative terms and consequently ascribe it to others and only rarely to 
themselves, even if in feet they do conform to their own interpretation of the term.82 Thus, 
as Ignatieff puts it, for most people ‘everyone else is a fenatic, everyone but us is a 
nationalist.’83
Nevertheless, all those figures and movements that are commonly regarded as nationalists 
also share the organic and familial conception of the nation. Thirdly, then, as far as real- 
world nationalists (especially elites) themselves are concerned, they have always described 
the nation in ethnic terms and used this description of theirs in mobilising the masses. In that 
respect, I find Connor’s critique of other scholars of nationalism quite compelling:
In ignoring or denying the sense of kinship that infuses the nation, scholars have been blind
81The particularist and exclusive nature of nationalism will be addressed in length in the next two 
chapters.
82Quite often, though, people do not impute nationalism even to others that deserve that title. Consider 
for example the policy of the Czech Republic towards its Romani population. The citizenship laws that were 
enacted by the Czech government (led by the alleged liberal V&clav Havel) in 1994 denied citizenship to 
many Roma. Moreover, sterilisation of Romani women was still taking place as 'a loose ad hoc racial 
hygiene programme...[A] Velvet genocide' under Havel's rule. See Kohn, The Race Gallery, pp. 202-203. 
That policy towards the Roma is clearly nationalistic, but Havel and fee Czech government have widely 
been described as liberal and democratic and by no means as nationalists. But this popular view of Havel 
and fee Czech government, to mention only one example of many, does not show feat people do not 
associate nationalism with particularism and exclusion but only exposes either ignorance, partiality or 
inconsistency in people's beliefs and attitudes.
83Ignatief£ Blood and Belonging, p. 16. Thus, for example, while Zionists refer to themselves as 
national (leumi ’im, in Hebrew), many of them refer to fee Palestinians as n a tio n a ls (leumanim) and to 
their legitimate aspiration to national self-determination as national^/ (leumani). In this, they hope to 
delegitimise fee said aspiration of fee Palestinians.
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to that which has been thoroughly apparent to nationalist leaders. In sharpest contrast with 
most academic analysts of nationalism, those who have successfully mobilized nations have 
understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense o f shared blood, and they have 
not hesitated to appeal to it.84
In fact, the argument that nationalism is inherently ethnic and ethnicist was put forward by
Connor right in the beginning of his book:
A likely first response to the title o f this book, Ethnonationalism , is “What is it and how 
does it differ from just plain nationalism T  The answer is that there is no difference if 
nationalism is used in its pristine sense. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case...[S]lipshod 
use of the key terms, nation and nationalism, is more the rule than the exception, even in 
works purportedly dealing with nationalism. As used throughout this book, nation connotes 
a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes 
identification with and loyalty to one’s nation as ju st defined. It does not refer to loyalty to 
one’s country. Admittedly then, ethnonationalism has an inner redundancy, and it is used 
solely to avoid any misunderstanding concerning our focus. Throughout this work, 
nationalism and ethnonationalism are treated as synonyms.85
Everything I have said thus far amounts to an empirical observation on nationalism, but one
8 4 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 197.
85Ibid.,p. xi. Connor thus infers that nationalism logically means ‘Loyalty to the ethnic group... ’ Ibid., 
pp. 40-41.
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may legitimately make a normative point and argue that nationalism should (and therefore 
may) be transformed into someting like civic or political nationalism as defined by 
Hutchinson et al. In order to remain coherent and credible, though, the concept of 
nationalism cannot be totally metamorphosed like in the case of Gregor Samsa, who in 
Kafka’s Metamorphosis one day turned into a cockroach. In other words, a transformed 
nationalism must bear some relations to its prior form, i.e., it must be sublated. The 
question is, Is it possible? Can nationalism be sublated into ‘civic’ one?
Sublation, we saw, means that in any transformation of an order the fundamental or innate 
characteristics of that order are preserved while its older form (the prior manifestation of 
those innate characteristics) is cancelled out. Now i£ as argued before, the intrinsic 
characteristics of nationalism are basically reflected in its organic conception of the nation, 
then any reasonable sublation of it would not and could not entail an overall cancellation 
of those ethnic (and ethnicist) properties. On the whole, then, I agree with Viroli that the 
language of nationalism is different and should be distinguished from the language of 
patriotism, which emphasises civic bonds and individual liberties rather than ethnic or 
organic ties.86 Let us see now how the nationalist creed that was depicted in this chapter 
bears on the question of national selfrdetermination.
86Viroli, For Love o f Country, note esp. p. 8, Incidentally, I think that it is not a coincidence that most 
(though not all) academic proponents of‘civic nationalism* are quite reluctant to actually use the concept 
of nationalism and normally prefer to use terms like nationhood, nationality or even nationness; similarly, 
they usually choose to employ the concept of national rather than national/5/. See, e.g., Miller, On 
Nationality.
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5
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
5.1 NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: GENERAL REMARKS 
In his book Nationalism, Kedourie asserts that nationalism is ’largely a doctrine of national 
self-determination/1 If we look at different nationalist movements it seems that Kedourie 
is quite right in this point: the aspiration to achieve national self-determination, and to 
preserve it once it has been achieved, has always been the main motive in the formation of 
nationalist movements and behind their thinking and activities. The idea of national self- 
determination, though, was never accepted and defended by nationalists alone. In other 
words, although all nationalists support the idea of national self-determination, one need not 
be a nationalist to favour it. As we shall see, the contradiction between nationalism and 
democracy, in our case, is not around the question of accepting or rejecting the idea of 
national self-determination but about their incompatible understandings of this idea, which 
both uphold.2 To show this incompatibility between nationalism and democracy, I would 
like to divide my discussion into four different questions. Although these questions are 
strongly interrelated, analytical purposes require that they be discussed separately. The 
questions I would like to deal with, then, are as follows:
1. what is the principle of national self-determination, i.e., what does national self­
^edourie, Nationalism, p. 23.
Tor the democratic views on national self-determination, see chs. 9-10.
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determination mean?
2. why, if ever, is national self-determination morally justifiable, i.e., what are, if 
any, the moral aims that national self-determination is supposed to achieve or 
protect, and, consequently, is there a universal moral right to national self- 
determination or are there any moral limitations to this right?
3. how are the answers to 1 and 2 connected, i.e., how is national self- 
determination believed to satisfy the moral aims, if any?
4. where is national self-determination supposed to take place, i.e., what is the 
specific territory in which the nation should become self-determined?3
Most scholars and political figures agree about the general meaning o f national self- 
determination, stressing that this notion refers to the set of political institutions that allow 
the nation to make collective decisions and to determine by itself how to conduct its own 
life, at least on those matters that are most significant for itself.4 A self-determined nation, 
then, is understood as a nation that holds its own political institutions through which it can 
reach and enforce collective policies and determine its own life. The demand for national 
self-determination, in its turn, is described as a political claim -  ’directed towards an 
institutional arrangement: it demands changes in legislation and economic policies, the 
setting up of new political institutions (government, political committees, etc.) and the re-
3Questions 1-3 will be addressed in this chapter whereas question 4 will be dealt with in ch. 6.
4 See Miller, On Nationality, p. 11 & ch. 4, esp. pp. 81 & 99-101.
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definition of their borders, both geographically and functionally.*5
National self-determination, though, does not necessarily mean an independent state and can 
be satisfied through other political arrangements. As R. Higgins argues, and demonstrates 
with a few examples, 'While independence has been the most frequently chosen path, other 
possibilities have always existed and have sometimes been chosen. General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 (XV) spoke long ago of self-determination being exercised 'through 
independence, free association, integration with an independent state, or emergence into any 
other political status freely determined by a people’.’ ’Self-determination', Higgins concludes, 
lias never simply meant independence. It has meant the free choice o f peoples f  both to 
adopt any political status they see fit as a way of realising self-determination, and 
subsequently to determine and pursue their own political, economic, social and cultural life 
through the status they have chosen and on a continuing basis.7
At this point, one should already understand why national self-determination is not identical 
to secession.8 On the one hand, secession does not necessarily refer to nations, and it 'may
5A. De-Shalit, ‘National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural’, in Political Studies44/5 (1996), 
p. 910.
6A11 quotations in this paragraph are from R. Higgins, Problems and Process (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), pp. 118-119 (italic mine).
7See ibid., pp. 120 & 123.
8For a discussion that confuses the idea of national self-determination with the concept of secession, 
see A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination o f Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass,
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include any group which wants to secede.19 On the other hand, even when secession does 
refer to nations, it reflects only one form of national self-determination as it ’involves the 
withdrawal of a group and its territory from the authority of a state of which it is a part,'10 
whereas national self-determination can take, as we have seen, forms other than that.11
Another point that demands clarification refers to the relations between national self- 
determination and national control over a particular territory. As de-Shalit’s quotation 
suggests, national self-determination refers to the re-definition of the borders of political 
institutions, ’both geographically and functionally.' The geographical aspect is indeed very 
important: normally, when a nation demands to be self-determined it also stakes a claim to 
a particular piece of land in which the nation aspires to form its own political institutions, 
Le., to turn this piece of land into a />o//rica/-territorial unit, be it a state, an autonomy 
within a larger state, or otherwise. Moreover, when a nation stakes such a territorial claim, 
it often sees the relevant territory as an integral part o f its nationality (i.e., as a national 
marker), and thus believes that to be really self-determined requires the formation of 
political institutions in this particular land and not elsewhere. Consequently, when such a
1991).
9De-Shalit, ‘National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural’, pp. 907-908.
10D. L. Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law*, in Shapiro & Kymlicka, 
NOMOSXXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights, p. 423.
uFor a relevant discussion, see ibid., pp. 421-463, and M. Freeman, 'Democracy and Dynamite: the 
Peoples' Right to Self-determination', in Political Studies 44/4 (1996), pp. 746-761. See also M. Walzer, 
740168 on the New Tribalism', in Political Restructuring in Europe, ed. C. Brown (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 199.
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nation fails to form its own political institutions in the relevant territory the nation might 
consider its self-determination as only partly realised and try to achieve it in full, i.e., to take 
control over the relevant land, and over that land as a whole.12
Nevertheless, I believe it would be wrong to say that territorial claims are immanent to the 
idea of national self-determination, as the latter can also be realised in forms other than 
territorial control, e.g., *through institutions (e.g., educational) which confer some self- 
government on the [national] segment.’13 In some cases, where two nations or more were 
intermixed throughout a specific territory, and neither of them could control this area, the 
adopted solution was 'a form of power-sharing between the groups to guarantee each at 
least some measure of self-determination.’14 Thus, for instance, in Brussels, in which the 
Flemings and the Walloons, as well as the German population, are living together, ’a system 
o f’personal’ autonomy is operating, with separate schools for members of each community
12To the question what is this relevant land and what are the criteria to determine it as such I shall 
return in the next chapter, When I deal with the question 'where is national self-determination supposed to 
take place?
13Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 137. For a relevant discussion, see H. van
Amersfoort, 'Institutional Plurality. Problem or Solution for the Multi-ethnic State?, in Notions o f 
Nationalism, ed. S. Periwal (Budapest, London & New York: Central European University Press, 1995), 
pp. 162-181. Freeman, for instance, argues that there are more than twenty forms of national self- 
determination, half are clearly non-territorial. See Freeman, ‘Democracy and Dynamite: the Peoples* Right 
to Self-determination’, p. 751. Although I believe that many of Freeman's examples do not represent 
national self-determination at all, his general argument that there are various forms of non-territorial self- 
determination (and some examples he mentions) seems to me to be quite correct.
14Miller, On Nationality, p. 118.
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under a common Brussels authority which neither community entirely controls.’15 And in 
pre-war Bosnia each community -  the Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian -  had a proportional 
representation in the province government, although in the end, as we know, the ’’solution" 
that was implemented by Karadzic and Mladzic’s gangs in their attempts to take control 
over Bosnia was another 'final solution' rather than any form of power-sharing.
So far I have given a very general account of the idea of national self-determination. 
However, as A. H. Richmond correctly realises, while The ideal of self-determination of 
peoples was entrenched in international law and the United Nations Charter...the concept 
of a 'people' is not defined, and the idea of 'self-determination' is open to various 
interpretations.'16 As far as I can see, there are two important elements in the idea of 
national self-determination that veer whenever the conception of the nation does, and thus 
also alter the meaning of national self-determination at large. The first, which seems to be 
quite neglected by political theorists, deals with the meaning o f national institutions and 
decisions (i.e., what renders them national). The second, to which many scholars have 
dedicated much attention, refers to the issue of the right to national self-determination and 
to the moral justification of this right.17
15Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 140.
16 A. H. Richmond, Global Apartheid (Toronto, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p. 225. C£ A. Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
17See for example Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law’, pp. 437-438, and 
Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 69-70.
As we have seen, a self-determined nation is understood to be a nation that holds its own 
political institutions through which it can reach and enforce collective decisions and 
determine by itself how to conduct its own life, at least on those matters that are most 
significant for itself. But what exactly renders any institutions and decisions to be really ’its 
own', Le., national? Largely, the answers are dependent upon the conception of the nation 
one chooses to employ. A nation is believed to have its own political institutions, I will 
argue, when two conditions are met: first, the condition of membership (MC), and second, 
the condition of national markers (NMC). As to the MC, a nation is regarded as having its 
own political institutions when these institutions include only members of the nation in 
question.18 This does not necessarily mean that each and every member of the nation is 
entitled to take an active part in these institutions, whether as a representative, a voter, or 
otherwise (note that I have said 'members o f the nation' and not 'the members o f the 
nation1). It does mean, though, that those who are entitled to take part in these institutions 
should be members of the nation so the institutions may reasonably be regarded as national 
in the sense that they are conducted by conationals and not by foreigners.19 Now this 
condition is indeed a necessity but not sufficient for saying that the institutions are really of 
the nation;20 there is a need, I believe, to look at the things that political institutions do and 
not only at the figures who take part in them. Here, then, the NMC becomes very
18Cf. Miller, On Nationality, pp. 88 & 150.
19C£ Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 2, ch. I.
20For a relevant reference, see Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 70-71 & 96.
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important.
I have said before that a self-determined nation can, by definition, determine by itself how 
to conduct its own life, at least on those matters that are most significant for itself 
Naturally, these most significant things are those factors that define the nation as such or, 
in other words, are considered as the markers of the national identity. In general, then, 
national institutions are those that embody the national markers and aspire to protect and 
advance them. When these institutions are sovereign, i.e., have the ability to reach and 
enforce collective decisions and are the final authority on all matters concerning the national 
markers, we would say that the nation is self-determined as it holds
...a political unit with authority of the relevant scope, but what that scope must be will 
depend on the particular identity of the group in question, and on the aims and goals that 
they [die group's members] are attempting to pursue. Thus, one nation may include 
religious affiliation as part of its self-definition, in which case it is very likely to want the 
political authority it exercises to extend to religious questions, whereas another nation may 
define itself in ways that make no reference to religion. It is therefore going to be difficult 
to set a priori limits to the proper scope of sovereignty from this perspective. Moreover, 
we cannot tell in advance which particular features of society's way of life will come to 
assume importance as markers of national identity.21
21Miller, On Nationality, p. 100.
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To illustrate the NMC, allow me to use Miller's own example.22 Think of those who 
consider the Pound as a marker of English national identity and as a symbol of English 
national self-determination. For them, the acceptance of the Euro is a threat to English 
identity and self-determination: by accepting the European currency, many of them claim, 
the English political institutions will no longer embody the Pound as a national marker, 
hence lose a great deal of their Englishness and of their sovereignty on matters regarding 
the English national identity. Thus, William Rees-Mogg, in an article in The Times, stressed 
that the acceptance of the single currency, taxation and electoral system of the European 
'new Holy Roman Empire', as he calls it, would reflect the destruction of England as a 
nation’ -  the loss of English national identity and sacrifice of English independence.23
I believe that the MC and NMC provide us with a good grasp of the principle of national 
self-determination. To put it succinctly, then, a nation is self-determined to the extent that 
the political institutions it holds embody its national markers, are sovereign on all matters 
concerning these markers, and are managed only by conationals who are committed to the 
protection and advancement of these markers. Consequently, only decisions that are 
accepted by institutions that answer the MC and NMC are regarded as the decisions of the 
nation, which reflect and allow it to determine its own collective life.
22See ibid., pp. 100-101.
23W. Rees-Mogg, 'Revenge of the Celtic Fringe', The Times, September 15,1997.
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Now the question is, as Miller justly says, What are the features that define the nation as 
such? Is a nation a race, a linguistic body, or maybe a body o f individuals who share the 
same citizenship? Moreover, is a nation an objective entity or is it constituted by beliefs? 
And do individuals acquire their nationality by birth or choice? Are conationals 
characterised by common habitation, or maybe by a shared culture? Obviously, each of 
these conceptions of nationality has a different understanding of what national institutions 
and decisions are, what they should embody and what turns them national. Accordingly, the 
idea of national self-determination varies as each conception of the nation interprets this 
idea in accordance with its own understanding of national institutions and decisions.
5.2 NATIONALISM AND THE MEANING OF NATIONAL SELF- 
DETERMINATION
Following their conception of the nation, and as far as the MC is concerned, nationalists 
would claim that a nation is self-determined to the extent that its institutions include only 
members of the organic nation. To put it briefly, nationalists perceive self-determination in 
ethnic terms and believe that in order to be self-determined the nation should keep its 
political institutions as much as possible away from any influence, let alone domination, of 
those who do not belong to the national stock. The nationalist principle of self- 
determination, then, reflects, to use Gellner’s words,24 an external autonomy (autonomy vis- 
a-vis exterior forces) for sure but also an internal ethnic homogeneity o f the political
24See Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 1.
159
institutions that the nation holds.25
Turning now to the NMC, we have seen that this condition requires that in order to count 
as national the political institutions should embody and advance the national markers, or 
features, of the nation. Also, only when these institutions are sovereign on all matters 
concerning those markers the nation will genuinely be self-determined. Nationalist 
movements, as we saw, employ various features to mark off their respective nations: 
culture, language, religion, place of residence and so forth, are all used as differentiating 
markers. But as we also saw, for nationalists ’a differentiating feature serves as a marker o f 
nationality when it is thought to coincide with a distinctive descent group.' In that sense, 
nationalists describe national markers in ethnic terms and thus believe that national 
institutions by definition embody and promote the ancestral markers of the nation and their 
corresponding values therein. For nationalists, then, a nation is self-determined only when 
it holds such institutions and when these institutions are sovereign and control all matters 
concerning the ethnic markers of the nation.26
I argued before that it is not enough that those who conduct the national institutions are 
conationals; to be precise, they must be devoted conationals, Le., committed to the
25C£ C. Schmitt, The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge &, London: the MIT Press,
1985), pp. 9-17.
26C£ Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', pp. 20-21.
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protection and advancement of the national features* If we coopt the MC onto the NMC, 
then, it is clear that from the nationalist point of view those conationals who are entitled to 
rule (and, more generally, to fully participate and influence) the national institutions are 
those who conform to the nationalist creed as presented above, i.e., those who fit the 
‘authentic voice of the nation.’ According to the nationalist stance, then, institutions that 
are not ruled by nationalists in their own right do not deserve the title ‘national’ in the first 
place, and those who do in fact run them should be considered as misguided (at best) or 
disloyal (at worst).
5.3 NATIONALISM AND THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
As mentioned before, there are two elements in the idea of national self-determination that 
change whenever the conception of the nation does. I would now like to turn to the second 
element: the issue of the right to national self-determination and its moral justification.
As J. Raz and A. Margalit put it, the issue o f the right to national self-determination 
embraces the question ’Who has the right and under what conditions is it to be exercised?27 
Assuming that the relevant group for national self-determination is the nation, the question 
can be rephrased as ’Who is the nation that has this right and under what conditions is it to 
be exercised? Obviously, when the conception of the nation changes, so does the group that
21 J. Raz and A. Margalit, 'National Self-Determination', in The Journal o f Philosophy LXXXVII/9 
(1990), p. 441.
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has the right, as well as the role of national self-determination, i.e., the aims that it is 
supposed to achieve or protect. In general, national self-determination is understood as a 
protective device: it aims at the protection either of specific communities, individual 
interests, human rights, world peace and order, or of some or all of them together.28 But 
each of these elements is associated with a different conception of the nation, each of which 
gives different weight apiece and justifies and bases its preferences on different ontological 
beliefs and moral grounds.29 So a dispute around the conception of the nation does not 
entail only a debate as to the group that deserves self-determination but also about the 
elements that self-determination ought to protect, that is, about the role of national self- 
determination. One objection to this argument o f mine is put forward by Tamir, who asserts 
that differences in the conception of the nation do not entail an essential disagreement as 
to the elements that national self-determination ought to protect. But I think it will not take 
too long to show that T amir's assertion is as realistic as, say, the story of creation in Genesis 
or the Original Sin.
Historically, Tamir argues, there were two interpretations to the right of national self- 
determination- cultural and democratic -  each o f which with its own distinctive conception
28See Freeman, ‘Democracy and Dynamite: the Peoples’ Right to Self-determination’, pp. 751 & 754-
761. See also Raz and Margalit, ’National Self-Determination', pp. 439-461; Barry, ‘Self-Government 
Revisited’, pp. 124-154; Miller, On Nationality, pp. 83-90; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 69-77. C£
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 157 & 165-173.
29See ibid., ibid.
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of the nation. These different interpretations, Tamir insists (not accidentally without any 
supportive reference or evidence) based their justification o f the right of nations to self- 
determination on one value: the protection of individual interests. Even the nationalist 
version, Tamir argues, always aimed at such a protection:
Historically, the interpretation o f the right to national self-determination followed two 
distinct courses, each relying on a different definition of the term "nation," and deriving its 
justification from the protection o f a different individual interest.. .According to the 
cultural version, "nation" is defined as a community sharing a set o f objective 
characteristics grouped under the rubric o f culture and national consciousness. 
Consequently, the right to national self-determination is understood as the right o f a nation 
or, more precisely, the members o f the nation, to preserve their distinct existence, and to 
manage communal life in accordance with their particular way of life...[This version] 
suitably reflects the national essence o f die right to self-determination...30
Tamir’s statement seems to be a sciolism or a figment rather than a historical observation 
or a serious analysis. As de-Shalit correctly argues, in his critique of Tamir’s theory, *A 
nationalism which is based on culture and cultural distinctions was, not very long ago, a 
concept characteristic of right-wing, or romantic theorists such as Herder...’31 As everybody 
knows, hopefully Tamir too, romantic nationalists have never aspired to protect individual
30Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 69 (emphasis original; italic mine).
31De-Shalit, ‘National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural’, p. 911.
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interests. Instead, they have stressed the importance of national self-determination for the 
protection and vitality of the nation and its unique identity as a collective, more often than 
not at the expense of individual liberties, rights or equality:
...an original people needs freedom, that this is the security for its continuance as an 
original people, and that, as it goes on, it is able to stand an ever-increasing degree of 
freedom without the slightest danger. This is the first matter in respect o f which love of 
fatherland must govern the State itse lf...//// must be love o f fatherland that governs the 
State by placing before it a higher object than the usual one o f maintaining internal 
peace, property, personal freedom, and the life and well-being o f all. For this higher 
object alone, and with no other intention, does the State assemble an armed force?2
The concept of'cultural nationalism', as Tamir uses it, goes beyond the romantic view and 
enfolds all forms of nationalism that see the nation as an objective body; in short, in my 
usage it applies to nationalism at large. As already noted in the former chapter, following 
Smith, ‘For nationalists, will and aspiration are predicated of the pre-existent nation. It is 
not your will and my aspirations that matters; it is the nation's, however 
embryonic,..[N]ations are distinct and natural entities, which thereby embody the collective 
will? This, of course, does not make Tamir's argument more plausible: nationalism in 
general aspires to vitalise, as it were, the authentic nation by reviving the self-identity of its
32See J. G. Fichte, ’Addresses to the German Nation’, in The Nationalism Reader, eds. O. Dahbour & 
M. R. Ishay (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), pp. 62-70. The quotation is from p. 66 (italic mine). See 
also Barry, ‘Self-Government Revisited’, pp. 150-151.
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members -  by imbuing them with the awareness to their idem identity and ethnic belonging. 
National self-determination, then, is understood by nationalists as a political device for 
national vitalisation and ethnic survival, neither for protecting individuals nor for embodying 
their interests or wills:
...the nostalgic perspective regards the survival o f the ethnie as the dominant value. The 
community may be defined by language, religion, 'race', and nationality, or simply as an 
extended family that wants to be reunited...The means to this goal is separation from and 
the exclusion of the 'Others'...It is also a powerful emotive component of most nationalist 
movements seeking independence...{Nationalism seeks to maintain die autonomy, unity, 
and identity of a nation. Fear of losing this identity, or the desire to restore it, drives the 
movements aimed at ethnic survival.33
For nationalists, to use Greenfeld's words, the nation 'is seen in unitary terms...[and has] the 
character of a collective individual possessed of a single w ill..134 Nationalists believe that 
this collective will must take priority over individual wills and aspirations and should 
determine conationals’ preferences and not the other way around; individuals, in this view,
33Richmond, Global Apartheid, pp. 224-225. Incidentally, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), where 
Tamir also serves, has dedicated much more attention to the ‘danger of assimilation’ of Jews in ‘the 
diaspora’ than to the menace of antisemitism. In other words, as far as the state of Israel is concerned the 
persistence of Jewish identity and nationhood (ethnicism, in Shimoni’s parlance) takes priority over the
freedom and wellbeing of individual Jews. Tamir, by die way, not only seems to accept this priority but 
actually contributed to it while serving as the Israeli Minister few (note the title!) Immigrant Absorption.
34Greenfeld, Nationalism, p. 11.
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are no more than ‘biological instruments’ o f the nation.35 National self-determination, as the 
way to realise the nation’s will, is also described as the will of the nation which naturally 
aims at its own self-preservation. The moral justification of national self-determination, 
then, is based on the view that the nation, its identity and will are the supreme values: 'What 
the Nation willed was its own justification: there were no limits to the demands it might 
make on its members.’36 Just like Edgar Allan Poe’s house o f Usher, which appears as a 
perfect mansion despite its crumbling individual stones, so nationalists aspire to reach a 
perfect collective even if individuals' conditions are poor. In that respect, then, it is not that 
nationalists aim at a solution for the individual identity crisis per se; rather, they aim at the 
preservation of the nation and the identity crisis simply makes it easier on them to mobilise 
the masses and assimilate them to their cause.
Now, after I examined the nationalist justification ofthe right to national self-determination, 
we are still left with the second part of Raz and Margalit's question, namely, Under what 
conditions is this right to be exercised? I shall argue that according to nationalists there are 
no moral limitations to this right and no special conditions are required. In order to make 
my point, allow me to follow Gellner and concentrate on what he calls an 'ethical 
universalistic spirit' of nationalism, which refers to nationalists who are 'preaching the
35The notion ‘cultural biological instruments’ was minted in Barry, ‘Self-Government Revisited’, p.
152.
36M. Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 26.
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doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let all o f them 
also refrain from including non-nationals under it.’37 This version is notably presented in the 
writings of Herder and Mazzini, who preached the right of all nations to be self-determined 
for the preservation of their natural features and ethnic identity.38 But this moral view of 
theirs stemmed from a deeper ontological conviction, i.e., that nations are 'distinct moral 
universes.'39 In other words, as far as content or substance are concerned -  i.e., the specific 
culture or national markers that self determination is supposed to revive or protect -  there 
are no common grounds between different nations which are culturally distinctive.
As Herder has put it, 'nations modify themselves, according to time, place, and their internal 
character; each bears in itself the standard of its perfection, totally independent of all 
comparison with that of others.*40 And as Viroli adds, for Herder *[t]o comply with nature's 
plan we must...protect the purity and authenticity o f our national culture, resisting both the 
arrogant inclination to conquer or dominate and the vain desire to imitate alien cultures.*41
37Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 1-2. Note that Gellner describes the nation in ethnic terms 
because he believes that this is the way nationalists themselves see it.
3 8 According to Horowitz, the post-World War I Wilsonian idea of national self-determination was 
commonly interpreted as this right of all nations to preserve their ethnic identity. Although in practice, he 
adds, this right was never completely realised. Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and 
Law’, p. 437.
39See Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique*, p. 49.
40J. G. Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind', in Dahbour & Ishay, The
Nationalism Reader, p. 54.
41 Viroli, For Love of Country, p. 123.
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Herder's objection to imperialism, it should be noted, has nothing to do with condemnation 
of oppression of individuals and everything to do with denunciation of 'cultural 
contamination and impurity.'42 Mazzini also believed that nations have no shared moral 
codes, and thus has called for the sovereignty of all nations: 'You', he called to his Italian 
conationals, 'will plant the banner of Liberty and of Association, so that it shines in the sight 
of all the nations,' and then he added '[y]ou will never deny the sister nations.'43 Mazzini, of 
course, was talking of national liberty, not of individuals’ freedom, and for him it was the 
former that God commanded, not the latter.44 Now if each nation is a (perhaps the) self- 
authenticating source of valid moral and cultural claims, and self-determination is 
understood as a political device through which ‘the survival o f the ethnie as the dominant 
value’ -  its ‘autonomy, unity, and identity’ -  is secured, then it is logically clear that each 
and every nation is morally entitled to self-determination, i.e., the right to national self- 
determination is unconditional and unlimited.
As Kedourie argues, Mazzini's legacy and, I would add, Herder’s too, lias found great 
vogue in recent decades in Asiatic and African countries.145 Indeed, this version of moral
42Ibid.,p. 120.
43G. Mazzini, 'The Duties of Man', in Dahbour & Ishay, The Nationalism Reader, p. 97.
44See ibid., pp. 92-97. See also Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 101-103.
45Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 103.
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relativism, which asserts the unbridgeable moral differences between nations,46 has been 
used by many anticolonialists and alleged nationalist liberation movements, although it is 
also accepted by many occidentals.47 Thus, for instance, a number of third world nationalists 
(e.g., the Chinese Sun Yat-Sen and the West Indian Frantz Fanon) reject the notion of 
universal human rights as Western 'cultural imperialism',48 hence stress the incompatible 
moral divergences between nations and call for the right o f each and every nation to be self- 
determined. This moral relativist stance was also well expressed by Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir, who stated at the annual meeting o f the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations in Kuala Lumpur (July 1997) that ‘Human rights is not a monopoly of the West,’ 
and, accordingly, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be reviewed. In 
reviewing the Universal Declaration Mahathir obviously did not mean that it should be 
brought in line with universal individual human rights but with, as it were, universal group 
(Le., national) rights, ie ., the universal right of all nations to self-determination.49
4 6Cf. P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 8-9, and Walzer, 
Spheres o f Justice, pp. 312-313.
47Note that I am not arguing here against anticolonialism or national liberation whatsoever. I believe 
that there is good reason, even a moral obligation, to support national liberation. But national liberation 
must not be confused with nationalist movements that consider liberation merely as freedom from foreign 
control, no matter what the alternative is as far as it is national. To override a foreign oppressor only to 
substitute it for an internal tyranny is hardly morally justifiable and should not be supported blindly or 
automatically. C£ G. Luk&cs,41Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation’, in Luk&cs, History 
and Class Consciousness, p. 311.
48See K  Boyle, 'Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 
1993’, in Politics and Human Rights, ed. D. Beetham (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 79-95.
49Cf. M. Walzer, Thick and Thin (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). In 
p. 16, for example, Walzer argues that ‘some things that we [i.e., the occidentals; O.C] consider oppressive 
are not so regarded everywhere.'
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My only reservation regarding Kedourie’s insight is, his concentration on the influence of 
Mazzinian ideas on Asia and Africa. Kedourie, himself a conservative and sympathetic to 
(British?) colonialism, prefers to overlook the Mazzini- and Herder-like romantic 
nationalism that flourished in Europe. Such nationalism, explains G. M. Fredrickson, 
actually came about as a reaction against the universal values of the European 
Enlightenment:
I f  civilizationism was a universalist progressivism with its roots in the European 
Enlightenment, romantic racialism -  as the term implies -  was a product of the nineteenth- 
century reaction against the Enlightenment. It held that each “race” or “nation” had its own 
inherent peculiarities of mind and temperament and would develop according to its own 
special “genius” rather than follow some model based on the experience o f peoples with 
different inherited or inbred characteristics.50
Following the said stance, to take one example, nationalists like Academician Sakharov and 
Gavriil Popov could insist that ’a "people” or a "nation" is first of all an ethnic community, 
that from the beginning it has an inherited "historical" right to its "own" state, and that each 
ethnos must have its own state, which is to be determined by the ethnos itself.’51
50G. M  Fredrickson, Black Liberation (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 69.
51See A. V. Tishkov, ‘Nationalities and Conflicting Ethnicity in Post-Communist Russia’,in Ethnic 
Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union (Cambridge: the Working Papa1 Series -  Conflict 
Management Group, 1993), p. 13 (italic mine). Note that it is only Sakharov who clearly speaks of states 
while Popov talks about self-determination in the form of'national-cultural autonomy.' The idea of an 
unlimited right of each nation, though, is the same in both cases.
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Nationalists see the nation as ’a collective individual possessed of a single will’ which is, as 
it were, the right will. Individuals who criticise or challenge their nation or its “authentic 
values”, then, are considered by the national self-anointed representatives as mistaken or 
misguided. But such individuals may also be considered as apostates who violate the 
national will and undermine its aspirations and “authentic values” who must therefore be 
rehabilitated, even by force if necessary.521 shall return to the nationalist attitude to such 
"deviant" members when I deal with the issue o f foreigners. There is, however, one point 
that emanates from the nationalist understanding of the national will and to which I would 
like to refer now. As Kedourie argues, nationalism is 'a method of teaching the right 
determination of the will.'53 As we can see, Kedourie is quite right. Yet we should remember 
that for Kedourie the nationalist method creates the nation whereas nationalism itself sees 
this teaching1 as a vitalisation o f a declining preexisting nation. For nationalism, teaching 
the right determination o f the will means to revive ‘a shared awareness on the part of 
members of a nation of those shared, objective characteristics by virtue of which they 
constitute a nation,’ i.e., ‘a passive reflection of the independently existing nation, the mere 
mental record of a feet.’54 The question we are feeing now is, How is self-determination
52See Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 102.
53Ibid., p. 76.
54George, 'National-Identity and National Self-Determination', p. 17. For attempts to achieve such a 
revival see for example the cases of the Ibo and Yoruba groups in Nigeria, in P. P. Ekeh, 'Colonialism and 
the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement1, in Comparative Studies in Society and History 17/1 
(1975), pp. 91-111, esp. pp. 104-105.
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believed to deliver the revival of the nation and the protection of its identity?
5.4 NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN ETHNIC SAFEGUARD 
How, then, is national self-determination believed to satisfy the nationalist aims? In my 
answer to this question I would like to employ three concepts: power, authority and 
legitimacy. As we shall see, nationalists believe that self-determination enables the nation 
to exercise its power, to enforce its will, and to practice and underpin its legitimate 
authority over its members so as to revive and protect the national identity.
National self-determination is taken by nationalists to be the political device by which the 
nation is able to practice its will, which is first and foremost its own self-preservation, i.e., 
its ethnic survival. As we have seen, nationalists believe that national survival can be 
accomplished by closing the gap between the organic and objective nature of the nation (or 
its ‘authentic essence’) and the unawareness o f conationals to their inborn membership in 
such a group. This project, in its turn, demands three basic things: education, education, 
education.53 Now for educating the members o f the nation in the spirit o f the national will, 
nationalists need first and foremost the power to enforce this (i.e., their) will on conationals 
at large. In other words, nationalists require ’the ability to influence or control the actions 
of others [conationals], to get them [conationals] to do what...[the nationalists] want them
55See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. xvii-xx.
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[conationals] to do, and what they [conationals] would otherwise not have done.'56
Indeed, nationalist movements often have different resources that give them the power to 
mobilise and influence members of the nation before the achievement of national self- 
determination. Nevertheless, to a great extent this power of theirs is very limited in practice 
as they have no freedom, or at least not enough of it, to use their power sufficiently and 
effectively: they lack the freedom to exercise the “national will” without foreign interference 
and the sovereignty to enforce (when they see fit) their decisions as a whole on the whole 
relevant population, and at all times.57 Thus, for example, the Zionist movement under the 
British Mandate in Palestine had its own institutions (national assembly and even political 
parties and elections), but these were not sovereign and could not enforce their decisions 
on the Jewish population in Palestine at large -  complying with those decisions was a matter 
of choice, an ideological and voluntarist commitment that people undertook upon 
themselves if and when they saw fit. Furthermore, the very belonging to the Zionist camp 
and acceptance of its conception of Jewishness (national markers) and institutions in the 
first place (their legitimisation) was also a matter of choice, and indeed many Jews (e.g., 
ultra-orthodox and communists) did not endorse them and occasionally even acted against
56D. Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power (Hampshire & London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 43. For a short 
but comprehensive analysis of the concept of power, see R. Dahl, 'Power’, in International Encyclopedia 
o f the Social Sciences 12 (London: Cromwell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), pp. 405-415.
57In that sense, of course, their power is itself rather flimsy. Accordingly, self-determination may be 
seen as a form of empowerment.
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them.58
The establishment of the state of Israel, of course, equipped the Zionist movement with the 
ability to impose the national markers (as Zionists decide them) and to enforce its decisions 
through the mechanism of a sovereign state.59 The same lack o f freedom characterised the 
situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Oslo Accords, even 
before the total reoccupation of those territories by Israel: although the Palestinians had 
‘their own political institutions, every law the Palestinians want[ed] to pass has [had] to 
obtain the authorization of the Israeli authorities.’60 Thus, the PalestinianNational Authority
58See D. Horowitz & M. Lissak, ‘Authority Without Sovereignty: The Case of the Jewish Community 
in Palestine’, Government and Opposition 8/1 (1973), pp. 48-71. See also their Origins o f the Israeli polity 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Agudat Israel (a Jewish ultra-orthodox group), for example, 
spoke against Zionism and the creation of a Jewish State quite from the very beginning of Zionism. Jakob 
Israel de Haan, probably the most articulate spokesman for Agudat Israel, was therefore assassinated by 
Zionists for this anti-Zionist stance of his in 1924.
59Note, however, that despite the general agreement among Zionists as to some national markers of 
Jewishness there are simultaneous disagreements about some other markers and about the relative 
importance of each of them. The ethnic nature of those markers, though, is common to all. See, e.g., the 
Israeli Law of Return (1950), sc. 4b, and Kimmerling, 'Neither Democratic nor Jewish'. See also O. 
Yiftachel, ‘Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine’, in Constellations 6/3 (1999), pp. 364- 
390.
60De-Shalit, ‘National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural’, p. 915. It is important to note, 
however, that many Palestinian nationalists would not accept de-Shalit's statement that the Palestinian 
nation (understood ethnically) holds its own political institutions. In their eyes, in its actual renunciation 
of the Palestinian ‘historical’ and ‘natural’ right to control Greater Palestine (which includes the whole 
territory that Israel now controls), the Palestinian Authority has abandoned a fundamental national marker, 
hence it is not national and cannot be regarded as a political institution of the nation. By the way, I am not 
necessarily denying here the right of return of the exiled Palestinians even to areas which are parts of the 
state of Israel, i.e., not only the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I would argue, though, that if such a right is 
to be justified, its justification should be based on principles of justice and not on ethnonational markers 
or, as it were, ‘historical’ possession or ‘natural’ rights to the land, unless these could somehow be reduced 
to principles of justice. In contrast to the view that many Palestinian nationalists hold, it is anyway clear 
that the right of return cannot justify an exclusive Palestinian control over the land.
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(PNA) lacked (still does) the freedom to exercise its power, to legislate its own laws and 
to enforce them on its members. Clearly, even before the Oslo Accords and the 
establishment of the PNA the Palestinian national movement (PLO) also had some power 
in mobilising Palestinians and influencing their activities. Yet again, the PLO, just like the 
PNA, lacked sovereignty and could not enforce its creed upon the Palestinians at large. As 
such, similar to the Zionist movement before the establishment of Israel, the PLO was often 
challenged by alternative (often nationalist in themselves) movements, e.g., Hamas.
As the Israeli and Palestinian examples indicate, veiy often nationalists who appeal to the 
very same titular nation61 are at odds with each other not only as to the ‘authentic national 
values* that should be preserved but also as to the national markers that delimit that nation 
or, at least, about the relative importance of each marker.62 Accordingly, in such cases 
nation-building and national self-determination may take different courses and will normally 
follow those boundary-keepers whose mobilising resources or power are greater than those 
of their competitors’.63 At times, the contending elites might join together and cartelise into
61In ‘appealing to the same titular nation’ I mean nationalists who use the same title (e.g., French 
nation or Hungarian nation) but in employing or emphasising different national markers actually include 
different populations under the same rubric. In G. Frege’s conceptualisation, nationalists may apply die 
same sense or mode of presentation to different references or ‘objects’. For a recent introduction to Frege’s 
conception of sense and reference, see R. L. Mendelsohn, The Philosophy o f Gottlob Frege (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. ch. 3.
62For a relevant discussion on Slovak, Greek, Indian and especially Irish nationalisms, see Hutchinson, 
The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism. On the Slovaks and Greeks, see pp. 23-30; on India, see pp. 42-46; 
and on the Irish see chs. 6-7.
63See, e.g., the competition between Zionism and the Jewish Labour Bund (‘league’ in Yiddish). For
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one national movement which speaks in one language.64 As Hutchinson shows, nationalists 
aim at national unity and wish to transcend internal divisions: ‘by ‘reviving’ an ethnic 
historicist vision of the nation,’ he says, nationalists seek ‘to redirect traditionalists and 
modernists away from conflict and instead to unite them in the task of constructing an 
integrated distinctive and autonomous community, capable of competing in the modem 
world. This they do by introducing into the community a new nationalist ideology in which 
the accepted meanings o f‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ are transformed.’65
National self-determination, understood as a ‘separation (even isolation) from those who 
are different,’66 gives the nationalist movements the freedom to use their power and to 
enforce the “national will”. But for practising their power nationalist movements need more 
than freedom from external interference, that is, legitimacy: their power needs to be 
accepted by conationals so as to turn the nation’s agents into legitimate political authorities.
a relevant discussion, see Y. Peled, Class and Ethnicity in the Pale (New York: S t Martin's Press, 1989), 
and Z. Gitelman (ed.), The Emergence o f Modem Jewish Politics (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 
2003).
64See O. Zimmer’s examination of Swiss nationalism in his A Contested Nation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 12-16 & chs. 3 & 6.
6SHutchinson, The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism, p. 34. C£ Kedourie’s reference to Cypriot 
nationalism as a sort ofhybridisation between Hellenism and orthodoxy in his Nationalism, p. 71. See also 
the Palestinian National Charter (1968), esp. articles 8 & 10-12. According to these articles, the supreme 
value is the preservation and cultivation of Palestinian and (pan) Arab national identity, for which 
Palestinian national unity and amalgamation of the different Palestinian groups are required. And as article
8 stresses, ‘the contradictions among the Palestinian national forces are of minimal importance that must 
be suspended in the interest of the main conflict between Zionism and Colonialism on the one side and the 
Palestinian Arab people on the other.’ Palestinian National Charter (1968), quoted in J. Nedava, Israel- 
Arab Conflict (Ramat Gan: Revivim, 1983), pp. 174-177. (In Hebrew).
66Richmond, Global Apartheid, p. 225.
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At this stage, I wish to distinguish between the philosophical account of legitimate authority 
(which asks what makes the authority legitimate) and the Weberian sociological account of 
legitimate authority (which asks what makes people believe that the authority is legitimate), 
and to show what the nationalist answers to these two questions are.
Nationalists (similar to democrats) see the nation as the ultimate source of political 
authority and believe that any legitimate political power should be authorised by the nation. 
In that sense, nationalists see themselves as the only legitimate political authority o f the 
nation because they claim to be the only ones who speak in its name and act on its behalf. 
But since nationalists present themselves as if they were speaking in the name of the nation 
as a collective self, the authorisation they speak about has nothing to do with the consent 
of individual conationals. Rather, as nationalists consider themselves to be the educators o f 
conationals it is the consent of the latter that should follow the nationalist authority. In other 
words, it is not individual members of the nation to authorise the nationalist movement; 
they, instead, are obliged to accept it as an existing legitimate authority which obtains its 
legitimacy from the collective will of the nation, as it were. Accordingly, when nationalists 
profess to speak in the name of a specific people they do not necessarily involve the relevant 
people (in plural) in any public discourse or decision-making. As Greenfeld shows in her 
examination of Russian nationalism,
The "people”, which the elite eventually made the central object o f collective worship, was 
a mental construct, the conclusion o f syllogism. The soul -  the sign of Russianness -  
derived from blood and soil. The people in the sense o f plebs, the toilers, animals
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uncontaminated by civilization, had nothing but blood and soil Therefore their soul -  their 
nationality -  was the purest67
Here we can see how right Greenfeld is in claiming that such nationalism is, as she puts it, 
authoritarian:
Collectivist ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the collectivity is seen in 
unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a 
single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community 
introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who 
are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications; 
the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.6*
And as Miller adds, when referring to conservative nationalism,
...the nation is compared to the family, a human community which has built into it the 
unequal relation of authority between parent and child. The family requires of its junior 
members not merely loyalty but piety.. .It is therefore a legitimate task of the state to ensure 
that national myths are preserved and, to the extent to which this conflicts with liberal 
commitments such as those of freedom of though and expression, liberalism must be
67Greenfeld, Nationalism, p. 258. Thus, for example, Uvarov, the Education Minister ofTsar Nicholas
I, publicly based his policy on the fundamental trinity of'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism', but was 
very far from allocating any active role to the masses in this policy of his. For a similar view regarding the 
role of the peasants in German nationalism, see Herf Reactionary Modernism, ch. 3, esp. pp. 55-59.
68Ibid.,p. 11.
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transcended.69
But nationalists, of course, still claim to represent the national will, and see themselves as 
the exclusive moral legitimate authority. At any rate, they can always claim that their critics 
are after all those individuals who lost their way and should be educated. As Ayatollah 
Khomeini declared, ’nobody else has the right to legislate and nobody may rule by that 
which has not been given power by God.’70 And indeed Khomeini and his successors have 
represented, as it were, the divine power, just like other nationalists claim to be given a 
similar moral authority from the national collective, whether it is described as a race, a 
culture or otherwise. From the nationalist philosophical or moral point o f view, then, it is 
not national self-determination that helps the nationalist movement to become a legitimate 
authority. Rather, because the nationalist movement is considered as the legitimate authority 
in the first place, national self-determination, as the movement sees it, is justified. 
Nationalist movements, though, still need to convince their conationals that they are really 
the authentic representatives of the nation and its only legitimate authority and should
69Miller, On Nationality, pp. 124-125 (italic original). We find here, then, another similarity between 
the nation and the Gemeinschaft: nationalist movements appear as if they were die manifestation of the 
national whole, exactly like the father in the family (as TOnnies understands it) or the father-like master 
in other old Gemeinschaften. Indeed, the tom  ‘father of the nation*, in the name of whom nationalists 
normally pretend to speak, exists in all nationalist genealogies or myths, e.g., Sun Yat-Sen as the father 
(Guofu) in Taiwan, Timur in Uzbekistan, Genghis Khan in Mongolia, Miguel Hidalgo in Mexico, Lajos 
Kossuth in Hungary, and Carl GustafEmil Mannerheim in Finland. Incidentally, as V. Lai has pointed out, 
‘No woman remembered as the 'Mother of the Nation’ would ever achieve parity with the 'Father of the 
Nation'...’ V. Lai, ‘The Mother in the ‘Father of the Nation’, in Manushi: A Journal o f Women and Society 
91 (1995), pp. 27-30.
70Ayatollah Khomeini, 'Islamic Government', in Dahbour & Ishay, The Nationalism Reader, pp. 260- 
267. The quotation is from p. 266.
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therefore get the support of the masses. The question, How do nationalists attempt to do 
that? refers to the Weberian sociological conception of legitimacy.
If nationalists see themselves as the 'authentic voice of the nation' and appeal to people who 
lost their attachment with their national whole, how can nationalists lead such people to 
identify with their nation again? How can they induce the masses to accept the nationalist 
movement, its ideas and power and to believe in its authority? Here too nationalists apply 
to education. The belief of conationals in the legitimate authority of the nationalist 
movement and its right to command is equated by nationalism with their acceptance o f the 
national will. Thus, nationalist education aims at both the acceptance of the national will and 
of the nationalist movement, two missions which are in feet one and the same: I am the 
nation and the nation is me, the nationalist says. It is important at this stage to mention 
briefly what I mean by educatioa
Education does not singly mean schools and national-political control o f curriculum. This 
is indeed an essential part of the general picture, as the next extract shows: 'all today's 
curricula and textbooks in the humanities are destined for fundamental revision if not 
outright rejection. And the drumming-in of atheism must be stopped immediately.'71 But 
obviously it cannot be the whole picture: when nationalists take control over a nation, by 
means of self-determination, they do not try to imbue the youngsters with nationalist ideas
11 A. Solzhenitsyn, ’Rebuilding Russia', in ibid., p. 175.
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while leaving the elderly to pursue with their own non-national lives. When Fichte, for 
instance, asserts that The new education must consist essentially in this...that it completely 
destroys freedom of will in the soil which it undertakes to cultivate, and produces, on the 
contrary, strict necessity in the decisions of the will, the opposite being impossible,172 he 
definitely does not refer to schools alone.
For nationalists, then, education (or, rather, socialisation) means the nationalisation of the 
masses:73 by means of sanctions, rewards, appeals to a national mythical past, and the 
guarantee of eternal life which is reflected, as it were, in the nation.74 As suggested before, 
nationalists otten tend to appeal to and speak in the name of the nation’s ancestors and their 
mandatory legacy. This, as Kuran noted, is especially easy: ‘Dead authorities are particularly 
convenient to invoke, for their teachings can be revised or reinterpreted without challenges 
from the authorities themselves.’75
The glorification of national wars and struggles are also used by nationalists to mobilise 
support and nationalise the masses. The Futurist Manifesto of 1909 and his proto-fascist
72Fichte, cited in Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 78.
73For a relevant and illuminating discussion, see G. L. Mosse, The Nationalization o f the Masses 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996).
74See Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, ch. 8.
75Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, p. 164.
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leader, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, have expressed the relations between war and 
nationalism (as well as the place of women in the national family) very clearly: ’we will 
glorify war -  the world’s only hygience -  militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of 
freedoms bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for women.’76 Many 
nationalists have worshipped the idea of national wars as an instrument for mobilising the 
conationals and melting them into one whole, as Fanon wrote:
The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way and in 
one direction...The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out o f the war o f liberation, 
introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas o f a common cause, o f a national 
destiny, and of a collective histcwy. In the same way, the second phase, that o f the building- 
up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of this cement which has been mixed with 
blood and anger...the struggle, they say, goes on...the native’s violence unifies the people.77
The same point is put forward in the autobiography of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir, and by figures such as Maurice Barres and Heinrich von Treitschke. As Howard 
shows, for nationalists 'Service to the Nation was ultimately seen in terms o f military 
service; personal fulfilment lay in making 'the supreme sacrifice'.'78 The nationalist use of
1€The Futurist Manifesto, sc. 9, cited in Z. Stemhell, M. Sznajder & M. Asheri, The Birth o f Fascist 
Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 29.
77F. Fanon, ‘The Wretched of the Earth’, in Dahbour & Ishay, The Nationalism Reader, pp. 282-283.
78Howard, The Causes o f Wars, p. 27. Cf Y. Shavit, ‘Uri Zvi Greenberg: Conservative 
Revolutionarism and National Messianism’, in The Jerusalem Quarterly 48 (1988), pp. 63-72.
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national wars, though, is not expressed only, and definitely not always, in actual 
conscription or warfare but also (perhaps mostly) in the glorification of historical battles, 
as if conationals throughout the generations were serving in the same platoon. The appeal 
to historical battles, however, is often used for justifying present wars in the name of the 
national ancestors and past martyrs who are taken to represent the real will o f the nation. 
Thus, the eternal life of the nation and its martyrs takes priority over present living 
individuals: ‘loyalty, discipline, selfless denial, and sacrifice’ are those virtues which place 
‘the good of the national Gemeinschaft over that of the individual.’79 Z. Tomac’s words in 
regard to the Croatians should resonate like Edvard Munch’s Scream: We, the living,’ he 
says, ‘no longer bury the dead -  the dead, more and more often, bury us alive.’80
In the Weberian sociological sense, the legitimation of nationalist movements begins before 
the achievement of self-determination and to a great extent the latter even depends on the 
former. In other words, nationalist movements need to get at least some degree of 
legitimacy from some conationals to have the ability to advance, let alone to achieve, self- 
determination. But once achieved, national self-determination underpins the ability of 
nationalists to gain support and legitimacy from the members o f the nation because it gives 
them a powerful political mechanism, especially when self-determination takes the form of
79Spengler, paraphrased in Herf, Reactionary Modernism, p. 51.
80Z. Tomac, The Struggle for the Croatian State (Zagreb: Profikon, 1993), p. 19. See also K. Marx, 
The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte, in MSW, pp. 300-301.
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a sovereign state. Thus, since nationalism is ‘Often unable to extend beyond the educated 
strata, it is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies by which to institutionalize its ideals in 
the social order. In this guise, although still an elite movement, revivalism is often of 
considerable political import.’81
Through national self-determination nationalists can monopolise education and regulate 
information,82 hold the means for military conscription, and control means o f rewards and 
sanctions. Thus, once a nationalist movement realises self-determination it can reduce 
foreign influence, indoctrinate conationals, practice its ‘moral authority’, and fortify its 
political legitimacy. In brief, the freedom nationalist movements get to exercise their power 
also gives them the means for underpinning their legitimacy and realising, as it were, the 
national will.
In the light of Weber’s typology of legitimate authority, it seems to me that nationalism fits 
the traditional basis. One should note, though, that like Weber I am referring here to 
archetypes, and that the basis of legitimacy of nationalist movements may combine tradition 
with charisma or even rationality. Tradition, however, is the only basis of legitimacy that 
each and every nationalism involves to define 'the boundaries of possible belief and debate,
8 Hutchinson, The Dynamics o f Cultured Nationalism, p. 17.
82See Richmond, Global Apartheid, p. 226.
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and the terms in which any debate must be conducted,'83 i.e., the realms of the thinkable, the 
unthinkable and (eventually) the unthought. The appeal o f nationalists to a mythical 
authentic and ancient nation -  its original identity and markers, golden age and wars -  in 
order to mobilise the masses is indeed an appeal to national tradition, even if mythical (as 
tradition often is), a tradition which sets the boundaries o f the public discourse within the 
national institutions and in society at large. Obviously, the boundaries of discourse are 
different from one nation to another and evolve in time. But in any event, those boundaries 
are set in accordance with the national markers and tradition which remain ethnic in their 
nature.84
As the last paragraph implies, not all nationalist movements and figures ban any form of 
public discourse and debate, and many may even allow {provided some conditions are met) 
a sort ofparticipation of “apostates” and even offoreigners in the public discourse and even 
in national institutions.85 Where such participation is allowed, though, it is so only when the
83Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power, p. 76. Cf. E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in Frame 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968).
84Thus, for example, all Zionists agree that Israel should be a Jewish state which, by definition, 
promotes die Jewish national tradition or identity. But what Jewish tradition or identity mean or include 
is highly controversial among Zionists, some of whom argue that it is limited to the Jewish religion credo 
(itself a moot question) while others contend that it covers, e.g., ‘canonical’ texts of secular Jewish 
personalities. What makes those personalities Jewish, though, is highly agreed and based on ethnic 
definitions of Jewishness. See Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology, p. 252 & passim. For an examination of 
debates about French national identity and tradition, see K. M. Baker, Inventing the Fremh Revolution 
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chs. 2-4.
85Those conditions and the circumstances under which they may emerge will be specified later. I will 
also argue, however, that such participation, when allowed, does not entail equal voice in the public 
discourse and always boils down to a division of the citizenry into first-class and second-class citizens.
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nation is already self-determined,86 and that for two basic reasons. First, very often once the 
nation becomes self-determined it contains non-nationals in its midst. Not all nationalists, 
despite their common aspiration to revive the ethnic nation and achieve an exclusive 
national rule, will be ready to take measures such as genocide, expulsion or even total 
gagging of foreigners or national “apostates”. As Hastings rightly observed, ‘The extreme 
nationalist will indeed regard all other values as insignificant compared with the imagined 
requirements of the nation but many nationalists would see those requirements as limited 
to some extent by other requirements o f morality, religion or even the rights of other 
communities.’87
Secondly, when nationalists are still involved in a struggle to national self-determination and 
lack sovereign institutions, they will naturally appeal exclusively to conationals in order to 
mobilise them. Moreover, in lacking sovereign institutions nationalists (and the nation at 
large) cannot rule non-nationals, hence do not have any formal political responsibility for 
them or commitment to involve them in deciding the national agenda. This, o f course, is in 
addition (as noted before) to the reluctance of “apostates” and foreigners themselves to be
86One may reasonably argue that this contention ofmine is inconsistent with my former argument that, 
according to nationalists genuine self-determination requires ethnic homogeneity of the political institutions 
and a commitment of those Mho conduct them to protect and advance the national features, i.e., the 
nationalist creed. Indeed, such aspirations reflect the nationalist ideal, but, as we shall see later (see sc. 6.2), 
when feeing reality nationalists are often compelled to moderate some of their ideal demands in order to 
save or materialise others.
87Hastings, The Construction o f Nationhood\ p. 32 (italic mine). The extent of those other 
requirements is also, of course, different from one case to another and from (me era to another.
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involved in the nationalist movement, an involvement they can avoid insofar as the 
movement is as yet not sovereign.
In many cases, then, even some nationalists do not impose a narrow substantial conception 
o f the good on the public and enables a debate as to that good. They do, nonetheless, still 
seek the good of their nation as a collective whole, which entails the preservation and 
advancement of its identity and tradition. This means that (i) the boundaries o f legitimate 
debate and controversy are limited to the broader conception of the national good (the 
preservation of its markers, identity and tradition), and accordingly (ii) those who have an 
equal voice in the public deliberation must themselves be devoted to that broader 
conception of the national good, i.e., they must accept the nationalist credo and undertake 
its promotion.
In such cases, then, the nationalist movement (and thereafter the nation-state) may be 
divided into different parties and organisations which debate and confront each other and 
even compete in elections. The elected representatives in these cases form, to use Weber’s 
words, a legal authority with a legal-rational basis for its legitimacy. Yet again, the debate 
itself and those who have an equal voice in it are determined and limited by the national 
tradition (its ways of allocating membership and of marking the national features) as the 
nationalist movement at large interprets it.88 In that sense, the unequal relation of authority,
88Cf. N. M. Stolzenberg, 'A Tale of Two Villages (or, Legal Realism Comes to Town)', in Shapiro
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that Miller ascribes to conservative nationalism, and the fiindamental inequality between 
those who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who are not qualified, 
that Greenfeld recognises as authoritarian nationalism, are both still characteristic of 
nationalism even where its entrepreneurs allow the kind of public debate that I have just 
sketched.
Now note that I was very cautious here and preferred to suggest that nationalists determine 
the national tradition rather than invent it.89 For ‘inventing’ implies the creation of 
something totally new, while ‘detennining’ does not. I f  as we saw, nationalists need to 
convince people to accept them as the authentic voice of the nation, then they cannot ignore 
the beliefs and values that prevail amongst those people.90 Thus, in their appeal to what they 
see as the eternal nation nationalists do not simply create tradition in the way that 
Frankenstein formed the Creature, i.e., it does not invent something from nothing. Rather, 
nationalists construct and bias these values and beliefs for their own advantage: they 
emphasise and exaggerate some aspects, marginalise and push out others, and in between 
also succeed in inventing some ‘traditional hybrids.’91 As Brass puts it,
& Kymlicka, NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights, p. 322.
89On the invention of tradition, see E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention o f Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
90For a relevant discussion, see Q. Skinner, ‘Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and
Action’, in Political Theory 2 (1974), pp. 277-303.
91See Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 69-71.
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.. .political and economic elites who make use of ethnic group attributes are constrained by 
the beliefs and values which exist within the group and which limit the kinds o f appeals 
which can be made. At the same time, the process by which elites mobilize ethnic identities 
simplifies those beliefs and values, distorts them, and selects those which are politically 
useful rather than central to the belief systems o f the people in question.92
‘[T]he choice of the leading symbol of differentiation’, adds Brass, ‘depends upon the 
interests of the elite group that takes up the ethnic cause.’93 So in determining the national 
tradition, nationalists also decide what are the national markers and, accordingly, who are 
the members of the nation.
In an age of a widespread identity crisis, and unfortunately history affirms that, nationalism 
has succeeded to thrust its way forward and to acquire the faith of the masses through the 
ways I mentioned before and to become the most powerful basis for the legitimation of 
political authorities. As we shall see in the next chapter, an integral part of any national 
tradition refers to the concept of ’homeland’, in which national self-determination is 
supposed to take place. As we shall see, the attempts to take control over the homeland are 
normally taken by nationalists as a necessary activity of any political movement that 
pretends to speak in the name of the nation, and as a precondition for the integrity and
92Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 16-17.
93Ibid., p. 30.
legitimacy of such a movement.
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6
HOMELAND AND FOREIGNERS
6.1 NATION AND HOMELAND
The nationalist education of the masses, as said earlier, applies to the national past and 
tradition. Basically, when nationalists apply to such a past and pretend to speak in the name 
of the authentic nation they refer to 'national ancestors', with whom present conationals are 
supposed to have a connection of blood, and to 'a national homeland', as a connection of 
that blood group to a specific land: The nationalism of real-world nationalists 
characteristically has two elements, often described as blood and soil. Less poetically, the 
first is the identification of a nation or people as a descent group; the second is the claim 
that there exists a certain national territoiy or homeland which the members o f the descent 
group are entitled to control.'1 Such a nationalist belief in the relations of blood and soil is 
expressed very clearly in the writings of Barres:
We shall derive profit by turning to the great moments of French history, by living in our 
thoughts with all our dead, with all the experiences o f our native land...Nothing is more 
valuable in forming a people's soul than the voice of our ancestors. Our soil gives us a 
discipline, for we are only the continuation o f the dead...We are the products of that 
collective being which speaks in us. Let the influence of our ancestors be enduring. Let the
1Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, pp. 16-17.
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sons be vigorous and honest. Let the nation be one.2
As I said before, Gellner argues that nationalism aspires for external autonomy and internal 
homogeneity. I applied Gellner's argument to the national institutions, but Gellner’s original 
argument refers to political-teraYona/ units. Thus, he says, 'Nationalism is primarily a 
political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent,' and 
'nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should 
not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state 
-  a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation -  
should not separate the power-holders from the rest.' Gellner also stresses that
There is a variety of ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated. The political 
boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or 
it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways 
at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non-nationals. Or 
again, a nation may live, unmixed with foreigners, in a multiplicity of states, so that no 
single state can claim to be the national one.3
If we apply Gellner's argument to the nationalist idea of homeland, then it becomes clear 
that for nationalists the ideal situation (i.e., an ideally self-determined nation) is: a nation
2M. Barres, 'The Undying Spirit of France, 1902,1917, in Snyder, The Dynamics o f Nationalism, pp.
125-126.
3A11 quotations in this paragraph are from Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 1 (italic original).
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that controls its homeland as a whole through its sovereign institutions and in which only 
conationals and the whole body o f conationals live. Thus, instead of Gellner's idea of 
twofold congruence (between the national and the political units), we should say that the 
nationalist ideal is of a triple congruence between the national, the political and the 
territorial units. Following Gellner's citation, it is also obvious that for nationalists the ideal 
form of self-determination is that o f a sovereign nation-state in the homeland, but it is still 
not the only form of self-determination that nationalism may accept. As Barry puts it,
A nation, understood as a collection of people unified by language and culture in this way, 
needs a state in order to create the institutional framework within which the common 
language and culture can be protected and the common values pursued through a variety 
of public policy measures. A weaker version allows that subunits (cantons, provinces, 
states) in a federal state may-on condition that they control linguistic and cultural 
issues-provide a satisfactory alternative to an independent state. Either way, the notion is 
that a political authority must have sufficient autonomy to embody, as it were, and to 
protect the distinctive language and culture of its people.4
Here we can see another identity between the nationalist conception of the nation and the 
Gemeinschaft: the nation has its own collective property, that is, a homeland, which must 
be controlled by the nation alone and in accordance with its collective will. Nationalists 
believe that the nation is not only entitled to control its ancestral homeland and to realise
4Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, pp. 20-21. Note that Barry mentions 
language and culture only as examples of ethnic markers.
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its self-determination there; it is rather a national decree to take control over the homeland 
because it is considered as an integral part of the legacy of the national ancestors, hence as 
a fundamental element of the national identity and tradition. Consequently, any realisation 
of national self-determination out of the relevant territory is not regarded as full or genuine 
self-determination and may even be seen as lack of self-determination altogether. Thus, for 
example, when B. Z. Herzl, the founder of Zionism, called for a sort of Jewish autonomy 
in Argentina, he saw it only as a temporary ‘night-shelter’ for the persecuted Jews and 
emphasised that only in the land of Israel (‘the land o f our ancestors that we will never 
forget’) the Jewish people can genuinely become self-determined.5 All similar ideas of 
Jewish temporary autonomous ‘night-shelters’ outside the land of Israel were successively 
rejected by the Zionist Congress and led to the abdication of few ‘pro-shelter’ Zionists from 
the Congress and the establishment of the (insignificant) Jewish Territorial Organisation 
(ITO) in 1905.6
Moreover, many nationalists claim that even if the nation does achieve a sort o f self- 
determination in the homeland, but controls only part o f the land, the nation is not 
completely self-determined and should therefore take control over the missing parts, by 
conquest if necessary. For such nationalists, if the political institutions do not endeavour to
5See B. Z. Herzl, ‘The Jews’ State’, in Zionist Writings (Tel Aviv: Mitzpe, 1950), p. 35. (In Hebrew).
See also ‘The Land of Israel’ in the same book, pp. 210-213.
6Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology, p. 91.
control the homeland as a whole, let alone are ready to renounce parts of it, these 
institutions are not national enough to be legitimised. Now there are still two questions that 
need to be answered: first, what exactly are the boundaries of the homeland and how are 
they to be determine as such? Second, if the ancestral homeland of a nation is currently 
populated by foreigners, in which they might even constitute the majority, how would 
nationalists treat them?
Nationalists, we saw, aspire to redeem the nation from its decline and to bring it back to its 
golden age as it allegedly was before the identity crisis of its members, or before the 
interference of foreigners. The national golden age, however, is not associated only with the 
identification of conationals with their national whole but also with the integrity of the 
national homeland as its boundaries were during that golden age. Nationalism, then, 
stretches the boundaries of the national homeland in both time and space: it goes back to 
this stage in history, often a mythical one, which is entitled as the national golden age, and 
in which the relevant territory was under the control of the nation and when the territorial 
boundaries under its control were larger than at any other point in history. Nationalists 
thereon draw the boundaries of the homeland in accordance with these largest historical 
ones, and occasionally demand a return to the "authentic" area.
As L. Brilmayer puts it, 'in assessing national claims, nationalists tend to take as the baseline 
-  the point against which claims should be justly measured -  their own historical apogee,
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the point o f their own greatest power.'7 Thus, Hungarian nationalists tend to define their 
homeland in accordance with Hungary’s borders before the Treaty of Trianon -  which 
included, amongst others, Transylvania (Erdely, in Hungarian), and present Slovakia 
(Felvidek). The harbingers of modem Slovak nationalism claimed that their homeland is 
delimited by the borders of their Greater Moravian state from the 9th century, and as 
Brilmayer illustrates,
...the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia measure the status quo against the point in time when 
they possessed control over the greatest amount of territoiy; the Chinese start the clock 
running at the point in time when (according to their view of the facts) China exercised 
dominion over Tibet; and Palestinians prefer the status quo of the beginning of this [20*;
O.C.] century rather than two millenia previous, when (according to their rival claimants) 
the land was a Jewish community.8
Nationalists, as previously mentioned, believe that the nation's "ownership" o f its homeland 
is a function of ancestral connections between the two, or what I have referred to as 
relations of blood and soil. In principle, then, nationalists that stake a claim to a particular 
land would consider this land as belonging to their nation whether the current population 
there is mostly national or not. In other words, the numerical balance between conationals 
and non-nationals is in principle irrelevant for the nationalist attitude to the national
7L. Brilmayer, ’The Moral Significance of Nationalism', in Notre Dame Law Review 71/1 (1995), p.
20.
8Ibid., ibid. For a similar point regarding Polish nationalism, see Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 115-116.
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homeland and to the national right, or rather the obligation, to control it.9 Thus, for 
example, in January 1991, six months before the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milosevic declared in a meeting with ambassadors from EU states that if 
Yugoslavia breaks up, Serbia would strive to establish Greater Serbia, which will include 
parts o f Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In accordance with this declaration, Serb 
nationalists took control over Srebrenica and stated that this is a part of Greater Serbia, 
although according to the census of 1990 75.2% of Srebrenica population were Bosnian- 
Muslims.10
Nationalists, we should recall, believe that individuals cannot change their nationality by an 
act of will and assimilate in another nation than the one they are bom to. Whatever an 
individual foreigner may do, then, he cannot be regarded as a member of the nation that 
claims for the land because his behaviour will always be associated, as it were, with his 
inborn national characteristics. A well-known experiment that may illustrate that point 
comes to mind here.11 In this experiment, a few students (the impersonators), considered 
as pathologically sane, were instructed to complain about voices they hear and to hospitalise
9See Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law’, p. 438. For this reason I prefer 
to use the term 'foreigners' rather than 'minorities'.
10See J. W. Honig & N. Both, Srebrenica (London: Penguin Books, 1996). Srebrenica, of course, is 
only one example of Serbian nationalist attitude to Bosnia at large (not to mention Kosovo), in which the 
Serbs comprised before the war only about 30% of the overall population. Nowadays, ten years after the 
Muslim massacre by the Serbs, only 40% in Srebrenica are Muslims. See D. Rohde, ‘Bosnian Muslims 
Retrace Steps of Those Killed in 1995', in The New York Times, July 11, 2005.
n See D. L. Rosenham, 'On Being Sane in Insane Places', in Science 179 (1973), pp. 167-185.
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themselves in different mental asylums. Once hospitalised, the impersonators were told to 
behave as usual (i.e., normally) in less than no time and to tell the asylum staff that the 
voices totally disappeared. Although all the staffs were informed in advance about the 
upcoming experiment (without mentioning the specific dates, of course), no one exposed 
the impersonators and, instead, ascribed any behaviour and declaration ofthe impersonators 
to their, as it were, insanity.
As the gestalt psychological school (within the realm of which the said experiment took 
place) indicates, ‘there are "central" personality traits...which are so powerful that they 
markedly color the meaning of other information in forming an impression of a given 
personality.’12 If in the said experiment the alleged insanity o f the impersonators was seen 
as such a personality trait, for nationalists it is the alleged inborn nationality that constitutes 
those traits.13 As the screenwriter Hanif Kureishi wrote, The British complained incessantly 
that the Pakistanis wouldn't assimilate. This meant they wanted the Pakistanis to be exactly 
like them. But o f course even then they would have rejected them...The British were doing 
the assimilating: they assimilated Pakistanis to their world view. They saw them as dirty, 
ignorant and less than human -  worthy of abuse and violence.'14 As Kureishi’s words show,
12Ibid., p. 173. See also S. E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).
13Cf. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 64-73, esp. pp. 70-72.
14H. Kureishi, 'London and Karachi', in Patriotism: the Making and Unmaking o f British National 
Identity vol. II, ed. R. Samuel (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 272-273.
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very often the foreigners are not only seen as essentially different, but also as inferior and 
doomed to rejection.
With this belief on the background, and its ideal of the triple congruence, when a nationalist 
movement stakes a claim to a specific land which is populated by foreigners,15 what could 
be its attitude towards them? This question takes us from the pure theoretical examination 
of nationalism or the nationalist ideal to the realm of political realism.
6.2 REALPOLITIK IN THE NATIONALIST POLICY
Much more often than not, the land to which nationalists stake a claim is also populated by 
non-nationals. Accordingly, the nationalist ideal o f the triple congruence can very rarely be 
realised in full, at least not without serious combat, brutal coercion or even genocidal 
practices. If the triple congruence appears as unrealistic or too costly, then nationalists may 
well go for a double congruence. In principle, then, nationalists might (i) give up those parts 
of the homeland that comprise many non-nationals and thus increase the congruence 
between the national and the political units,16 or (ii) take political control of the homeland
15Note that in foreigners I mean non-nationals, i.e, those who are identified as foreigners by the 
nationalists who stake the claim to the land. Evidently, in many cases those who are considered as 
foreigners are actually the indigenous people of the land.
16Thus, for example, in justifying their support of Sharon’s Disengagement Plan and, furthermore, 
a total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, the so-called Zionist-leftists emphasise the need 
to relinquish those parts of the homeland staffed by Palestinians in order to attain Jewish majority in the 
state of Israel, hence to secure the Jewish state. In other words, they aspire to enlarge the congruence 
between the national and the political units by retreating from what they still see as parts of the Jewish 
homeland. Incidentally, the ‘Zionist-left’ also says that only such a retreat would secure Israel as a
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as a whole and “reduce” the number of non-nationals within it.17
Theoretically there is also another option, i.e., (iii) giving up the idea of a political unit 
altogether so as to achieve a congruence between the national and the territorial units. 
There are a few reasons why such an option should be regarded as a nonsensical one, but 
it would suffice for our purpose here only to indicate that it cannot be regarded as a 
nationalist (or even a national) one. As indicated right in the beginning of the former 
chapter, nationalism is largely a doctrine o f national self-determination. Evidently, the third 
option just mentioned is at odds with any form  of self-determination, hence it cannot be 
characteristic o f nationalism.
Basically, then, nationalists aspire to reduce the number o f non-nationals in the national 
homeland and thereby also to prevent their involvement in, or influence on, the political 
institutions that the nation may form in “its” land. This "reduction" may be executed 
through genocide (as in the Nazi case), massive deportation (as Armenia did when it 
deported all Azerbaijanis from its area), or by encouraging conationals to migrate to their
democracy. What it actually suggests is that, if the majority in Israel would not be Jewish, then the state 
would have to infringe on non-Jews’ rights in order to preserve the Jewishness of the state, which entails 
that the state will not be democratic. The question, then, is not of numbers per se but of sovereignty: not 
how many gentiles reside in the state but who should be the sovereign in that state. Accordingly, those 
gentile citizens (mostly Palestinians) that reside in Israel proper (i.e., where there is no military occupying 
rule) are still not regarded as equal citizens, even by those who are identified (grotesquely enough) as 
leftists.
17There is also a possibility of combining those two options: nationalists may forego some areas staffed 
by non-nationals while clinging to others in which there are also many non-nationals, of whom they may 
then try to be rid of or, at least, to deny them equal treatment, as just exemplified by the case of Israel.
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homeland so as to reduce the number of foreigners in comparison to that of conationals, as 
Serbia did in Kosovo alongside its genocidal policies there. Another possibility, as 
advocated by the Israeli party Moledet ('Homeland') -  now a faction in the far-right 
National Union Party, is called ‘voluntary transfer’.18 The idea here is to persecute and 
harass the foreigners so as to make them flee the land, of their own free will as it were. As 
MK Binyamin Elon, Moledef s Chairman, said to former MK Shulamit Aloni, ‘You are 
opposed to transfer, so we will embitter their lives until they transfer themselves.’19
Very often, however, nationalists allow foreigners to live in the national homeland provided 
they remain under the domination of the relevant nation, which itself remains the sole agent 
of sovereignty; international pressure, lack of power, economic needs (e.g., the need for 
cheap labour), and even moral considerations may all prevent a policy of "reduction", 
although there are always and everywhere nationalist factions that insist on the expulsion
18Cf. J. Casey’s call for the voluntary repatriation of British Indians and West Indians, in his ‘One 
Nation: the Politics of Race’, in Salisbury Review 1/1 (1982), pp. 23-28.
19Quoted by Shulamit Aloni in her ‘Israel's Wonderful Youth’, Haaretz, July 10,2005. Incidentally, 
in July 2005 the Israeli Knesset enacted (by support of overwhelming majority of MKs, including Prime 
Minister Sharon) a law for the commemoration of Rehavam Zeevi’s legacy. Zeevi, the Israeli tourism 
minister who was assassinated in October 2001, was the founder and head of the Moledet party who more 
than once referred to the Palestinians as ‘lice’ and a ‘cancer’. It is quite clear, then, what the legacy of such 
a person (now legally entrenched) entails. In fact, discrimination of the Palestinian citizens and negligence 
of their needs were always carried out by the Israeli governments, particularly in Jerusalem where such 
policies are employed ‘in order to urge the Arabs to emigrate out of Jerusalem’sjurisdiction.’ M. Klein, The 
Jerusalem Question in the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations -  Arab Stands (Jerusalem: the Jerusalem 
Institute for Israel Studies, 1995), pp. 35-40 & 86. (In Hebrew). The citation is from p. 36. For an example 
of such a policy, see G. Myre, ‘Israeli Barrier in Jerusalem Will Cut Off 55,000 Arabs’, in The New York 
Times, July 11,2005.
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of the foreigners, often accusing them for, e.g., 'taking our jobs'.20 The presence of 
foreigners, though, may be tolerated by nationalists if and only if the demographic and/or 
power relations between conationals and foreigners are clearly in favour of the former and 
there is no foreseeable risk of any significant influence (let alone domination) of the latter 
on the national institutions.
As G. Smith has shown, although in both post-Soviet Latvia and Estonia Russian 
descendants were ‘categorized as social and political agents of sovietization’ and seen as 
‘a sociocultural threat, as illegal migrants, and as politically disloyal,’ it was easier on 
Estonian nationalists to reach a compromise on the (still restrictive and exclusionary) 
citizenship laws because they felt more secure against their Russian population than Latvian 
nationalists did. Thus, ‘the greater willingness of Estonia’s political factions to reach a 
compromise on the citizenship question, undoubtedly made easier than in Latvia by 
Estonians feeling more comfortable about the greater security of their ethno-demographic
20For the very same reasons some nationalists may even support the “imports” of foreigners, although 
they generally oppose any kind of foreign immigration. The most comm c h i  incentive in “importing” 
foreigners is, of course, economic: the interest in cheap labour. Few nationalists, though, may even agree 
to grant political asylum to foreigners, although that will normally follow political interests rather than 
moral considerations. As many noted, granting asylum to refugees from the east bloc during the cold war 
was conceived as a political triumph, and it was that victory which drove their acceptance. Furthermore, 
granting such an asylum was always determined in accordance with the seekers’ ethnicity, especially the 
colour of their skin. For a deep scrutiny of the issue of restricted immigration and asylum giving in Britain, 
see S. Rushdie, ‘The New Empire within Britain’, in his Imaginary Homelands (Harmondsworth: Granta, 
1991), pp. 129-138. For an ethical examination of immigration, see B. Barry & R. E. Goodin (eds.), Free 
Movement (New York: Harvester Wheatsheafj 1992).
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ratio.’21
As just suggested, wherever foreigners are allowed to stay in the national homeland, they 
are expected to live under the domination of the relevant (and sovereign) nation and the rule 
o f its state. That, of course, means that the foreigners will always be regarded and treated 
by the national institutions as second class citizens, or, even worse, subjects.22 In cases 
where the political discourse (and system) is particularly exclusive and limited to a very 
narrow stratum of'national interpreters and educators', and individual liberties are restricted 
in the first place, foreigners are normally further marginalised, delegitimised (even 
dehumanised) and discriminated against in additional ways: residential segregation and 
restrictions of movement, legal limitations on worship and language usage, poor or 
unavailable housing, education and healthcare, inaccessibility to jobs and material resources, 
and discriminatoiy treatment by the police and the courts -  are all characteristic of the 
nationalist attitude towards the 'others'. Naturally, this discrimination on the institutional 
level (what Richmond calls 'macro racism1) makes the foreigner more vulnerable to assaults 
on the part of individual conationals ('micro racism'): the 'others', as Kureishi puts it, are 
seen as 'worthy of abuse and violence'.
21G. Smith, ‘The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia’, in 
Nationalities Papers 24/2 (1996), p. 204.
22In Israel, for example, even Palestinians and Lebanese people who collaborated with the Israeli 
occupying forces in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Lebanon were often denied shelter in Israel. Those who 
were let in, though, were hardly accommodated and always denied citizenship altogether or maltreated, e.g., 
by being forced to live in (usually hostile) Palestinian communities within Israel.
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In cases where the political discourse is less restricted (i.e., v4^n it is limited by the national 
tradition, yet enables the existence of a plurality of voices within it which may even compete 
in elections), foreigners are usually excluded from this discourse,23 e.g., by depriving them 
of the legal status o f citizenship altogether (as Russia did with some minorities within its 
area), or by practically preventing them from voting, let alone being elected (as was the 
case with the black population in the southern states of the US).24
Another way of excluding the foreigners is to allow them to take part in the public discourse 
and even in national elections and institutions, but to prevent them of having an equal voice 
in them, or, as Y. Peled puts it: to deny them the status of republican citizenship, i.e.,the 
right to take part in deciding the national common good (as Israel does in regard to its 
Palestinian citizens).25 This can be done by, e.g., delegitimising (even outlawing) any 
challenge on the national character and “ownership” of the state, i.e., by limiting some 
liberties and rights (e.g., freedom of speech and association) of the foreigners. Thus, Basic 
Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9) of 1985 reads as follows:
23For a relevant discussion, see P. Panayi, 'Methods of Minority Exclusion in the Liberal Nation State', 
a paper given at the conference Nationalism and Racism in the Liberal Order (Usti nad Labem, the Czech 
Republic, July, 1997).
24In practical prevention I mean to include different devices by which a specific population is excluded 
from any involvement in the collective decision-making, even if there is no legal obstacle. Thus, for 
example, black Americans in the southern states could legally vote after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but 
many of them were (often physically) not allowed to register to vote or were compelled to pass literacy tests 
which were premeditated so as to foil them and thwart their legal right to vote.
25See Y. Peled, 'Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens and the 
Jewish State', in American Political Science Review 86/1 (1992), pp. 432-443.
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‘Prevention of participation of candidates' list
7 A. A candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its objects or 
actions, expressly or by implication, include one of the following:
(1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people;
(2) negation of the democratic character of the State;
(3) incitement to racism.’26
However, when foreigners are allowed to participate in the political discourse and happen 
to succeed the domination of the nation, then it is most likely that nationalists will try to 
restore the national control and may even resort to violence, as happened for instance in Fiji 
in 1987, when 'an election was won by a party which predominantly represented the 
descendants of the Indians originally imported as indentured laborers who stayed on (and 
some who came independently). Then the government was promptly overthrown by the 
army, overwhelmingly staffed by native Fijians.'27 It is important to note, though, that the
26I find it very hard to see how the first section can become compatible with sections (2) and (3). 
Moreover, as already noted in regard to the Moledet party, the Knesset is not exactly clear of racist lists. 
In all fairness, though, the Israeli High Court has continuously permitted the participation in elections to 
the Knesset of parties that explicitly negate ‘the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people.’ The very existence of section (1), though, entails a formal restriction on gentile’s rights in Israel. 
Taken as a whole, the Amendment reminds me of that restaur anteur who insisted that no Jews and racists 
be let in to his business. It is rather clear why he himself should not enter.
27Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, p. 43. For a relevant discussion, see 
R. R. Premdas, ‘Balance and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji’, in The Politics o f Ethnic Conflict Regulation, eds. 
J. McGarry & B. O’Leary (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 251-274.
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institutional exclusion of foreigners is often accompanied with discrimination and 
prosecution which are typically associated with the more exclusive and restricting political 
regimes. Thus, the main critique of Amnesty International Report 1997 of the states that 
are commonly called 'liberal democracies' refers to their ill-treatment of foreigners and 
asylum seekers.28
It seems that the most common form of exclusion and marginalisation of foreigners is after 
all carried out by means of residential segregation and poor access to different services and 
resources. As Fredrickson noted, the bad socioeconomic lot ofblacks in the northern states 
of the US that led to the bloody riot in Watts district in Los Angeles (1965) was not purely 
an unintended by-product of rampant capitalism, market failures or running rife economic 
competition:
...the end of legal segregation and racially discriminatory voting restrictions in the southern 
states did not address the main problems of poor, urban blacks, who suffered less from a 
denial of their civil rights than from unemployment, inadequate housing, and limited 
educational opportunities. Fully enfranchised, they often did not bother to vote because none 
of the parties or candidates addressed their problems. The residential segregation they 
suffered from was sustained by a bewildering complex of laws, regulations, and institutional 
practices that were ostensibly impartial or color-blind but had the effect of disadvantaging
28See ‘Refugees: Human rights have no borders’, in Amnesty International Report 1997 (London: 
Amnesty International Publications, 1997), esp. pp. 4-15. See also the sections on Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK in this repot.
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blacks more than whites.29
On the whole, all forms of exclusion and marginalisation that were depicted so far boil 
down to one policy commonly employed by nationalists, though in different extents: 
unequal treatment in accordance with the nationalist division of the state’s residents 
(citizens or otherwise) into first- and second-class denizens. One may argue, though, that 
the very existence of public discourse and elections, in which foreigners are also eligible to 
participate, signifies that the political system or state in question is necessarily democratic, 
especially if the results in the elections are based on the principle of majority rule. But As 
J. McGarry and B. O’Leary argue, ‘Democracy in its most primitive meaning is understood 
as ‘majority rule’.’ But, they add, “ majority rule’ can become an instrument of hegemonic 
control,’ which they identify as ‘ethnic domination.’30 In the upcoming chapters I shall argue 
that such ethnic domination (just like any other form of hegemonic control) does not simply 
point to a democracy of low quality, as S. Smooha argues,31 but to something which is not 
democratic at all because it contradicts the most basic democratic requirements.
29Fredricksan, Black Liberation, p. 291. As Malcolm X once asked, what use is there in having the 
right to sit at the same restaurant with the whiteman if the blackman has no money to actual ise that right? 
C£ Australian socioeconomic marginalisation of Aboriginals, in S. Castles, B. Cope, M. Kalantzis & M. 
Morrissey, ‘Australia: Multi-Ethnic Community Without Nationalism?’, in Hutchinson & Smith, Ethnicity, 
esp. p. 364.
30 J. McGarry & B. O’Leary, ‘Eliminating and Managing Ethnic Differences’, in Hutchinson & Smith, 
Ethnicity, pp. 339-340.
31S. Smooha, ‘The State of Israel's Regime: A Civil Democracy, a Non-Democracy, or an Ethnic 
Democracy?’, in Israeli Sociology 2/2 (2000), see esp. pp. 567-568 (in Hebrew).
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6.3 THE MISODEMOS
Another distinction that nationalists commonly make, which is also connected to the 
division of the population into first- and second-class citizens, is between devoted 
conationals, i.e., those who are committed to the national tradition and its limited discourse, 
and those who violate this discourse and try to transcend it (the ‘misodemos’, to use 
Polycrates’s term in his accusation of Socrates). The latter, then, are also excluded from the 
public discourse or at least do not enjoy an equal voice in it, and are often accused as 
traitors who betray the national will or as 'patricides' who violate the ancestral bond and 
should therefore be amended by the nationalist movement or state.32 Thus, for instance, 
individuals who were regarded as authentic Americans (basically, WASPs) in the 1950's but 
were suspected of leftist activity, had to confront the Un-American Activities Committee. 
As the name of the committee suggests, to be an authentic American, as it were, but to act 
in contrast to the American authentic way of life, entails a loss of one's real Americanism 
and therefore requires one's exclusion from the political discourse as well as the exercise 
of other retributive means, e.g., discrimination in the job market or even imprisonment.33
In many cases, then, national “apostates” (similar to foreigners) are persecuted and
32See Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 201.
33On the persecution of homosexuals as another unauthentic American group (commonly called the 
‘pervert peril’) during the McCarthy era, see C. J. Cohen, ‘Straight Gay Politics: The Limits of an Ethnic 
Model of Inclusion’, in Shapiro & Kymlicka, NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Grotq? Rights, pp. 585-586.
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discriminated against in other ways than mere exclusion from the public discourse, and are 
often imprisoned, deported, executed or physically attacked (as normally happened, for 
instance, in Spain under Franco and in Chile under Pinochet’s rule). Very often such 
“apostates” are not only accused of adopting alien ideas, cultures or ideologies but also of 
being associated (not always wrongly) with the foreigners themselves and their own (just 
or unjust, real or imaginary) aspirations and interests. Such accusations, particularly the 
second one which presents the “apostates” as a fifth column or collaborators with the 
enemy, is normally used to delegitimise those “apostates” and their ideas, and to justify their 
persecution. Thus, for example, during the witch hunts of the McCarthy era whites who 
fought against racism and for racial equality were often identified as communists who not 
only, by definition, subvert the American way of life but also cooperate with and fight for 
the ‘black foes’. So, although the (predominantly white) Committee on Racial Equality 
(CORE) ‘was staunchly non-Communist, its members were often accused of being “reds” 
by people who shared the common belief that only Communists believed in racial 
equality.’34
As we saw, nationalists tend to limit the foreigners and (at the very least) some of their 
rights and liberties, often by legal or regulatory restrictions on their freedom of association, 
speech or participation in decision-making procedures (where those are permitted in the
34Fredrickson, Black Liberation, p. 236.
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first place). Those restrictions, as said, are not reflected solely in the exclusion of foreigners 
as such but also in the imposition of the national tradition as the only criterion that sets the 
boundaries of any legitimate deliberation. Accordingly, laws and regulations that prevent 
foreigners from challenging the national tradition or the national character and “ownership” 
of the state, equally apply to conationals who oppose them. Consider for example 
Amendment No. 9 of Basic Law: The Knesset that I mentioned earlier. I stressed that 
section (1) of that amendment entails a formal restriction on gentiles’ (especially 
Palestinians’) rights in Israel. But this is also true of ethnic Jews who oppose the nationalist 
creed of Zionism and the corresponding state and policies. Obviously, those (unfortunately 
scarce) Jews are limited and discriminated against almost like those that Israel considers as 
foreigners.
Nationalists, to use Barry's words, impose ‘a “collective goal” held by “political society” 
on those who repudiate that goal and therefore (despite being members of the ethnic nation) 
do not belong to a society defined by its adherence to it.’35 This feet about nationalism is 
another illustration of its authoritarian character, as Greenfeld calls it. The interpreters of 
the national will, so called, define the national markers, set the boundaries of the national 
tradition and discourse, and determine what is the national collective goal. Consequently, 
they exclude the ones they see as foreigners and traitors, and thus advance their own
35Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, p. 48.
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interests which are presented as if they were the national collective interests:
...an ethnic nation is a (mythical) extended family... [and] an appeal to the “interests o f the 
family” against claims by individual members of it may very well be a cover for the pursuit 
of the interests and objectives o f the one who decides the agenda...[TJhe “interests o f the 
nation” normally goes along with the suggestion that it is at best irrelevant and at worst 
disloyal to divide the nation by making demands on behalf o f one socioeconomic group 
against another.36
Marx, for whom the dominant group that decides the agenda is always the dominant class, 
has also understood that any attempt to enforce a sort o f common interest or good actually 
reflects a veiy particularist interest or conception of the good: 'throughout history the 
'general interest' is created by individuals who are defined as 'private persons'...[T]he so- 
called 'general' is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest...'37
In my view, the nationalist guiding principle that is reflected in Barry’s and Marx’s 
criticisms is one of divide and rule: those nationalists who ‘impose a collective goal’ and 
‘decide the agenda’ not only exclude foreigners but also use them as a scapegoat -  they
36IbicL, p. 50.
37Marx, The German Ideology, in MSW, p. 183.
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overstate38 (at times even invent) an image of those non-nationals as an external enemy or 
risk, hence try to unite the nation under their own rule, to minimise the “apostates”, and to 
marginalise their remnants by, e.g., identifying them as sympathisers o f that external risk. 
That way, nationalists may promote their own sectorial (economic, class or other) interests 
and objectives. As historical records show, this strategy much too often proved successful. 
In Australia, for example, racism and the exclusion o f the Aboriginals was used to draw 
‘people together through effective links which transcend conflicting socio-economic 
interests;’39 and as W. E. B. du Bois noted in his discussion of the division and lack of 
cooperation between white and black workers, ‘the white group of labourers, while they 
received a low wage, were compensated for by a sort o f public and psychological wage,’ 
that is, a feeling of membership in the ruling nation.40
The said insight may also answer a question that might have been raised following my 
quotation of Barry, who indicates that conationals who repudiate a ‘collective goal’ that 
nationalists impose through ‘political society’ (i.e., the state) do not belong to that society 
despite being members of the ethnic nation. If that is true, and I think it is, then it seems that
3eIn ‘overstate* I refer to cases where there is a real conflict (even armed) between the nation or the 
nation-state and another group/s or nation state/s but in which the nationalist masters try to manipulate the 
situation and present it as if it were graver or even insoluble.
39Castles et al., ‘Australia: Multi-Ethnic Community Without Nationalism?’, pp. 363-364.
40Du Bois, quoted in A. Callinicos, Race and Class (London, Chicago & Sydney: Bookmarks, 1998), 
p. 36.
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nationalism not only fails in solving identity crises but actually creates them because it may 
easily lead to social contradictions between the national demands and other affinities or 
expectations.
According to Callinicos, racism (and equally nationalism) offers ‘workers the comfort of 
believing themselves part of the dominant group, ’ and gives them a particular identity which 
unites them with “their” capitalists -  ‘we have here, then, a case of the kind o f ‘imagined 
community’ discussed by Benedict Anderson...[I]n particular, ‘regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep 
horizontal comradeship’.’41 Callinicos, then, asserts that conational workers may accept 
their subjugation in order to feel part of the dominant nation and in order to achieve an 
identity that would ‘provide them an imaginary solution of real contradictions' a solution 
which is, in being imaginary, ‘a false one.’42 Applying this explanation to Barry’s point, it 
would seem that workers may (though they also may not) repudiate a collective goal 
imposed on them by nationalist entrepreneurs or boundary-keepers, but in being identified 
as part of the dominant (ethnic) nation they will repress this repudiation of theirs (in 
Kuran’s words, they will brainwash themselves, thereby bringing their private preference 
in line with the dominant public preference) so as to cling to their belonging to that
41Ibid., p. 38. See Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 1,
42Ibid., ibid (italic mine).
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dominant nation. That way, workers may overcome the real contradictions between their 
factual exclusion from ‘deciding the agenda’ (their ‘actual inequality and exploitation’, as 
Anderson puts it) and their (false) identification by nationalist entrepreneurs as full and 
equal members in the nation (their ‘deep horizontal comradeship’).
On the whole, I find this explanation quite compelling, but there are however two points 
I would like to revise. First, I think it would be wrong to focus only on workers. In my 
view, we should apply the said argument to subjugated strata and groups as a whole, e.g., 
women, homosexuals and even some sub-ethnies within the encompassing one, i.e., the 
nation. Second, Callinicos seems to conflate two distinct observations which need not come 
together. On the one hand, he argues that workers (or the subjugated groups in general, as 
I put it) may well follow the nationalist creed in order to be part of the dominant nation,
i.e., in order to feel superior in comparison to another (national or racial, as it were) 
group/s. Similar to Rousseau, then, Callinicos asserts here that people ‘let themselves be 
oppressed only insofar as they are carried away by blind ambition; and looking more below 
than above them. Domination becomes dearer to them than independence, and they consent 
to wear chains in order to give them to others in turn.’43 On the other hand, however, 
Callinicos stresses that people ‘consent to wear chains’ in order to feel as full and equal
43See J. J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins o f Inequality (Second Discourse), in Discourse on the 
Origins o f Inequality (Second Discourse), Polemics and Political Economy (Hanover & London: Dartmouth 
College, 1992), p. 63.
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members o f a nation which is not necessarily dominant -  in Berlin’s viewpoint, they prefer 
to be maltreated by conationals rather than being well-treated by aliens so as to achieve a 
sense of belonging.
Callinicos’s two arguments, of course, are logically unrelated and historically not necessarily 
connected. In my view, then, while the first argument may apply to some cases, the second 
one always applies, and to all cases where nationalist dictates of identity and agenda are 
widely accepted. As I argued earlier, though, such an acceptance is not a consequence of 
the ‘longing for status’ or recognition a-la Berlin but of the need for coherence, i.e., the 
incentive to avoid identity crises. Facing identity crises, nationalism will appear very 
attractive and appealing for most people, if no other credible alternative is available. But it 
is also crystal clear that in each and every nation there are some people (even if a minority) 
that do not accept the nationalist credo and, instead, strive to transcend or overthrow it. 
Those people, the “apostates”, then, will surely repudiate the ‘collective goal’ that 
nationalists impose and may well pay the price for.
Thus far, I have concentrated on nationalists’ attitude to those they themselves consider as 
foreigners. But there is also a possibility o f people who see themselves as non-nationals and 
are yet considered as conationals by those nationalists who stake a claim to the land in 
which those people reside. Apparently, in such cases nationalists will employ a policy of 
assimilation (the ‘melting pot’ policy, as it was often called) rather than one of exclusion.
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The basic perception here, however, remains the same as in the case of exclusion, i.e., that 
the individual cannot change his national membership simply by an act of will. As we saw, 
the nationalist understanding of the relations between individuals and their national whole 
fits what Tamir calls ‘the strict discovery model’ according to which one’s national identity 
‘can only be discovered and cannot be a matter of choice.’44 Accordingly, nationalists may 
enforce different groups in the national homeland to assimilate in the relevant nation, while 
insisting that those groups are actually not foreign but part o f the nation in question and that 
they simply have to be guided by the nationalist movement to discover this fact. For the 
nationalist movement itself, of course, this guidance has nothing to do with assimilation 
because it only reflects the teaching of the ‘right determination of the will’ of groups that 
are already taken to be an integral part of the relevant nation. But for the groups that are 
required to accept the nationalist "teaching" (or at least for those who decide their own 
agenda), and may even hold their own nationalisms, this "teaching" reflects an attempt to 
enforce them to assimilate in a foreign group and to adopt alien goals and traditions.
Obviously, then, in many cases people who are expected to assimilate reject the national 
"teaching" and insist on clinging to their own traditions or goals. Facing opposition, those 
who take the assimilating cause may well apply a policy of exclusion to those who repudiate 
that cause, although they will exclude them as internal renegades who deny the ‘right
44Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 20.
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determination of the will’ and not as foreigners. Moreover, since a policy of enforced 
assimilation by definition entails a marginalisation (if not a total erasure) o f identities of 
those who are supposed to assimilate, such a policy is almost always accompanied by 
practices of exclusion. Paraphrasing Barry, nationalists impose a collective identity on those 
who repudiate that identity and therefore (because they are identified by nationalists as 
members of the ethnic nation) do not belong to a society defined by it. This mode of 
enforced assimilation and simultaneous exclusion was employed, for instance, by French 
nationalism towards Corsicans and Bretons, by Castilian Spanish nationalism towards 
Basques and Cata lans, and to some extent by Kalman Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister 
between 1875 and 1890, who employed a policy of Magyarisation amongst the subject 
nationalities.45
4 5For a profound examination of enforced assimilation into Zionism and accompanied marginalisation 
of Mizrahi identities and the corresponding exclusion of Mizrahim in Israel, see Shalom Chetrit, The 
Mizrahi Struggle in Israel, passim.
